

## Reserve Demand, Interest Rate Control, and Quantitative Tightening

David Lopez-Salido, Federal Reserve Board and CEPR

Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Federal Reserve Board and CEPR<sup>1</sup>

First version: November 1, 2021. Current version: September 18, 2023

**Abstract:** We provide a framework for understanding banks' demand for central bank reserves. The main reserve demand drivers are: The spread between market rates and the interest rate on reserves, banks' liquidity needs (implying that reserves generate a convenience yield), and bank balance sheet costs. Given reserve demand, we show how central banks control equilibrium short rates via interest on reserves, securities holdings and lending/borrowing facilities. We estimate reserve demand for the US from 2009M1-2022M10 and use the estimated reserve demand function to (a) guide the setting of interest on reserves, and (b) assess how much quantitative tightening is feasible before interest rate volatility is likely to increase.

---

<sup>1</sup> E-mails: [David.Lopez-Salido@frb.gov](mailto:David.Lopez-Salido@frb.gov), [Annette.Vissing-Jorgensen@frb.gov](mailto:Annette.Vissing-Jorgensen@frb.gov). We thank Trevor Reeve, Jim Clouse, Ed Nelson, Juan Morelli, Ben Bernanke, Jeremy Stein, Viral Acharya, Peter Ireland, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and seminar/conference participants at University of Chicago, University of Maryland, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Norges Bank, Bank of Italy, Bank of Canada, the Dutch Central Bank, OFR, CEPR and NBER for feedback. The views expressed herein are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Reserve System.

## 1. Introduction

A central bank's supply of reserves plays a central role in monetary policy. Prior to the financial crisis, most central banks focused on conventional monetary policy in which they used variation in the supply of reserves to control a chosen short-term interest rate. The supply of reserves was modest and reserves often did not earn interest. Central banks were able to change the short-term rate (in the US, the effective federal funds rate) with small changes in reserve supply via open market operations. This suggests that banks were on a steep part of their reserve demand curve. When the zero lower bound became binding during the financial crisis, many central banks turned to unconventional monetary policy, with forward guidance and quantitative easing (QE) being the most prominent. With QE, reserve supply expanded dramatically, and more central banks started paying interest on reserves. This new setting is sometimes referred to as the ample-reserves regime. In this paper, we focus on the role of reserve demand in the ample-reserves regime. We are interested in two issues.

First, what is the role of reserve demand for interest rate control in the ample-reserves setting? What are the drivers of reserve demand? How elastic is reserve demand to the spread between short-term market rates and the interest rate on reserves? What is the mechanics through which central bank facilities set up to keep market rates in a corridor achieve their objectives (in the US, these facilities are the discount window and the overnight reverse repurchase facility)? Answering these questions should help central banks set reserve supply and the array of interest rates they control to ensure that short-term market rates clear around a desired value.

Second, and closely related, to what extent can QE be unwound via quantitative tightening (QT)? Because central banks fund their bond purchases by creating short-term liquid liabilities (mainly reserves), balance sheet reduction comes with a reduction in central bank-provided liquidity. The lower the supply of central bank liquidity, the higher the risk of spikes to funding costs in short-term money markets as those who hold liquid central bank assets may hold on to them to have liquidity available when needed, rather than lending them out to others in needed of funding. Quantitative tightening may thus lead to a loss of control over interest rates and to financial instability. This part of our analysis is motivated by the U.S. experience in 2019. This QT episode ended in September 2019 when short-term money market rates spiked sharply, as illustrated in Figure 1.<sup>2</sup> In light of this experience, the risk of an abrupt end to the ongoing balance sheet

---

<sup>2</sup> Work on the September 2019 yield spikes include Anbil, Anderson and Senyuz (2020), Correa, Du and Liao (2021), Afonso, Cipriani, Copeland, Kovner, La Spada and Martin (2020), and Copeland, Duffie and Yang (2021).

reduction of the Federal Reserve is a concern among many market participants, as documented in, e.g., Wall Street Journal (2022).

We start by deriving banks' demand for reserves from a bank optimization problem with three main ingredients. First, reserves pay interest. Second, we model transaction cost savings from reserves as a convenience yield on reserves which is increasing in reserves and decreasing in deposits. This approach has parallels to that of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) who model the safety and liquidity features of Treasury securities using a convenience yield function that is increasing in Treasuries and decreasing in GDP. In the reserve context, the transaction cost savings from holding reserves stem from banks' need to manage the liquid liabilities they have issued. Deposits are the main such liability, but other liquid claims could matter too. Reserves can be used to manage deposits outflows with few costs, unlike less liquid bank assets such as loans or securities. Third, we assume a bank balance sheet cost which is linear in bank assets. We derive banks' reserve demand from the banks' first-order condition for borrowing in the federal funds market and investing in reserves. This first-order condition states that the effective federal funds rate (EFFR) equals the interest rate on reserves (IOR) plus the marginal convenience yield from additional reserves, minus the per-dollar balance sheet cost, thus laying out three drivers of reserve demand. If banks view additional reserves as less and less useful for the management of their net deposit flows, a downward sloping reserve demand results, with reserve demand declining in the market interest rate on alternatives to reserves (such as the EFFR).

We emphasize that the reserve demand curve can be defined relative to any liability used to fund reserves. To model repo borrowing, we introduce a cost of posting collateral in repo contracts (in practice representing foregone securities lending revenues) and derive the reserve demand relative to repos from the banks first order condition for borrowing via repo to fund reserves. The EFFR and repo interest rates are those of most direct interest to the Federal Reserve because it targets the EFFR rate and because the interest rate in the repo market determines take-up at the overnight reverse repo facility and the discount window (both of which are collateralized). While our reserve demand framework is laid out in the institutional context of the United States, it should be straightforward to extend it to other countries with appropriate modifications to interest rate labels.

We next turn to how a central bank controls the equilibrium interest rates given the reserve demand function. We develop a graphical framework for this purpose. The Federal Reserve controls the equilibrium short-term interest rate via the setting of the IOR, the size of its securities holdings, as well as facilities in place to put a ceiling and a floor on the market-clearing interest rate. These facilities are the discount window (at which banks can borrow reserves from the Federal Reserve against collateral) and the overnight reverse repurchase (ONRRP) facility (at which banks, government-sponsored enterprise and money market funds

can invest with the Federal Reserve, receiving collateral). We show how these facilities for lending to banks and borrowing from non-banks lead to flat parts of the reserve supply curve. In equilibrium, the private sector's decisions to borrow/lend at these facilities changes reserve supply to ensure that the market interest rate remains between the floor and ceiling rates (aside from any slippage due to stigma of banks from borrowing at the discount window or due to it taking time for the private sector to react to interest rate incentives).

We compare our framework to prior work, summarized in Ihrig, Senyuz and Weinbach (2020), emphasizing two novelties. First, our reserve demand curve is not directly affected by the floor and ceiling rates. Instead, reserve supply adjusts via private sector take-up decisions to ensure that the market rate clears in the interest rate corridor. Our framework therefore allows us to speak to drivers of take-up at the ONRRP facility which recently has been over \$2T. We show graphically how ONRRP take-up can result from increased reserve supply (specifically, the Fed's securities holdings net of the autonomous factors), from a downward shift to the reserve demand function, or from an increase in the interest rate on the ONRRP facility (for given IOR). Second, our framework emphasizes the role of deposits (and other liquid bank liabilities) in determining the location of the demand curve. Effectively, deposits are a scale variable in the demand function that, in interest rate-quantity space, constitute a demand curve shifter. Although recent work on reserve demand has not focused on the role of deposits, banks' use of reserves to manage deposit flows is at the center of the literature on reserve demand from the period before the ample-reserves regime (see Judson and Klee (2009)). In this earlier regime, reserve demand was driven by reserve requirements and by banks' demand for holding reserves above the regulatory minimum. Banks' need for required reserves followed directly from the amount of money they created in the form of deposits (with reserve requirements set as a percentage of transactions deposits, see [Archived Reserve Maintenance Manual](#)). Banks could choose to hold reserves above the regulatory minimum to facilitate transactions while avoiding overdrafts with the Federal Reserve. During the scarce reserve-zero IOR regime, the Federal Reserve carefully modeled the demand for excess reserves and adjusted reserve supply daily to ensure that the federal funds rate traded near the federal funds rate target. By contrast, during the current ample reserve-positive IOR regime, the Federal Reserve does not adjust the size of its balance sheet in response to reserve demand shocks (except when the interest rate ceiling is binding), instead using the size of its balance sheet to affect employment and inflation.

Having laid out a framework for reserve demand and interest rate control, the second half of the paper turns to empirical estimation of reserve demand and its implications for current monetary policy. We assume that the marginal convenience yield on reserves is linear in log reserves and in log deposits. The banks' first-order condition for borrowing via federal funds and investing in reserves then implies a reserve demand

function which links the EFFR-IOR spread to log reserves and log deposits. We estimate this reserve demand function using instrumental variable estimation. Reserves are not exogenous because reserve supply changes in response to reserve demand shocks when ONRRP take-up is not zero (as will be clear from our graphical framework for interest rate control). We instrument log reserves by the log of reserves+ONRRP take-up. From the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, reserves+ONRRP equals securities minus autonomous factors (liabilities other than reserves and ONRRP) plus Fed lending to banks. Fed lending to banks is small over our sample. We argue that securities minus autonomous factors, and thus reserves+ONRRP, is plausibly exogenous once deposits are included in our regression as a control variable. In our baseline estimation, we do not instrument for deposits, but we show as a robustness check that instrumenting for deposits has little effect on results. Our baseline estimation implies that reserve demand has a semi-elasticity around -5 with respect to the EFFR-IOR spread -- thus suggesting a very elastic but not flat reserve demand -- and an elasticity above one with respect to deposits. The reduced form of our reserve demand estimation links the EFFR-IOR spread to the log of reserves+ONRRP and log deposits. The fit of this relation is very tight over the estimation period from 2009M1 to 2022M10. We illustrate this by showing that the EFFR-IOR spread has a tight relation to the log of reserves+ONRRP (i.e., Federal Reserve supply of interest-bearing liabilities), adjusted for deposits. This contrasts sharply with the unstable relation between the EFFR-IOR spread and reserves (or reserves+ONRRP) when one does not account shifts in reserves demand due to changes in deposits. Smith and Valcarcel (2021) is an example of recent work on reserve demand that emphasizes reserve demand instability but does not account for deposits.

Using the estimated reserve demand function, we can calculate the predicted EFFR-IOR spread given the Federal Reserve's current quantity of reserves+ONRRP and given current deposits. This guides the setting of the IOR needed to hit a given federal funds target: An IOR set equal to the federal funds target minus the predicted EFFR-IOR spread will result in a predicted federal funds rate equal to the target. Since the predicted EFFR-IOR spread is declining in the supply of reserves+ONRRP, a lower IOR is needed for the market rate to hit the federal funds target for low supply. We denote combinations of the IOR and Reserves+ONRRP that imply a chosen predicted effective federal funds rate as an *iso-federal funds curve*. This terminology was introduced by Bianchi and Bigio (2022) in a theoretical analysis based on a somewhat different framework than ours. We provide the first empirically estimated iso-federal funds curves in the literature.

The estimated reserve demand function can also be used to guide the Federal Reserve's quantitative tightening. There are two possible angles to this.

The angle we explore in the current paper is that the curvature of reserve demand determines how much QT is feasible before interest rate volatility may emerge in response to supply changes. One can think of

this as a financial stability perspective on QT. QT is used as one tool to tighten the stance of monetary policy and banks' demand for reserves is central for the effect of balance sheet reduction on interest rates. Leading up to both the prior balance sheet reduction period in 2018-2019 and the current one (starting in 2022), the Federal Reserve has communicated that QT would be limited by the nature of reserve demand. In the 2017 Addendum to its Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) stated:

*“The Committee currently **anticipates reducing the quantity of reserve balances**, over time, to a level appreciably below that seen in recent years but larger than before the financial crisis; the level will reflect the banking system’s **demand for reserve balances** and the Committee’s decisions about how to implement monetary policy **most efficiently and effectively** in the future.”<sup>3</sup>*

Our reduced form relation can be used to predict what the EFFR-IOR spread would be at various levels of reserve+ONRRP supply, given the current level of deposits. As of October 2022, the supply of reserves+ONRRP was \$5.4T (20.4% of GDP). We show that reducing reserve+ONRRP supply to 7% of GDP (\$1.8T) as was done during the policy normalization period leading up to September 2019 would result in a historically low value of the deposit-adjusted supply of reserves+ONRRP and a predicted EFFR-IOR spread much above that in September 2019. We consider more conservative amounts of reduction in reserves+ONRRP. Reserves+ONRRP supply of 11% of GDP (\$2.8T) would lead to the same (positive) predicted EFFR-IOR spread as in September 2019 and thus may also be risky from a financial stability perspective. A more conservative choice would be a reserves+ONRRP supply of 13.5% of GDP (\$3.5T) which leads to a predicted EFFR-IOR spread of zero. As an alternative approach, we also consider the current level of ONRRP take-up (\$2.2T as of October 2022) as a useful guide to when reduction in reserves+ONRRP may lead to interest rate volatility. Since ONRRP take-up emerges because the Federal Reserve supply of reserves+ONRRP exceeds reserve demand evaluated at a market interest rate equal to the ONRRP rate, the current size of ONRRP take-up reveals how large a reduction in reserves+ONRRP is possible, without lifting the market repo rate above the ONRRP rate floor. Both approaches imply that reserve+ONRRP reduction of around \$2T as of October 2022 are possible before interest volatility is likely to emerge. This translates into a smaller amount of reduction in the Federal Reserve's securities holdings. Reserves+ONRRP equals Federal Reserve securities minus “autonomous factors” (when loans to banks are small). Concerns about interest rate volatility suggest running down securities only to the point that volatility in the autonomous factors will not drive reserves+ONRRP below the value assessed to be feasible

---

<sup>3</sup> [Policy Normalization Principles and Plans \(federalreserve.gov\)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/policy/normalization/principles-and-plans). Similarly, the latest “[Principles for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet](https://www.federalreserve.gov/policy/normalization/principles-for-reducing-the-size-of-the-federal-reserve-balance-sheet)” released on 1/26/2022 states that “Over time, the Committee intends to maintain securities holdings in amounts needed to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively in its ample reserves regime.”

before interest rate volatility may occur. We caution that there several complicating factors that are difficult to quantify but both suggest that more QT may be possible before interest rate volatility emerges than our estimate. First, as the Federal Reserve runs down its balances sheet, someone has to step in to hold more bonds. This may reduce deposits (and thus reserve demand, thereby increasing feasible QT) if households buy more bonds directly, transfer deposits to bond funds, or move deposits to money market funds who in turn fund hedge fund bond purchases via repo lending. Second, in July 2021 the Federal Reserve introduced a Standing Repo Facility (SRF) at which dealers and depository institutions can borrow funds from the Federal Reserve via repo borrowing. The SRF provides liquidity when needed and thus may help reduce the risk of yield spikes for a given level of reserves+ONRRP. Again, this would imply that more QT is feasible than in our estimate.

In follow-on work, Vissing-Jorgensen (2023) analyzes QT from a different angle focusing on how large a central bank balance sheet is optimal from the perspective of supplying of liquid and safe assets. Reserves are perhaps the ultimate liquid and safe asset, and a central bank may want to supply reserves until their convenience yield reaches zero. However, whether this is optimal from a convenience supply perspective depends on how the central bank supplies reserves. If it supplies them by purchasing assets that themselves are safe and liquid (e.g., US Treasuries or German Bunds), then this reduces the supply of convenient assets available for the private sector to hold. The central bank's convenience-maximizing reserve supply equalizes the convenience yield on reserves (net of any balance costs associated with banks funding reserves) and the convenience yield on bonds. The reserve demand function again plays a central role for calculating desirable QT from a convenience-maximization perspective, just like it does when thinking about QT from an interest rate volatility perspective.

In sum, we make four contributions in this paper: First, we develop a simple framework for understanding reserve demand. Second, we show how the Federal Reserve controls the equilibrium market interest rate via the interest rate on reserves, the supply of reserves, as well as facilities in place to put a ceiling and a floor on the market-clearing interest rate. Third, we estimate the reserve demand function for the US over the ample reserves period since 2009, finding a stable relation once the growth in deposits is accounted for. Fourth, we use the estimated reserve demand function (given current levels of deposits as of October 2022) to estimate iso-federal funds curves and the amount of QT that is feasible before interest rate volatility may emerge.

## 2. Deriving reserve demand from banks' optimization

This section lays out our framework for understanding reserve demand. We derive reserve demand from banks' optimization in a setting with interest on reserves, a convenience yield from reserves and balance sheet costs. We provide a micro foundation for the convenience yield in Appendix 1.

As background for laying out the framework, Table 1 shows the Federal Reserve balance sheet as of October 26, 2022. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the Federal Reserve balance sheet over time, illustrating both the total size and the five liability components. The Federal Reserve's main assets are Treasuries and MBS securities. On the liability side, the largest categories are reserves (banks' deposits with the Federal Reserve), overnight reverse repurchase agreements (repo investments with the Federal Reserve, mainly by money market funds), currency, and the Treasury General Account (the Treasury's deposit account with the Federal Reserve).<sup>4</sup>

To derive banks' reserve demand curve explicitly from bank optimization, consider a typical banking sector balance sheet.

<i>Assets</i>	<i>Liabilities</i>
Reserves	Deposits
Securities	Federal funds
Loans	Repo
	Equity

Reserves earn interest. In addition, they lead to transactions cost savings as liability outflows can be managed with reserve reductions rather than sales of less liquid securities or loans. We model these transactions cost savings as a convenience yield on reserves, i.e., a benefit of holding reserves above and beyond earning the IOR. Our assumed convenience yield function is  $v(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits})$  with  $v'_R() > 0$  (as more reserves lead to increased cost savings and  $v'_D() < 0$  (as more deposits increase costs of liquidity management)). This convenience yield function is conceptually similar to that for Treasuries in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). They model the convenience yield on Treasuries using a function  $v(\text{Treasuries}/\text{GDP})$ . Here we allow for the two inputs to enter separately. We assume (and confirm empirically), that  $v''_R() < 0$  (as reserves are less and less useful for given deposits) and  $v''_{R,D}() > 0$  (as additional deposits increase the marginal value of reserves). Appendix 1 provides micro foundations for the  $v()$  function, showing how it captures saved transactions costs from managing deposit flows with reserves. Assume furthermore that banks face a balance sheet cost of  $\phi$  per dollar of assets, capturing the effect of

---

<sup>4</sup> The "other" category on the asset side includes bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve at the discount window or via other facilities. None of our results are sensitive to subtracting discount window borrowing from reserves. Conceptually, it is most appropriate to *not* subtract discount window borrowing, as it is a channel through which reserves are increased as will be laid out below.



regulatory requirements. We are particularly interested in the spread of the effective federal funds rate relative to IOR and repo relative to IOR. We use a function  $w(\text{Repo})$  to denote the costs of posting collateral in repo contracts, with  $w' > 0$ .

Profits to equity holders in a given period are then:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi = & IOR * Reserves + r(\text{Securities}) * Securities + r(\text{Loans}) * Loans \\ & - [r(\text{Deposits}) * Deposits + r(\text{FF}) * \text{FF} + r(\text{Repo}) * \text{Repo}] \\ & + v(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) - \phi * (\text{Reserves} + \text{Securities} + \text{Loans}) - w(\text{Repo}) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where  $r()$  denotes a return. We use this setup to derive the first-order conditions for bank borrowing via each of the short-term liabilities and investing in reserves. We assume there is no risk involved in federal funds borrowing/lending.

The banks' first-order condition for borrowing in the federal funds market and investing in reserves sets the marginal cost of borrowing via federal funds,  $r(\text{FF})$ , equal to the marginal benefit of investing in reserves,  $IOR + v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) - \phi$ , and thus implies

$$r(\text{FF}) = IOR + v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) - \phi \quad (2)$$

Similarly, the banks first-order condition for borrowing via repo and investing in reserves sets the marginal cost of borrowing via repo,  $r(\text{Repo}) + w'(\text{Repo})$ , equal to the marginal benefit of investing in reserves,  $IOR + v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) - \phi$  and therefore implies

$$r(\text{Repo}) = IOR + v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) - \phi - w'(\text{Repo}) \quad (3)$$

Adding assumptions about the cost of raising deposit funding one could also derive a first-order condition for borrowing via deposits and investing in reserves. We omit it here as it is of less interest for our purposes. Adding an assumed functional form for  $v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits})$ , we obtain a version of (2), which we will estimate empirically below.<sup>5</sup>

**Result 1.** If

$$v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = d + b * \ln(\text{Reserves}) + c * \ln(\text{Deposits}) \quad (4)$$

then banks' first order condition for borrowing via federal funds and investing in reserves is

$$r(\text{FF}) - IOR = a + b * \ln(\text{Reserves}) + c * \ln(\text{Deposits}) + u \quad (5)$$

---

<sup>5</sup> We focus our estimation on (2) rather than (3) due to not having a good instrument for repo borrowing inside the  $w'()$  function. More on instrumenting below.

where  $a = d - \varphi$  and we have added an unobserved reserve demand shock  $u$ . If additional reserves are less and less useful for liquidity management purposes (for given deposits), then  $b < 0$ , corresponding to  $v_R''() < 0$ . If additional reserves are more useful when deposits are higher, then  $c > 0$ , corresponding to  $v_{R,D}''() > 0$ .

Expressing reserve demand as a function of reserve demand drivers, (5) corresponds to a reserve demand function of the following form

$$\text{Reserves} = \alpha \text{Deposits}^\beta e^{\gamma * [r(\text{FF}) - r(\text{Reserves})]} \varepsilon \quad (6)$$

where  $\alpha = e^{-a/b}$ ,  $\beta = -c/b$ ,  $\gamma = 1/b$ , and  $\varepsilon = e^{-u/b}$ . Equation (6) shows how reserve demand is a function of the interest rate spread between reserves (which earns the interest rate on reserves, IOR, in practice referred to as IOR) and the market interest rate  $r$  as well as banks' need for liquidity driven by their deposit management.<sup>6</sup> Taking logs in (6),

$$\ln(\text{Reserves}) = \ln(\alpha) + \beta * \ln(\text{Deposits}) + \gamma * [r(\text{FF}) - r(\text{Reserves})] + \ln(\varepsilon) \quad (7)$$

In the money demand literature this would be referred to as a semi-log functional form, meaning that the measure of money (here reserves) enters in logs but the measure of the cost of holding money (here  $r(\text{FF}) - \text{IOR}$ ) enters in levels.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Interest rate control

The central bank affects the market equilibrium interest rate via the setting of the IOR (which affects the vertical position of the demand curve) and via the supply curve of reserves which the central bank determines through its securities holdings and its lending and investment facility rates. In this section, we illustrate the determination of the market equilibrium rate. We show that because the central bank can affect both reserve demand and supply there are many combinations of the IOR and securities holdings which generate the same equilibrium interest rate. This is an old insight going back to at least Goodfriend (2002) which emerges clearly in our framework. In the empirical analysis, we will provide the first empirically estimated “iso-federal funds curves” that illustrate combinations of the IOR and supply that lead to a given predicted federal funds rate. The more novel insight that emerges from our equilibrium analysis is the mechanics of how the central bank's lending facility for banks and its investment facility for non-banks (if

<sup>6</sup> Goodfriend (1982) models reserve demand as a function of deposits (either demand or time) and the level of market interest rates. With interest on reserves, the opportunity cost of reserves is the spread between the market interest rates and the interest rate on reserves.

<sup>7</sup> Lucas (2000) models the demand for M1 (currency plus checkable deposits and traveler's checks). He models  $m = \text{M1}/\text{GDP}$  as a function of a nominal interest rate,  $r$ . In line with the money demand literature, he considers both a semi-log relation,  $m = B e^{-\xi r}$ , and a log-log relation,  $m = A r^{-\eta}$ . We focus on the semi-log functional form since the measure of the cost of liquidity with IOR is (market interest rate - IOR) which can go negative, implying that the log-log relation is not well-defined (as  $\ln(m) = \ln(A) - \eta \ln(r)$  is not well-defined for negative  $r$ ).

a such facility is in place) keep the market clearing interest rate in the range between the rates on the facilities. We show how this emerges in equilibrium via changes to equilibrium supply induced by private sector take-up at the facilities.

#### a. The reserve demand curve

Figure 3, Panel A illustrates the reserve demand curve. It looks like a standard money demand curve for currency consistent with the idea that reserve demand is a form of money demand for banks. The downward slope of both the reserve demand curve and the standard money demand curve is due to a declining convenience yield (liquidity value) of the asset as holdings increase. While money demand depends on households' (and firms') convenience yield from money due the liquid nature of currency, reserve demand depend on banks' convenience yield on reserves due to the liquid nature of reserves. The convenience yield on reserves emerges from banks' need for liquidity to manage flows of liquid short-term liabilities, notably deposits as laid out above.

To be more precise, the reserve demand curve graphed is equation (2),  $r(\text{FF}) = \text{IOR} + v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) - \phi$ . The reserve demand curve traces out the interest rate banks are willing to pay to borrow and invest in reserves, as a function of the amount of reserves held. Consider the role of each of the terms on the right-hand side. Changes to the IOR lead to corresponding vertical shifts in the reserve demand curve as the attractiveness of reserves as a store of value changes. This differs from the money demand curve for currency since the interest rate on currency is always zero. The downward slope of the reserve demand curve is driven by the second term, the convenience yield  $v'_R()$ . The convenience yield declines with reserves, resulting in a downward-sloping reserve demand curve, if banks have a declining marginal value of holding additional reserves for managing a given amount of deposits. Asymptotically, we expect  $v'_R()$  to go to zero for sufficiently high reserve supply. The final determinant of reserve demand in our framework is the bank balance sheet costs. Higher balance sheet costs shift the reserve demand curve down.<sup>8</sup> If the convenience yield from reserves goes to zero as supply increases, the reserve demand curve asymptotes to  $\text{IOR} - \phi$  for large reserve supply, as illustrated in the graph in Figure 3 Panel A.

---

<sup>8</sup> Historically, the main determinant of reserve demand was reserve requirements. However, during the post-GFC period with large reserve supply and interest on reserves, banks hold many more reserves than required. Reserve requirements were set to zero in the US on March 26, 2020 and throughout the post-GFC period required reserves have been very small relative to total reserve supply. Vissing-Jorgensen (2023) shows that using excess reserves results in similar parameter estimates in the reserve demand function over the 2009-2023 period.

## b. The reserve supply curve

Figure 3 Panel B illustrates the reserve supply curve. The left graph is for a central bank that has a lending facility for banks but no investment-facility for non-banks. The right graph is for a central bank that has both these facilities. In all cases studied, the central bank offers banks the ability to hold reserves with the central bank earning an interest rate of IOR.

The central bank balance sheet implies:

$$\text{Securities} + \text{Loans to banks} = \text{Autonomous factors} + \text{Reserves} + (\text{Non-bank investment facility}). \quad (8)$$

This equation states that the central bank funds its asset holdings (the left hand side) with a mix of liabilities consisting of autonomous factors (of which currency and government deposits typically are the main ones), reserves (which is central bank borrowing from banks), and borrowing from non-banks via any non-bank investment facilities with the central bank. Reorganizing the central bank balance sheet, we get

$$\text{Reserves} = \underbrace{[\text{Securities} - \text{Autonomous factors}]}_{\text{Net securities}} + \underbrace{\text{Loans to banks}}_{\substack{\text{Reserves borrowed} \\ \text{from the central bank} \\ \text{by banks}}} - \underbrace{(\text{Non-bank investment facility})}_{\substack{\text{Reserves lent} \\ \text{to the central bank} \\ \text{by non-banks}}}. \quad (9)$$

The amount of securities that is not funded with autonomous factors is the starting point for understanding reserve supply. We introduce the term “net securities” to describe securities minus autonomous factors, with “net” referring to the fact that autonomous factors are subtracted. If there is no take-up at either of the central banks facilities (or if such facilities are simply not in place), then reserves equal net securities.

Most central banks have a lending facility through which they lend reserves to banks against collateral. For example, in the US, the Federal Reserve lends in the discount window at the primary credit rate. With bank borrowing from the central bank, loans to banks are positive and reserves are added. Mechanically, when a bank gets a loan from the central bank, its “checking account” with the central bank – reserves – is increased by the amount borrowed.

To ensure that the market interest rate does not clear “too far” below the IOR (as will be graphed shortly), some central banks have an investment facility for non-banks in which non-bank financial institutions can invest with the central bank. For example, the Federal Reserve’s Overnight Reverse Repo (ONRRP) facility allows non-banks to lend to the Fed overnight via repurchase agreements (repo). A broad set of non-bank financial institutions can invest at the ONRRP facility.<sup>9</sup> If non-banks lend to the central bank via the non-

---

<sup>9</sup> Eligible counterparties include primary dealers, banks, money market mutual funds, and government sponsored enterprises. Since the ONRRP interest rate has always been below the interest rate on reserves, banks in practice will invest in reserves, not ONRRP.

bank investment facility, then reserves are subtracted. Mechanically, think of a money market fund lending funds to the central bank. The money market funds' bank reduces the money market fund's checking account by the amount of the investment and the bank's reserves at the central bank is increased accordingly. The central bank then has a new liability structure, with fewer reserves (borrowing from banks) but more borrowing from non-banks.

Before the introduction of central bank investment facilities for non-banks, net securities were commonly referred to as "non-borrowed reserves", in recognition that a central bank buying a particular amount of net securities paid with that same amount of reserves. With central bank investment facilities for non-banks, a central bank paying for its net securities creates liabilities in the form of reserves and non-bank facility take-up. The term "non-borrowed reserves and non-bank facility take-up" is much too long so we use "net securities". This terminology is also a reminder that non-borrowed central bank liabilities are created from central bank (net) securities purchases.

In Figure 3 Panel B, we draw (part of the) reserve supply as vertical at the amount of net securities. A vertical supply curve as drawn emerges if the central bank does not change its securities holdings net of autonomous factors as a function of the market interest rate. As for the central bank's facilities, the lending facility represents a willingness of the central bank to *increase* reserve supply elastically at a market rate equal to the lending facility rate. The supply curve therefore becomes flat at this rate, as graphed in both graphs in Figure 3 Panel B. If an investment facility for non-banks is in place, then this represents a willingness of the central bank to *reduce* reserve supply elastically at a market rate equal to the non-bank facility rate. In that case, the supply curve has two horizontal parts.

### c. Equilibrium

Figure 4 and 5 illustrate the equilibrium emerging from the intersection of demand and supply. Figure 4 is for the case with no central bank investment facilities for non-banks while Figure 5 is for the case where such a facility is in place.

In Figure 4, we distinguish between an equilibrium with no bank borrowing at the central bank's lending facility (Panel A) and one with such borrowing (Panel B). As shown in Panel A, with no bank borrowing at the lending facility, reserves equal net securities. Because the central bank can move both the demand and supply curves, the same equilibrium market rate  $r$  can be achieved with many combinations of the IOR and net securities. For example, the central bank could set a low IOR, thus facing a low demand curve. It would then hit a given  $r$  with a modest amount of net securities. Alternatively, the central bank could set a higher IOR in which case it would face a higher demand curve and would need a higher amount of net securities to hit a given equilibrium rate  $r$ .

Bank borrowing at the lending facility ensures that the market rate does not exceed the lending facility rate (if there is no stigma attached to borrowing from the facility). If there is sufficient reserve scarcity, there will be take-up (bank borrowing) at the lending facility. Specifically, whether there will be take-up at the lending facility depends on whether the demand curve intersects the supply curve on the vertical or the flat part. It thus depends on three factors: The location of the demand curve, the amount of net securities, and the lending facility interest rate. *If reserve demand evaluated at a market rate equal to the lending facility rate exceeds the amount of net securities, then the lending facility will be used.* As illustrated in Figure 4 Panel B, with bank borrowing at the lending facility, reserves equal net securities plus borrowed reserves and the market interest rate clears at the lending facility rate. Reading the graph vertically, at a reserve supply equal to the net securities, banks are willing to pay an interest rate higher than the lending facility rate to borrow reserves. Banks therefore borrow from the central bank. This increases reserve supply until equilibrium is reached at point A in the graph. If banks react quickly, the market rate  $r$  will never exceed the lending facility for long. If there is a stigma to borrowing at the lending facility,  $r$  can exceed the lending facility rate by the amount of the stigma (in interest rate terms). Comparing Figure 4 Panel A and B, take-up at the lending facility can emerge if the demand curve shifts up/right, if the supply curve shifts left via a decrease in net securities, or if the interest rate on the lending facility is lowered.

In Figure 4 (both Panel A and B), reserves are scarce in equilibrium in the sense that the convenience yield is positive. The market rate  $r$  therefore exceeds the asymptote of  $\text{IOR}-\phi$ . As net securities increases, the market rate goes to  $\text{IOR}-\phi$ . The market rate falls below  $\text{IOR}$  when the supply of liabilities created by the central bank's net securities holding is sufficiently large that  $v'_R(\text{Reserves, Deposits})-\phi$  is negative. Of course, for there to be market activity at a market interest rate below the  $\text{IOR}$ , some investors must not have access to invest in reserves with the central bank. In the US context, money market funds and government-sponsored enterprises do not have access to interest-bearing reserves. Banks may then engage in arbitrage, borrowing from these investors and investing in reserves, but balance sheet costs reduce banks' willingness to compete for funds, resulting in a market-clearing interest rate  $r$  that is below the  $\text{IOR}$  for sufficiently large net securities.

Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium when an investment facility for non-banks is in place. We illustrate both an equilibrium without take-up at the non-bank investment facility (Panel A) and one with such take-up (Panel B). In the top graph, the non-bank investment facility has no effect on the equilibrium interest rate since demand and supply intersect above the non-bank facility interest rate. By contrast, in the bottom graph, the presence of the non-bank investment facility prevents the equilibrium market rate from falling below the non-bank facility rate. From this graph, it is clear that (as for the lending facility) three factors determine whether there will be positive take-up at the investment facility for non-banks: The location of

the demand curve, the amount of net securities, and the non-bank facility interest rate. Specifically, *if reserve demand evaluated at a market rate equal to the non-bank facility rate is below the amount of net securities, then the non-bank investment facility will be used.* The central bank then funds its net securities holdings by a mix of reserves and non-bank facility take-up and the market interest rate clears at the non-bank facility rate. Reading the graph vertically, at a reserve value equal to net securities, banks would only be willing to pay an interest rate below the non-bank facility rate to borrow reserves. Lenders therefore lend to the central bank (at the central banks' investment facility for non-banks) rather than banks, to the point that reserves are equal to the value banks demand at a rate equal to the non-bank facility rate (point A in the graph). If non-banks are quick to change their investments as the market rate falls below the non-bank facility rate, the market rate  $r$  will never fall much below the non-bank facility rate.

Comparing Panel A and Panel B of Figure 5, it is apparent that take-up at the non-bank investment facility can emerge due to change in either of the three factors discussed above. A decrease in reserve demand, an increase in supply via net securities, or an increase in the interest rate on the non-bank facility (for given IOR). A decrease in demand (a downward/leftward shift in the demand curve) could be due to a lower IOR (shifting the demand curve down), a decline in deposits (shifting the demand curve left via a lower convenience yield function  $v'_R()$ ), or an increase in banks' balance sheet costs (shifting the demand curve down). In terms of balance sheet costs, US banks were granted relief from the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) rules from April 1, 2020, to March 31, 2021. During this period, calculations of capital needed under the SLR omitted Treasuries and reserves. The expiration of SLR relief lines up well with the timing of increased ONRRP take-up in the spring of 2021, as illustrated in Figure 2. An increase in supply via net securities could result from central bank balance sheet expansion or a reduction in one of the autonomous factors. As illustrated in Figure 2, in the US, the Treasury General Account fell sharply in 2021, leading to increased net securities. This timing lines up with increasing ONRRP take-up.<sup>10</sup>

In laying out our graphical framework, we have been deliberately vague about which market interest rate  $r$  the framework applies to. When deciding to hold reserves, banks can fund such holdings with a host of liabilities. In that sense, there is not one but many reserve demand functions. The reserve demand function defined relative to a particular liability shows banks' willingness to pay to borrow using that liability and

---

<sup>10</sup> As for the role of the ONRRP rate in understanding the increase in ONRRP take-up in 2021, it was likely modest. The Federal Reserve increased both the ONRRP rate and the IOR on June 17, 2021. This would not directly lead to increased ONRRP take-up as both the reserve demand curve and the ONRRP rate shifts up by the same amount. It could indirectly increase ONRRP take-up by lowering bank deposits via flows to money market funds, as tend to take place in times of higher rates due to banks not increasing deposits rates one-for-one with the Federal Reserve's administered rates. In practice, only a small fraction of the increased ONRRP take-up in 2021 happened around June 17, 2021.

invest in reserves, as a function of the amount of reserves. We illustrate this in Figure 6, with separate reserve demand functions for borrowing via unsecured interbank borrowing (federal funds in the case of the US) and via repo funding. Unsecured interbank borrowing and repo borrowing differ in that collateral must be posted in repo borrowing. There is a cost to having to post collateral, which in practice comes from lost revenue from securities lending and is captured by the  $w()$ -function. The marginal cost of posting collateral shifts down the reserve demand curve defined relative to repo (as it makes banks' less eager to hold reserves funded with repo). From the perspective of monetary policy, both reserve demand curves are important because they determine market interest rates of importance to the central bank. The Federal Reserve targets the equilibrium rate in the federal funds market. The market rate on repo (in practice, the secured overnight financing rate SOFR is a commonly used measure) matters for the Federal Reserve because it is what the Federal Reserve can control directly via the ONRRP facility and the discount window, both of which are collateralized.<sup>11</sup>

To summarize the equilibrium analysis, the central bank controls short market interest rates via its administered rates (the interest rates on reserves, and the rates on the lending facility and the investment facility for non-banks) and the choice of net securities. In terms of the role of the central bank's lending facilities for banks and investment facility for non-banks, the key lesson is that private-sector use of these facilities changes the equilibrium supply of reserves which keeps the market-clearing interest rate in a desired range. This lesson emerges in a straightforward manner in our reserve demand-reserve supply framework and it becomes clear which factors drive take-up at the lending and investment facilities (as discussed).

Relating our approach to prior work, Mishkin (2022) provides an analysis of take-up at the central bank's lending facility which is similar to our Figure 4 Panel B with a flat part of the supply curve at the lending facility rate. We provide foundations for the reserve demand function from banks' optimization problem, add analysis of the non-bank investment facilities, and implement the reserve demand-supply framework empirically to provide input to policy making. Our framework features a "standard" shaped convex reserve demand curve and a supply curve which has one or two flat parts. By contrast, with the exception of Mishkin (2022), it is common to instead graph the demand curve as flattening out at the rates on central bank facilities and the supply curve as being vertical for all interest rates. As an example, we include an exhibit from Ihrig, Senyuz and Weinbach (2020) in Appendix Figure 1. Ihrig et al (2020) assume that the reserve demand curve flattens out horizontally as it approaches the primary credit rate (the rate on the Fed's lending facility for bank) and as it approaches the ONRRP rate. This implies that interest rate control is achieved

---

<sup>11</sup> With this clarification, in Figure 4 and 5, the demand curve should be shifted down by the  $w'()$  function.



partly by these two rates directly controlling the shape of the demand curve. The setup of Ihrig et al (2020) can be thought of as tracing out how the equilibrium interest rate changes with supply, with less attention paid to the mechanics of take-up at the central banks' facilities works in the background to affect the equilibrium. In our framework, reserve demand traces out the interest rate banks are willing to pay to borrow from anyone – the market or the central bank – as a function of reserve holdings. The rate at which the central bank lends therefore does not directly affect reserve demand in our setup. It instead determines how much banks end up borrowing from the central bank in equilibrium. Similarly for the non-bank investment facility rate – it does not directly affect reserve demand but determines how much non-banks lend to the central bank in equilibrium. Take-up at the facilities in turn ensures that reserves changes and thus that the market rate stays in the range between the facility rates. The mechanics of how take-up at the facilities relate to reserve demand, reserve supply and interest rates thus becomes clear in our setup. In addition to the different shapes of demand and supply, a useful feature of our framework is that it clarifies which factors may shift the demand curve. In our empirical results, we will emphasize the importance of controlling for the size of the banking sector (deposits) because higher liquidity needs will shift the convenience yield function  $v'_R()$  and thus the reserve demand curve. Recent work on the ample reserves setting has generally not accounted for deposits as a demand-shifter while the modeling of deposits was standard in the era of binding reserve requirements as these depended on deposits.

#### **4. Reserve demand estimation**

We turn next to estimating the reserve demand function for the US in monthly data for 2009M1-2022M10. We address identification issues, discuss the main input series and the need to control for deposits, and then present our estimated return demand function. We use IV estimation and provide both a structural form and a reduced form reserve demand function.

##### **a. Identification**

Estimation of equation (5) by OLS will lead to consistent parameter estimates if reserve demand shocks (the error term,  $u$ ) are uncorrelated with reserves and with deposits.

Reserves are exogenous if reserve supply does not accommodate reserve demand shocks that are not controlled for in the regression via deposits. From the graphical analysis, it is apparent that shifts in the demand curve along either of the horizontal parts of the supply curve will lead to changes in reserve supply in response to demand shocks. Reserves are thus not exogenous if facility take-up is positive. From the central bank balance sheet

$$\text{Reserves} = \underbrace{[\text{Securities} - \text{Autonomous factors}]}_{\text{Net securities}} + \underbrace{\text{Loans to banks}}_{\substack{\text{Reserves borrowed} \\ \text{from the central bank} \\ \text{by banks}}} - \underbrace{(\text{Non-bank investment facility})}_{\substack{\text{Reserves lent} \\ \text{to the central bank} \\ \text{by non-banks}}}$$

where the last two terms on the right-hand side likely responds to reserve demand shocks. For example, in the US, ONRRP take-up was modest up to March 2021. After this, ONRRP take-up grew and may be correlated with reserve demand shocks as negative reserve demand shocks can drive up ONRRP take-up.

The above equation suggests a possible instrument for reserves, net securities. If the central bank does not change net securities in response to reserve demand shocks, then this component of reserves is exogenous. We will argue that this is plausibly the case. To simplify, notice that if loans to banks are small, then net securities approximately equal Reserves+(Non-bank investment facility), or Reserves+ONRRP in the US context. We therefore use Reserves+ONRRP as our instrument for reserves.<sup>12</sup>

The argument for why movements in net securities are plausibly exogenous to reserve demand shocks is as follows. Our analysis focuses on the US, post-financial crisis. Over this sample, movements in net securities have been driven by rounds of quantitative easing and quantitative tightening. QE/QT has been done to affect employment and inflation rather than for controlling short-term interest rates. Fluctuations in net securities are thus *not* due to the Fed accommodating reserve demand shocks.

To clarify the role of the autonomous factors from an identification perspective, the Federal Reserve generally accommodates trends in autonomous factors by changing the size of its securities holdings. For example, trends in currency demand are accommodated by trends in securities holdings. In the post-GFC era with a large balance sheet, the Federal Reserve generally does not change securities holdings in response to more transitory movements in autonomous factors. Transitory movements in the Treasury General Account (TGA) due to tax payments, government spending, and debt issuance/payments therefore contribute to fluctuations in net securities and thus in reserves. This is unproblematic from the perspective of using net securities as an instrument, as long as TGA fluctuations are not correlated with reserve demand shocks. Assuming no correlation between TGA fluctuations and reserve demand shocks is plausible because we include deposits as a regressor. For example, if a household pays its federal taxes using deposits, this increases the TGA (as the government receives the funds) which lowers net securities on the Fed's balance sheet. However, the tax payment's effect on reserve demand is captured by deposits (reserve demand falls as the household's bank now has fewer deposits to manage). The payment thus does not lead to a non-zero reserve demand shock in the form of a regression residual but is captured by including deposits as a regressor. Similarly, if the government makes a payment to a household or firm, their bank deposits

---

<sup>12</sup> We have verified that using net securities (Reserves+ONRRP-Loans to banks) leads to very similar results.

will increase, with no resulting reserve demand residual.

We conduct our estimation at the monthly frequency using monthly averages of the available data. Estimation in weekly data would also be possible, while daily data are not available for deposits.

We next turn to whether deposits are exogenous. One could think of factors that would drive a correlation between deposits and the error term  $u$  in (5). For example, perhaps deposits are more volatile (on a per dollar basis) when they are larger or smaller, and deposit volatility affects reserve demand. Then deposit volatility would be an omitted variable, causing deposits to be correlated with  $u$ . While this is possible, we think it is unlikely to be a material issue and therefore do not instrument for deposits in our baseline estimation. We then provide a robustness check in which we instrument deposits with household financial assets and the level of the interest rate on reserves to show that this leads to very similar results (we will motivate these instruments for deposits below).

The advantage of not instrumenting for deposits in our baseline specification is that deposit data are available with only a short lag while household financial assets are available (from the Financial Accounts of the United States) only with a lag of several months. A reserve demand estimation that does not rely on instrumenting for deposits can thus be updated in real time. This is an advantage for real-time policy making.

#### **b. The main series and the importance of controlling for deposits**

We use the FRED database data to obtain all the inputs into our reserve demand estimation. Figure 7 provides a time series plot of the Reserves/GDP ratio and the EFR-IOR spread using monthly average data since 2009.<sup>13</sup> The policy-induced variation in Reserves/GDP is apparent with the series increasing around the times of QE1, QE2, QE3, after September 2019 (as the FOMC increased reserves due to reserve scarcity) and with the COVID-related LSAPs. Following the end of the QE rounds, Reserves/GDP falls due to a combination of lower reserves and higher nominal GDP.

The Reserves/GDP ratio has a clear negative relation with the EFR-IOR spread, consistent with the above-described reserve demand framework. However, the relation is unstable in that the EFR-IOR spread is higher in the later part of the sample for a given Reserves/GDP value. In particular, the EFR-IOR spread is substantially above zero in September 2019 for Reserves/GDP around 7%, in contrast to a negative EFR-IOR spread in December 2010, when the Reserves/GDP was also around 7%.

---

<sup>13</sup> We calculate monthly averages from weekly data for reserves and daily data from EFR-IOR. We assume that GDP was the same across months within the quarter.

To further illustrate the reserve demand function instability when not controlling for deposits, Figure 8 provides scatter plots of the EFFR-IOR spread against Reserves (Panel A) and Reserves/GDP (Panel B). We have labeled the data points that precede reserve expansions as well as the final data point of our sample, 2022M10. The reserve demand curve appears flatter when reserves expand than when they contract (though the last year of the sample is an exception to this pattern). We will argue, however, that this fact does not mean that there is something fundamentally different about reserve expansions and reserve contractions. Instead, there is an omitted variable that increases reserves demand over time leading to the observed expansion-contraction pattern. This results in a relation that looks like an unstable Phillips curve. Just like time-varying inflation expectations make the Phillips curve unstable if inflation expectations are not considered, time-varying deposits make the reserve demand curve unstable when deposits are not accounted for, and deposits have been increasing (even relative to GDP) over the period since 2009.

Figure 9 illustrates the increase of deposits as a share of GDP over time. The left graph illustrates deposits held with all commercial banks relative to nominal GDP, showing a sharp increase starting around 2000. Over the period of ample reserves since 2009, Deposits/GDP increase from 50% in 2009M1 to 68% in 2022M10. The right graph shows various types of deposits. The increase in overall deposits is driven by an increase in demand deposits and other liquid deposits (which include savings accounts). As liquid deposits require more reserve backing (for both economic and regulatory reasons) this fact is particularly pertinent to understanding the instability of reserve demand over time when deposits are not considered.<sup>14</sup>

The fact that deposits is a central driver of reserve demand is common across various types of banking. In *narrow banking*, required reserves equal deposits as deposits are backed one-for-one by reserves. In *fractional reserve banking*, required reserves equal a fraction of deposits. In a scarce reserves version of fractional reserve banking, the central bank restricts the supply of reserves to manage bank lending. Our framework is for the more recent setting of *ample reserves banking*, where reserve demand is driven by the liquid and safe nature of reserves as laid out above.

### c. Baseline estimation of the reserve demand function for the US

Table 2, Panel A presents the second stage of our IV estimation of the reserve demand function in equation (5) for the period 2009M1-2022M10, with  $\ln(\text{Reserves})$  instrumented by  $\ln(\text{Reserves}+\text{ONRRP})$ . Table 2, Panel B shows the first stage of the IV estimation. Not surprisingly  $\ln(\text{Reserves}+\text{ONRRP})$  is a strong instrument for  $\ln(\text{Reserves})$ , with a t-statistic above 10 and a first-stage  $R^2$  as high as 0.96. Table 2, Panel

---

<sup>14</sup> For simplicity, we use total deposits in our specification. Results are similar if we omit time deposits and focus on demand and other liquid deposits which account for the majority of deposits over our sample (as documented in Figure 7).

C shows the reduced form of the IV estimation which simply regresses the EFFR-IOR spread directly on the exogenous variables ( $\ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP})$  and  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  in this baseline approach where we assume  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  is exogenous).  $t$ -statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation in the residuals in all panels.

In Table 2, Panel A, the EFFR-IOR spread is estimated to be significantly related to both  $\ln(\text{Reserves})$  and  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  with the expected signs and large  $t$ -statistics ( $p$ -values below 1 percent). In economic terms, a 10% increase in reserves (an increase in supply tracing out a downward sloping demand curve) lowers the EFFR-IOR spread by 2 basis points. Interpreted within our theoretical framework, this suggests that the marginal value of additional reserves  $v'_R$  declines only very slowly with reserves. Another way to state this finding is to calculate the resulting reserve demand semi-elasticity  $\gamma$  in (7). The estimated value of  $b = -0.2$  corresponds to  $\gamma = -5$ , implying that a 10 basis point reduction in the EFFR-IOR spread (making the market rate lower relative to reserves), entices banks to increase reserve holdings by 50 percent. Reserve demand is thus highly elastic with respect to the EFFR-IOR spread. The coefficient on log deposits in Table 2, Panel A, is positive, consistent with the idea that higher deposits increase the marginal value of additional reserves,  $v'_R$ . In terms of (7), the estimation implies that the elasticity of reserve demand with respect to deposits is  $\beta = -\frac{c}{b} = -\frac{-0.358}{0.2} = 1.79$ . A value of  $\beta$  above one means that a one percent increase in deposits leads to more than a one percent increase in reserves and thus that banks invest a higher fraction of deposits in reserves at higher levels of deposits. In our framework,  $\beta > 1$  means that  $c$  exceeds  $b$  and thus that  $v'_R$  is more sensitive (in absolute value) to log deposits than to log reserves (see equation (4)).

The reduced form estimation in Table 2, Panel C, is useful for understanding the empirical fit of our framework, i.e., how much explanatory power  $\ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP})$  and  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  have for the EFFR-IOR spread. We find a regression  $R^2$  of 0.895.<sup>15</sup> Figure 10, Panel A illustrates the tight relation between the EFFR-IOR spread and the predicted value from the regression in Table 2, Panel C. Our estimation also implies that there should be a tight link between the EFFR-IOR spread and a measure of supply ( $\ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP})$ ) adjusted for deposits. The reduced form specification is

$$r(\text{FF}) - r(\text{Reserves}) = A + B * \ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP}) + C * \ln(\text{Deposits}) + U \quad (10)$$

Rewriting (10) as

$$r(\text{FF}) - r(\text{Reserves}) = A + B * \left[ \ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP}) + \frac{C}{B} * \ln(\text{Deposits}) \right] + U \quad (11)$$

<sup>15</sup> To ensure to the high  $R^2$  in Table 2, Panel C, is not simply due to trends in the data, we have also estimated the same relation using 12-month differences. This still results in a high  $R^2$  of 0.72.

shows that “deposit-adjusted supply”  $\ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP}) + \frac{c}{b} * \ln(\text{Deposits})$  should be tightly linked to the EFR-IO spread. We illustrate this relation in Figure 10, Panel B, graphing both the EFR-IO spread data and the fitted value based on deposit-adjusted supply calculated using the parameter estimates from Table 2, Panel C. The relation between the EFR-IO spread and deposit-adjusted supply appears stable over the 2009M1-2022M10 period. Consistent with the usefulness of our framework for understanding the EFR-IO spread, September 2019 has the lowest value for deposit-adjusted supply and the highest value of the EFR-IO spread. The high EFR-IO spread in September 2019 is therefore not surprising once the increasing need for reserves due to higher deposits are accounted for. Given the growth in deposits from 2010 to 2019, a value of Reserves/GDP of 7% was much less accommodative than the same value of Reserves/GDP in 2010.

Figure 10, Panel C repeats Figure 10, Panel B, without taking the log when calculating deposit-adjusted supply. We present this to show that the EFR-IO spread has a convex relation to supply when not taking logs, consistent with our graphical framework in Figure 3 where we implicitly assumed that the marginal value of additional reserves fell at a slower rate at higher reserve levels. The tight relations in Figure 10, Panel B and C, contrasts sharply with the unstable relation between the EFR-IO spread and reserves shown in Figure 8.

#### **d. Recovering the structural reserve demand shock**

We can use the estimated demand curve in Table 2, Panel A to assess whether negative unobserved reserve demand shocks may have contributed to the large take-up at the ONRRP facility since spring 2021. Expressing the estimated demand curve with quantity as dependent variable as in equation (6) and calculating

$$\varepsilon = e^{-u/b} \tag{12}$$

using the estimates of  $u$  and  $b$  from Table 2, Panel A, we obtain Figure 10, Panel D. The figure shows that the multiplicative reserve demand component fell from around 1.2 in March 2021 (when ONRRP take-up started to increase) to below 0.8 toward the end of the sample. Given reserves around \$3.7T in March 2021, a drop of  $0.4 * \$3.7T$  amounts to \$1.5T, which accounts for the majority of the increase in ONRRP take-up. A large negative reserve demand shock reconciles a substantial decline in reserves at the same time as the EFR-IO spread has fallen and while deposits have remained fairly stable.

We can only speculate about reasons for the large negative reserve demand shock. One possibility is that banks had become less worried about sudden reductions in deposits as deposits had remained high post-COVID.

### e. Robustness: Instrumenting for deposits

An understanding of the drivers of deposits is useful because it may suggest instruments for deposits and it may help predict deposits and thus reserve demand going forward.

Basic portfolio theory implies that deposits should depend on (a) household financial assets and (b) the portfolio weight allocated to deposits as households allocate financial assets between cash-like assets such as deposits, and higher-return assets such as bonds, stocks, mutual funds, etc. The deposit portfolio weight in turn would be expected to depend on the spread between market rates on deposit alternatives and the rate on deposits (a spread that captures the opportunity cost of holding deposits). This spread tends to increase with the level of market interest rates as these have less than full passthrough to deposit rates (e.g., Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl (2017)).

In Figure 11, Panel A, the left graph documents a sharp increase in the ratio of the financial assets of households and non-profits to GDP over our sample period 2009M1-2022M10. The right graph shows that households and non-profits have chosen a remarkably stable portfolio weight for deposits of around 15% over this period.

As a robustness check on our baseline estimates from Table 2, Table 3 presents the corresponding three panels of results when we instrument for both  $\ln(\text{Reserves})$  (as before) and  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$ . We use the log of the financial assets of households and non-profits as our first instrument for deposits. As our second instrument for deposits, we use the level of short-term interest rates, measured by the IOR. We use the IOR rather than the deposit rate- $\text{IOR}$  spread because the latter is affected by banks' deposit setting behavior which could potentially be correlated with reserve demand shocks. Armed with two instruments for deposits, we can perform a test of overidentifying restrictions to assess the validity of the deposit instruments. Since financial assets of households and non-profits are available quarterly (from the U.S. Financial Accounts, Table B.101, line 9), the estimation in Table 3 is done at the quarterly frequency, using data for the last month of the quarter for  $\text{EFFR-IOR}$ ,  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  and  $\text{IOR}$  (using monthly averages as in our earlier analysis).

A comparison of the results in Table 3, Panel A to those in Table 2, Panel A shows that the estimated parameters of the reserve demand function are similar whether deposits are instrumented for or not. Using the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, we find an insignificant  $p$ -value of 0.29, supporting the exogeneity of the instruments for  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$ . The modest difference between our baseline regression in Table 2 and Table 3 suggests that deposit endogeneity is not a substantial factor bearing on our baseline estimation. Table 3, Panel B, shows that the first stage for  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  is strong, with  $\ln(\text{Financial assets})$  being a particularly strong instrument, but the  $\text{IOR}$  also entering significantly. The estimated coefficient on

$\ln(\text{Financial asset})$  is around one, consistent with the stable portfolio weight over the sample period. The interest-sensitivity of deposits is  $-0.035$ , implying a decrease in deposits of 3.5% for a 100 bps increase in the interest rate. Figure 11, Panel B, illustrates the ability of the instruments to explain variation in  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$ . The fit is tight, with the exception that deposits have not declined following the drop in financial assets in 2022Q2. Table 3, Panel C, shows the reduced form of the IV estimation where we instrument for both  $\ln(\text{Reserves})$  and  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$ . The  $R^2$  is over 90%, illustrated by the tight fit of this reduced form, which we graph in Appendix Figure 2.

Our discussion of drivers of deposits in the period since the financial crisis is related to that in Acharya and Rajan (2022) and Acharya, Chauhan, Rajan and Steffen (2022). Acharya and Rajan (2022) argue theoretically that higher reserve supply causes the banking sector to issue more liquid claims, including deposits and credit lines. When central banks do QE, banks must hold the additional reserve supply in equilibrium and banks have an incentive to fund reserves with liquid short-term liabilities. These liabilities have low interest rates (relative to other sources of funds, or other assets that could be reduced) and reserves enable banks to manage the liquidity risks from additional liquid liabilities. Their framework thus centers on banks' willingness to *supply* deposits. Acharya et al (2022) test this hypothesis empirically. They provide evidence based on regressing deposit growth on reserve growth in time-series and panel data. We find little role for reserves driving deposits when we include drivers of households' *demand* for deposits. Appendix Table 1, Panel A, column (3), shows that in a horse-race between deposit supply drivers (reserves) and deposit demand drivers (financial assets and the IOR), reserves enter with a *negative* sign. Focusing on liquid deposits, the effect of reserves on deposits is modest when financial assets and the IOR are included, see column (6). The additional explanatory power for  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$  from adding  $\ln(\text{Reserves})$  is small, compare column (5) and (6). Acharya et al (2022) use a specification in changes. Similar conclusions emerge from adding household financial assets and the level of interest rates to that specification, as shown in Appendix Table 1, Panel B, where reserves have no significant explanatory power for either deposits or liquid deposit once financial assets and the IOR are included. Of course, QE may have been an important driver of household financial assets in the post-GFC period, but that still puts emphasis on deposit demand, not deposit supply. An additional argument against QE being the main driver of increased deposits, is that in Figure 9 (left), the growth in deposits started around 2000, much before the start of QE in late 2008. Furthermore, while both Deposits/GDP and Reserves/GDP increase in 2020, this increase in deposits may be more related to lockdowns (limiting spending), fiscal stimulus, and increased risk aversion due to COVID-19 than to banks enticing customers with attractive deposits rates to fund their reserve holdings.

Regardless of whether deposits have gone up due to increased deposit supply or increased deposit demand, we agree with Acharya et al (2022) that high deposits make QT harder because they increase banks' reserve



demand. We turn next to the implications of our estimated reserve demand function for interest rate control and for estimating feasible QT, given current deposits.

## 5. Implications of reserve demand for interest rate control

With a downward sloping reserve demand function, the equilibrium Effective Fed Funds rate-IOR spread is decreasing in reserve supply. Therefore, to achieve a desired value for the Effective Fed Funds rate, the Federal Reserve needs to set a lower IOR for a smaller balance sheet than for a larger balance sheet.

Figure 12 illustrates the predicted value for the Effective Fed Funds rate-IOR spread as a function of the supply of Reserves+ONRRP given the current level of deposits. The prediction is based on equation (10), using the parameter estimates for  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $C$  from Table 2, Panel C, and deposits of \$17.753T as of 2022M10.<sup>16</sup> Reserves+ONRRP is varied from \$100B to \$7,000B. Observed reserves+ONRRP data for our sample 2009M1-2022M10 range from \$662B to \$5,811B, indicated by grey shading. The predicted spread is 37 bps higher at the lower end of this range than at the upper range. Accordingly, to achieve a given predicted effective federal funds rate value, the IOR needs to be set 37 bps lower at the lower end of the balance sheet range. In other words, a given predicted effective federal funds rate value can be achieved with a host of balance sheet size-IOR combinations, with lower IOR values needed for smaller quantities of reserves+ONRRP. We denote combinations of IOR and Reserves+ONRRP that imply a chosen predicted effective federal funds rate as *iso-federal funds curves*, using the terminology introduced by Bianchi and Bigio (2022) in a theoretical analysis in a different setup than ours. In our setting, along an iso-federal funds curve with a predicted effective fed funds rate of  $X$ :

$$X - r(\text{Reserves}) = A + B * \ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP}) + C * \ln(\text{Deposits})$$

which implies

$$r(\text{Reserves}) = X - [A + B * \ln(\text{Reserves} + \text{ONRRP}) + C * \ln(\text{Deposits})] \quad (13)$$

Figure 13 shows our estimated iso-federal funds curves as of 2022M10 (deposits of \$17.753T) for  $X=2\%$  (left) and  $X=4\%$  (right). To our knowledge these are the first empirically estimated iso-federal funds curves in the literature. The Federal Reserve can use these curves to guide the setting of the IOR for given balance sheet size. Other central banks could estimate corresponding curves for their jurisdictions.

---

<sup>16</sup> Predicted EFFR-IOR=  $-2.193-0.172*\ln(\text{Reserves}+\text{ONRRP})+0.367*\ln(17753)$

## 6. Implications of reserve demand for quantitative tightening

Section 6.a uses our reduced form reserve demand estimation to how large a reduction in reserves+ONRRP is feasible before interest rate volatility may increase. Section 6.b lay out how current ONRRP take-up also provides useful information about how much reserves+ONRRP supply can be tightened. Section 6.c emphasizes that the autonomous factors on central bank balance sheets can be volatile, implying that from an interest rate volatility perspective it is prudent to run down the central bank's assets by less than the amount of the estimated feasible reduction in reserves+ONRRP.

### a. Baseline approach

Our reduced form estimation in Table 2, Panel C can be used to guide the feasible reduction in the supply of reserves+ONRRP. As discussed in section 5, for any potential choice of the level of reserves+ONRRP, the reduced form provides a predicted EFR-IOR spread given the current level of deposits. Figure 14, Panel A repeats the exercise from Figure 12, adding a set of vertical lines marking reserves+ONRRP values of interest. Figure 14, Panel B scales the x-axis by GDP. As of October 2022, reserves+ONRRP was \$5.274T (monthly average), amounting to about 20.4% of GDP, illustrated by the rightmost vertical lines in the graphs in Figure 14.<sup>17</sup> Three possible counterfactual levels of Reserves+ONRRP are of particular interest, illustrated by the leftmost vertical lines in Figure 14, Panel A and B.

#### 1. Reserves+ONRRP equal to \$1.806T (7% of GDP)

In the previous episode of balance sheet runoff ending in September 2019, the FOMC took actions that lowered (reserves+ONRRP)/GDP to around 7%. As of October 2022, this would correspond to reserves+ONRRP of \$1.806T. Our estimated reserve demand function predicts that at this level the EFR-IOR spread would be 11 bps. This counterfactual is illustrated further in Figure 15. The predicted EFR-IOR spread of 11 bps would be substantially higher than any values of the spread observed in-sample. The high predicted spread is due to the much higher level of deposits currently (in dollars and as a percent of GDP) than during the last policy normalization cycle. Reserves of \$1.806T would therefore result in a historically low (in the period since 2009M1) value of deposits-adjusted supply of reserves+ONRRP.

Does the high predicted value of the EFR-IOR spread at reserves+ONRRP of 7% of GDP imply that reducing reserves+ONRRP to this level is undesirable? As discussed in Section 5, faced with a high EFR-IOR spread, the Federal Reserve could adjust the IOR to a lower value to try to ensure that EFR clears near a particular desired value. For any given federal funds rate target (or target range mid-point), the IOR

---

<sup>17</sup> GDP data for 2022Q4 are available as of time of writing. We assume a monthly GDP growth rate in October 2022 equal to the average monthly GDP growth rate from 2022Q2 to 2022Q3.

would need to be set about 11 bps below the target to make the EFFR clear at a chosen Fed funds target, on average over the month. However, as illustrated in Figure 1, a high EFFR-IOR has been associated with daily yield spikes in EFFR and especially in repo rates. Reserves+ONRRP of \$1.806T would be a risky choice from the perspective of money market stability as deposit-adjusted reserves+ONRRP supply would be much below that in September 2019. The new Standing Repo Facility may help prevent yield spikes at such levels of liquidity supply, but it remains untested.

2. *Reserves+ONRRP equal to \$2.840T (11.0% of GDP): Would lead to the same deposit-adjusted reserves+ONRRP as that in September 2019*

In September 2019, deposit-adjusted reserves+ONRRP (i.e.,  $\ln(\text{Reserves+ONRRP}) + (C/B) * \ln(\text{Deposits})$ ), amounted to -12.97. Given deposits of \$17.753T as of the end of our sample in 2022M10, deposit-adjusted reserves+ONRRP would equal -12.97 for reserves+ONRRP of \$2.840T (corresponding to 11.0% of GDP). This is the predicted level of reserves at which large daily yield spikes may emerge, based on the estimated reduced form reserve demand function and the experience from September 2019 and the months leading up to it.

3. *Reserves equal to \$3.495T (13.5% of GDP): A more conservative choice, at which the predicted EFFR-IOR spread is zero*

As an example of a more conservative reduction in reserves+ONRRP, the value of reserves+ONRRP at which the predicted EFFR-IOR spread is 0 is \$3.495T as of 2022M10. From Figure 15, this compares to a predicted spread of 4 bps in September 2019 and would thus be a bit less risky in terms of money market stability. A spread of zero is special in that at spreads above zero, banks are holding reserves despite being able to earn more by lending in the federal funds market, suggesting some level of liquidity scarcity.

Overall, our estimated reserve demand function (the reduced form) can be used to guide policy tightening both in terms of the setting of the IOR relative to the mid-point of the target range and in terms of evaluating which amount of reduction in reserves+ONRRP is likely to be risky in terms of money market stability. The above calculations are done for a specific value of deposits, that prevailing in October 2022. As deposits change, so will the reserves+ONRRP level that leads to a given predicted EFFR-IOR spread. This level of reserves+ONRRP can be calculated from equation (10), as estimated in Table 2, Panel C, updating the deposit level from the 2022M10 value. Therefore, one should not think of there being one particular value of reserve+ONRRP supply that will deliver a given amount of tightness of liquidity in money markets. To understand reserve demand going forward, it will be important to monitor the development of deposits. Predicting the evolution of deposits is difficult given its dependence on financial assets which are volatile as well as the fact there is some variation in the portfolio share for deposits. Furthermore, QT may itself

affect deposits. As the Federal Reserve reduces its bond holdings during QT, someone else must hold more bonds in equilibrium. This may reduce deposits, if households buy bonds or transfer deposits to bond funds or transfer deposits to money market funds who in turn fund hedge fund bond purchases via repo lending. To the extent that deposits fall, more QT is possible.<sup>18</sup>

In related work, Afonso, Giannone, La Spada and Williams (2021) estimate a reserve demand function in which the EFR-IOER spread is modeled as a function of the ratio of reserves to banks' total assets. They work with daily data and instrument the reserve-to-asset ratio by the forecast error for this variable 5 days prior, using a VAR to obtain the forecast error. The idea is that the forecast error predicts reserves but will be uncorrelated with reserve demand shocks 5 days later if demand shocks tend to resolve in less than 5 days. Their estimation allows for a time-varying effect ( $\beta$ ) of the reserves-to-asset ratio on the EFR-IOER spread. They estimate  $\beta$  to be significantly negative in 2010-2011 and 2018-2019 but close to zero from 2012-2017, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2020, and in 2021. Their results imply that a negative ( $\beta$ ) starts to emerge at reserves around 12% of banks' total assets. To compare that with our results, observe that in October 2022, banks' total assets amount to \$22.6T. Reserves of 12% of banks' total assets would thus come to \$2.7T.

We calculate the feasible reserves+ONRRP value as opposed to the feasible reserve value because the Federal Reserve controls reserves+ONRRP while the split between reserves and ONRRP is determined also by the setting of the ONRRP rate and the shape of banks' reserve demand function. If, as would be expected, reductions in reserves+ONRRP first reduce ONRRP take-up to zero, before generating much reduction in reserves, then by the time reserves+ONRRP take-up is reduced to the number in one of our three scenarios, ONRRP is close to zero. Our calculation is then comparable to that of Afonso et al (2021). Their \$2.7T number is close to the number \$2.840T (11.0% of GDP) that we calculate would generate the same deposit-adjusted reserves+ONRRP supply as that in September 2019. Our approach and that of Afonso et al (2021) rely on different methodologies. We exploit lower frequency (mainly QE/QT induced) movements in reserves and use a functional form for reserves demand where constant parameters appear to provide a good fit across the 2009M1-2022M10 period. Afonso et al (2021) rely on daily reserve variation. On the basis of the functional form that they specify for the reserve demand function, their  $\beta$  parameter is estimated to be time-varying. Despite the different approaches, a key lesson common to both papers is that running down

---

<sup>18</sup> It is possible that deposits are unaffected as reserves+ONRRP is reduced. Suppose that ONRRP take-up falls one-for-one with reduction in reserves+ONRRP. Money market funds are the largest investor at the ONRRP facility. If they choose to invest in the repo market instead of the ONRRP facility, this could facilitate higher bond holdings on the part of hedge funds, with hedge funds replacing the Federal Reserve as a bond investor. In this case, deposits are unaffected by lower reserves+ONRRP.

reserves to 7% of GDP, as was done in the last policy normalization episode, is likely to lead to strains in short-term money markets.

### **b. ONRRP take-up as a guide to feasible reduction in reserves+ONRRP**

As a complementary approach, the amount of ONRRP take-up is potentially informative for assessing feasible reduction in reserves+ONRRP. This follows directly from Figure 5 Panel B. ONRRP take-up (non-bank facility take-up) is positive because the Federal Reserve's net securities (and thus its supply of reserves+ONRRP) are larger than the amount of reserves banks demand when the market interest rate  $r$  equals the ONRRP rate (non-bank facility rate). The ONRRP facility "mops up" the excess supply of reserves+ONRRP, thereby ensuring that the market repo rate does not fall below the ONRRP rate. This suggests that if the reserves+ONRRP supply was reduced by the amount of the current ONRRP take-up, the market rate would stay at  $r$ =ONRRP rate, reserves would be unchanged and ONRRP take-up would fall to zero. Given ONRRP take-up of \$2.2T in October 2022, this suggests that a correspondingly large reduction in reserves+ONRRP is possible, without lifting the market repo rate above the ONRRP rate floor. Some additional reduction in reserves+ONRRP is possible before the market repo rate exceeds the IOR. Potential effects of balance sheet reduction on deposits are again a complicating factor.

A simple message from this complementary approach to assessing feasible QT is that one should take a reduction of ONRRP take-up toward zero as a signal that markets are getting close to the point at which the rate in the repo market starts to exceed the ONRRP rate. This approach is not able to speak to how much additional reduction in supply is possible past that point before the market interest rate-IOR spread exceeds a particular value.

### **c. Accounting for volatility in the autonomous factors**

From the central bank balance sheet

$$\text{Reserves} + \underbrace{(\text{Non-bank investment facility})}_{\substack{\text{Reserves lent} \\ \text{to the central bank} \\ \text{by non-banks}}} = \underbrace{[\text{Securities} - \text{Autonomous factors}]}_{\text{Net securities}} + \underbrace{\text{Loans to banks}}_{\substack{\text{Reserves borrowed} \\ \text{from the central bank} \\ \text{by banks}}} .$$

In the case of the Federal Reserve and assuming loans to banks are small

$$\text{Reserves+ONRRP}=\text{Securities-Autonomous factors.}$$

From an interest-rate volatility perspective, it is prudent to run down securities only to the point that fluctuations in autonomous factors will not result in reserves+ONRRP below the value assessed to be feasible value (e.g., below \$3.495T in our third option in section 6.a). The needed buffer to account for volatility in the autonomous factors depends on the risk aversion of the decision maker and the expected

volatility in the autonomous factors going forward. A buffer of several hundred billion dollars does not seem unreasonable given recent TGA volatility. The large recent fluctuations in the Treasury General Account are visible in Figure 2.

In Figure 16, we zoom in on year 2019 to illustrate the negative relation between reserves+ONRRP and the TGA. Based on our framework, the underlying reasons for the yield spikes of September 2019 was lower supply of reserves+ONRRP (due to QT) and growth in the size of the banking sector (higher deposits). However, the “final straw” that reduced reserves+ONRRP enough to create yield spikes on September 17, 2019, was an increase in the TGA due to corporate tax payments and Treasury issuance on September 16, 2019 (see Anbil, Anderson and Senyuz (2020)). The TGA increase is visible in Figure 16 as a sharp increase in the blue line around September 17, 2019.

## 7. Conclusion

Understanding reserve demand is central for achieving interest rate control and assessing how much QT is feasible before interest rate volatility may emerge. We develop a new framework for reserve demand in which it is driven by three main factors: The interest rate spread between short-term money market rates and the IOR, the convenience yield on reserves (due to reserves being valuable for managing deposit flows), and bank balance sheet costs (which limit banks’ ability to arbitrage spreads by borrowing at market rates and investing at the IOR). Our framework differs from recent work on reserve demand in an ample-reserves setting by the shape of the reserve demand function, by clarifying how take-up at Federal Reserve facilities helps control reserve supply, and by having a central role for deposits (and other short-term bank liabilities) as a reserve demand shifter.

Empirically, reserve demand is negatively related to the EFFR-IOR spread with a semi-elasticity of -5 over the 2009M1-2022M10 period. We document a stable reduced form for the reserve demand curve once deposits are accounted for, finding a tight negative relation between the EFFR-IOR spread and deposit-adjusted reserves+ONRRP supply. Our estimation exploits monthly variation and assumes that most of the variation in reserves+ONRRP supply at the monthly frequency is not due to reserve supply accommodating demand shocks but instead driven by monetary policy, notably the rounds of quantitative easing and tightening over the sample.

Our estimated reserve demand function can be used to guide policy tightening both in terms of the setting of the IOR relative to the mid-point of the target range and in terms of assessing how much reserves+ONRRP supply can be reduced before a liquidity shortage may emerge. Our estimated reduced form implies that due to increasing deposits (even relative to GDP), liquidity strains may emerge much before reserves+ONRRP was reduced to 7% of GDP as was done during policy normalization leading up

to September 2019. Based on two complementary approaches, we assess that a reduction in reserves+ONRRP by at least \$2T appears feasible before interest rate volatility may emerge, though the evolution of deposits, the value of the Standing Repo Facility and volatility in the autonomous balance sheet factors makes for substantial uncertainty in this assessment.

## References

Acharya, Viral V. and Raghuram G. Rajan, 2022, “Liquidity, liquidity everywhere, not a drop to use – Why flooding banks with central bank reserves may not expand liquidity”, CEPR DP16907.

Acharya, Viral V., Rahul Singh Chauhan, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Sascha Steffen, “Liquidity Dependence: Why Shrinking Central Bank Balance Sheets is an Uphill Task”, Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, 2022.

Afonso, Gara, Marco Cipriani, Adam Copeland, Anna Kovner, Gabriele La Spada, Antoine Martin, 2020, “The Market Events of Mid-September 2019”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 918.

Afonso, Gara, Domenico Giannone, Gabriele La Spada, and John C. Williams, 2021, “Scarce, Abundant, or Ample? A Time-Varying Model”, working paper.

Anbil, Sriya, Alyssa Anderson, and Zeynep Senyuz, 2020, “What Happened in Money Markets in September 2019?”, *FEDS Notes* (2020) <https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2527>

Bianchi, Javier, and Saki Bigio, 2022, “Banks, Liquidity Management, and Monetary Policy”, *Econometrica*, Vol. 90, No. 1, 391–454

Copeland, Adam, Darrell Duffie, and Yilin (David) Yang, 2021, “Reserves Were Not So Ample After All”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, No. 974.

Correa, Ricardo, Wenxin Du, and Gordon Liao, 2021, “US Banks and Global Liquidity,” Working Paper, University of Chicago.

Drechsler, Itamar, Alexi Savov and Philipp Schnabl, 2017, “The Deposits Channel of Monetary Policy”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4), 1819-1876.

Frost, Peter A., 1971, “Banks' Demand for Excess Reserves”, *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 79, No. 4, 805-825.

Goodfriend, Marvin, 1982, “A Model of Money Stock Determination with Loan Demand and a Banking System Balance Sheet Constraint”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review, Jan/Feb 1982.

Goodfriend, Marvin, 2002. “Interest on Reserves and Monetary Policy.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 8, No. 1 (May).

Ihrig, Jane, Zeynep Senyuz, and Gretchen C. Weinbach, 2020, “Implementing Monetary Policy in an “Ample-Reserves” Regime: The Basics (Note 1 of 3)”, FEDS Notes, July 2020.

Judson, Ruth and Elizabeth Klee, 2009, “Whither the Liquidity Effect: the impact of Federal Reserve open market operations in recent years”, FEDS working paper 2009-25.

Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012, “The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt”, *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 120, No. 2, 233-267

Lucas, Robert E., 2000, “Inflation and Welfare”, *Econometrica*, Vol. 68, No. 2, 247-274.

Mishkin, Frederic Stanley, 2022, “The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets”, 13<sup>th</sup> edition, Pearson.

Smith, A. Lee and Victor J. Valcarcel, 2021, “The Financial Market Effects of Unwinding the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet”, Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2023, “Balance Sheet Policy Above the Effective Lower Bound”, *ECB Forum on Central Banking (Sintra)*.

Wall Street Journal, 2022, “The Other Doomsday Scenario Looming Over Markets”, September 3, 2022.



### Appendix 1. Micro founding the convenience yield on reserves

Consider the setup from section 2, adding detail on the bank's liquidity management problem.

Suppose deposits may change and that net deposit outflows, as a fraction of the initial deposit level, is a random fraction  $\tilde{F}$  of deposits, with  $\tilde{F}$  distributed uniform(-k,k), with  $k \leq 1$ .

Assume that deposit outflows met using reserves incur no transactions costs while deposit outflows that cannot be met using reserves must be made by reducing holdings of bonds. Suppose that selling bonds results in transactions costs  $TC(\text{Amount sold})$ , where  $TC(x) = \delta * x^2$ , an increasing and convex function.

For given Reserves (R) and Deposits (D), bonds sold is then a random variable  $\max(\tilde{F}D - R, 0)$  resulting in transactions costs being a random variable  $\tilde{TC} = \delta * [\max(\tilde{F}D - R, 0)]^2$ . Therefore,

$$E(\tilde{TC}) = \int_{-k}^k \delta [\max(FD - R, 0)]^2 f(F) dF = \int_{\frac{R}{D}}^k \delta (FD - R)^2 \frac{1}{2k} dF \quad (\text{A1})$$

$$= \frac{\delta}{2k} \left[ \frac{1}{3D} (FD - R)^3 \right]_{\frac{R}{D}}^k = \frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{1}{3D} (kD - R)^3 \quad (\text{A2})$$

Define the function  $v(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits})$  as expected transactions costs savings from holding reserves:  $v(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = E(\tilde{TC}(\text{Reserves} = 0, \text{Deposits})) - E(\tilde{TC}(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}))$ . It follows from (A2) that the marginal convenience benefit from reserves is positive (saved transactions cost)

$$v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = -\frac{\partial E(\tilde{TC})}{\partial R} = \frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{1}{D} (kD - R)^2 > 0 \quad (\text{A3})$$

while the marginal convenience benefit from deposits is negative (additional transactions costs)

$$v'_D(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = -\frac{\partial E(\tilde{TC})}{\partial D} = -\frac{\delta}{2k} \left[ \frac{k}{D} (kD - R)^2 - \frac{1}{D^2} \frac{1}{3} (kD - R)^3 \right] \quad (\text{A4})$$

$$= -\frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{1}{D} (kD - R)^2 \left[ k - \frac{1}{3D} (kD - R) \right] = -\frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{1}{D} (kD - R)^2 \left[ \frac{1}{3D} (2kD + R) \right] < 0 \quad (\text{A5})$$

As for the second derivatives, it follows from (A3) that  $v''_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits})$  is decreasing in reserves and increasing in deposits:

$$v''_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = -\frac{\delta}{k} \frac{1}{D} (kD - R) < 0 \quad (\text{A6})$$

for  $R < kD$  and

$$v''_{R,D}(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = \frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{(kD - R)}{D} \frac{(kD + R)}{D} > 0 \quad (\text{A7})$$

for  $R < kD$ .

Equation (A3) can be expressed as

$$v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) = \frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{1}{\exp(\ln D)} (k * \exp(\ln D) - \exp(\ln R))^2 \quad (\text{A8})$$

A first-order Taylor approximation around values  $\ln D_0$  and  $\ln R_0$  gives

$$\begin{aligned} v'_R(\text{Reserves}, \text{Deposits}) \approx & \frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{1}{D_0} (kD_0 - R_0)^2 \\ & - \frac{\delta}{k} \frac{1}{D_0} (kD_0 - R_0) * R_0 * [\ln R - \ln R_0] \\ & + \frac{\delta}{2k} \frac{(kD_0 - R_0)}{D_0} \frac{(kD_0 + R_0)}{D_0} D_0 * [\ln D - \ln D_0] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A9})$$

which is the micro-founded version of (4) in Result 1.

We note that our micro foundations for the expected transactions costs are related to those of Frost (1971). He models banks' demand for excess reserves in an environment with no interest on reserves and assumes that banks face a fixed cost of adjusting their securities holdings, along with a constant variable cost of adjustment. We model banks' demand in an environment with interest on reserves and assume quadratic adjustment costs for securities. In both settings, the expected transactions costs savings from reserves lower their yield relative to other assets.

**Table 1. Federal Reserve balance sheet, October 26, 2022**

The table is based on data from the Federal Reserve's H.4 release. Treasuries and MBS are at face value. The largest category within "Other" assets is unamortized premium on securities.

Assets (\$B)		Liabilities (\$B)	
Treasuries	5,609	Reserves	3,108
MBS	2,679	Overnight reverse repurchase agreements	2,187
Loans to banks	19	Currency	2,285
Other	466	Treasury general account	557
		Other	636
	8,773		8,773

**Table 2. Reserve demand estimation, instrumenting for reserves**

Monthly data, 2009M1-2022M10. IV estimation. t-statistics are robust to autocorrelation up to order 12.  
 \*\*\* indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.

**Panel A. Second stage**

	Dependent variable: (Effective federal funds rate-IOR)
ln(Reserves)	-0.200*** (t=-10.44)
ln(Deposits)	0.358*** (11.86)
Constant	-1.900*** (-10.64)
N (months)	166

**Panel B. First stage for ln(Reserves)**

	Dependent. variable: ln(Reserves)
ln(Reserves+ONRRP)	0.860*** (t=14.07)
ln(Deposits)	-0.049 (-0.47)
Constant	1.467 (1.64)
N (months)	166
R <sup>2</sup>	0.960

**Panel C. Reduced form**

	Dependent. variable: (Effective federal funds rate-IOR)
ln(Reserves+ONRRP)	-0.172*** (t=-18.78)
ln(Deposits)	0.367*** (23.81)
Constant	-2.193*** (-21.12)
N (months)	166
R <sup>2</sup>	0.895

**Table 3. Reserve demand estimation, instrumenting for both reserves and deposits**

Quarterly data (last month of the quarter), 2009Q1-2022Q2. t-statistics are robust to autocorrelation up to order 4. \*\*\* indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.

**Panel A. Second stage**

	Dependent variable: (Effective federal funds rate-IOR)
ln(Reserves)	-0.207*** (t=-11.53)
ln(Deposits)	0.377*** (12.92)
Constant	-2.025*** (-11.62)
N (quarters)	54

**Panel B. First stages for ln(Reserves) and ln(Deposits)**

	Dependent variable: ln(Reserves)	Dependent variable: ln(Deposits)
ln(Reserves+ONRRP)	0.845*** (t=8.53)	-0.029 (t=-0.85)
ln(Financial assets)	0.035 (0.24)	1.091*** (20.65)
IOR	-0.010 (-0.31)	-0.035*** (-2.62)
Constant	0.746 (0.66)	-2.671*** (-7.43)
N (quarters)	54	54
R <sup>2</sup>	0.971	0.987

**Panel C. Reduced form**

	Dependent. variable: (Effective federal funds rate-IOR)
ln(Reserves+ONRRP)	-0.198*** (t=-17.57)
ln(Financial assets)	0.430*** (21.87)
IOR	-0.020*** (-4.88)
Constant	-3.378*** (-23.02)
N (quarters)	54
R <sup>2</sup>	0.905

**Figure 1. Yield spikes in September 2019**

Daily data, April 2018 to October 2022. The series graphed are the effective federal funds rate (the short-term market rate at which banks and government-sponsored enterprises lend to each other in the federal funds market), the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (a measure of the cost of borrowing cash against Treasury collateral using repo contracts), and the interest rate on reserves set by the Federal Reserve.





Figure 2. The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, 2006M1-2022M10


The figure is based on data from the Federal Reserve’s H.4 release. Data are monthly averages.






**Figure 3. Reserve demand and supply**

**Panel A. Reserve demand**




**Panel B. Reserve supply**

With lending facility for banks  
but no investment facility for non-banks




With lending facility for banks  
and investment facility for non-banks




**Figure 4. Equilibrium without lending facility for banks but no investment facility for non-banks**

**Panel A. No take-up at lending facility for banks**




**Panel B. Positive take-up at lending facility for banks**

Occurs if: Reserve demand evaluated at  $r$ =lending facility rate  $>$  Net securities




**Figure 5. Equilibrium with lending facility for banks and investment facility for non-banks**

**Panel A. No take-up at non-bank investment facility**



**Panel B. Positive take-up at non-bank investment facility**

Occurs if: Demand evaluated at  $r = \text{non-bank facility rate} < \text{Net securities}$



**Figure 6. Defining reserve demand relative to different sources of funding**






Figure 7. (Effective Federal Funds Rate)-IOR spread and Reserves-to-GDP, time series plot

Monthly data (averages), 2009M1-2022M10




**Figure 8. (Effective Federal Funds Rate)-IOR spread and Reserves, scatter plot**  
Monthly data, 2009M1-2022M10.

**Panel A. Reserves**




**Panel B. Reserves-to-GDP**



**Figure 9. Deposits**


In the left figure, deposits are for all commercial banks, from the Federal Reserve’s H8 release (via FRED). The right figure is based on data from both the H8 and H6 releases, as noted. Data are monthly averages for 1986M1-2022M10 (left figure) or 1986M1-2022M9 (right figure).




**Figure 10. Fit of estimation**

The fitted lines in both panels are based on the regression in Table 2, Panel C.

**Panel A. Time series plot of (Effective Federal Funds Rate)-IOR spread and fitted values**




**Panel B. (Effective Federal Funds Rate)-IOR spread and fitted values as function of deposit-adjusted supply**






**Panel C. (Effective Federal Funds Rate)-IOR spread and fitted values as function of deposit-adjusted supply, non-log x-axis**



**Panel D. Estimated reserve demand shock**


The figure is based on the reserve demand estimation in Table 2, Panel A. The vertical line indicates the end of March 2021.



**Figure 11. Deposit drivers**


**Panel A. Financial assets of households and non-profits as a driver of deposits**

Values graphed are for the last month of the quarter, 2009Q1-2022Q2.



**Panel B. Fit of deposit demand function estimation**

Quarterly data (last month of the quarter), 2009Q1-2022Q2. The fitted line is based on the regression in Table 3, Panel B for  $\ln(\text{Deposits})$ .




### Figure 12. Predicted spread at current deposit level

The figure illustrates the predicted value for the Effective Fed Funds rate-IOR spread as a function of the supply of Reserves+ONRRP. The prediction is based on the estimated version of equation (10)

$$r(FF) - r(Reserves) = A + B * \ln(Reserves + ONRRP) + C * \ln(Deposits)$$

using the parameter estimates for  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $C$  from Table 2, Panel C, and deposits of \$17.753T as of 2022M10. Reserves+ONRRP is varied in increments of \$100B and Reserves+ONRRP graphed ranges from \$100B to \$7,000B. Observed Reserves+ONRRP data for our sample 2009M1-2022M10 range from \$662B to \$5,811B, indicated by grey shading.



**Figure 13. Iso-fed funds curves**


The figures show combinations of IOR and Reserves+ONRRP which result in a predicted effective federal funds rate equal to a chosen value (2% in the left figure, 4% in the right figure). A given iso-fed funds curve is constructed from equation (10)

$$r(FF) - r(Reserves) = A + B * \ln(Reserves + ONRRP) + C * \ln(Deposits)$$

which implies that along an iso-fed funds curve with a predicted effective fed funds rate of X:

$$r(Reserves) = X - [A + B * \ln(Reserves + ONRRP) + C * \ln(Deposits)]$$


We implement this using the estimated values for  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $C$  from Table 2, Panel C, and deposits of \$17.753T as of 2022M10. Along a given iso-fed funds curve, Reserves+ONRRP is varied in increments of \$100B and Reserves+ONRRP graphed ranges from \$100B to \$7,000B. Observed Reserves+ONRRP data for our sample 2009M1-2022M10 range from \$662B to \$5,811B, indicated by grey shading.




**Figure 14. Balance sheet runoff counterfactuals**

Panel A repeats Figure 10, focusing on the range of observed data and adding vertical lines for various values of Reserves+ONRRP: \$1,806B (7% of GDP), \$2,840 (same predicted value as in 2019M9), \$3,495B (predicted value of zero), and \$5,274 (the current value as of 2022M10).

Panel B repeats the exercise from Panel A but uses (Reserves+ONRRP)/GDP on the horizontal axis. Predicted values are still calculated as for Panel A. The vertical lines are at 0.07, 0.110 (same predicted value as in 2019M9), 0.135 (predicted value of zero), and 0.204 (the current value as of 2022M10).




**Figure 15. Counterfactual: Predicted (Effective Federal Funds Rate)-IOR spread for Reserves/GDP=0.07 in 2022M10**



**Figure 16. Reserves+ONRRP and the TGA around the September 17, 2019, yield spike**

Amounts are in billions of dollars.



**Appendix Table 1. Drivers of deposits, monthly data, 2009M1-2022M6**

Monthly data for 2009M1-2022M6. Liquid deposits are defined as demand deposits plus other liquid deposits (H6 release). Household financial assets (including assets of non-profits) are from the Financial Accounts of the United States. IOR is the interest rate paid on reserves. In Panel B,  $\Delta$  denotes a one-year change relative to the same month the prior year. t-statistics in parenthesis (based on 12 Newey-West lags). \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## Panel A. Regressions in levels


	Dependent variable					
	ln(Deposits)			ln(Liquid deposits)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln(Reserves)	0.50*** (7.14)		-0.045* (-1.75)	0.70*** (8.95)		0.088*** (2.50)
ln(Household financial assets)		1.03*** (42.71)	1.10*** (29.63)		1.39*** (37.68)	1.25*** (20.91)
IOR		-0.025*** (-5.40)	-0.036*** (-4.71)		-0.036*** (-3.76)	-0.014 (-1.59)
Constant	5.50*** (10.56)	-2.26*** (-8.35)	-2.69*** (-10.08)	3.85*** (6.60)	-6.34*** (-15.33)	-5.50*** (-12.33)
N (months)	162	162	162	162	162	162
R <sup>2</sup>	0.659	0.987	0.988	0.721	0.985	0.988

## Panel B. Regressions in changes

	Dependent variable					
	$\Delta$ ln(Deposits)			$\Delta$ ln(Liquid deposits)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta$ ln(Reserves)	0.11*** (5.78)		0.033 (1.27)	0.17*** (3.73)		-0.0006 (-0.01)
$\Delta$ ln(Household financial assets)		0.38*** (4.80)	0.31*** (4.19)		0.53*** (4.00)	0.33* (2.36)
$\Delta$ IOR		-0.047*** (-13.15)	-0.036*** (-4.87)		-0.067*** (-11.35)	-0.066*** (-5.58)
Lagged levels of explanatory variables and dependent variable included as regressors	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant term included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N (months)	150	150	150	150	150	150
R <sup>2</sup>	0.854	0.870	0.898	0.639	0.833	0.870

**Appendix Figure 1. Reserve demand as a function of the market interest rate**

Framework of Ihrig, Senyuz and Weinbach (2020)



**Appendix Figure 2. Fit when instrumenting for both reserves and deposits**

The fitted line is based on the regression in Table 3, Panel C.

