

Optimal Progressivity with Age-Dependent Taxation*

Jonathan Heathcote Kjetil Storesletten Giovanni L. Violante

First draft: August 2017 – This draft: December 2018

Abstract

This paper studies optimal taxation of earnings when the degree of tax progressivity is allowed to vary with age. We analyze this question in an equilibrium overlapping-generations model that incorporates irreversible skill investment, flexible labor supply, ex-ante heterogeneity in disutility of work and cost of skill acquisition, partially insurable wage risk, and a life cycle productivity profile. An analytically tractable version of the model without intertemporal trade is used to characterize and quantify the salient trade-offs in tax design. The key result is that progressivity should be U-shaped in age. This quantitative finding is confirmed in a version of the model with borrowing and saving solved numerically. Welfare gains from making the tax system age dependent exceed two percent of lifetime consumption.

JEL Codes: D30, E20, H20, H40, J22, J24.

Keywords: Tax Progressivity, Life Cycle, Income Distribution, Skill Investment, Labor Supply, Incomplete Markets, Government Expenditures, Welfare.

*Heathcote: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and CEPR, e-mail heathcote@minneapolisfed.org; Storesletten: University of Oslo and CEPR, e-mail kjetil.storesletten@econ.uio.no; Violante: Princeton University, CEPR, CEPR, IFS, IZA, and NBER, e-mail violante@princeton.edu. The first draft was prepared for the conference “New Perspectives on Consumption Measures.” We are grateful to Ricardo Cioffi for outstanding research assistance. We thank Andrés Erosa, Mark Huggett, Axelle Ferriere, Guy Laroque, Magne Mogstad, Nicola Pavoni, various seminar participants, and two anonymous referees for comments. Kjetil Storesletten acknowledges support from the European Research Council (ERC Advanced Grant IPCDP-324085), as well as from Oslo Fiscal Studies. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

1 Introduction

A central problem in public finance is to design a tax and transfer system to pay for public goods and provide insurance to unfortunate individuals while minimally distorting labor supply and investments in physical and human capital. One potentially important tool for mitigating tax distortions is “tagging”: letting tax rates depend on observable, immutable or hard-to-modify personal characteristics. This idea was proposed first by Akerlof (1978) and has recently gained new attention in the policy debate (see, for example, Banks and Diamond, 2010). Age is one such characteristic.

The purpose of this paper is to study optimal labor income taxation in a setting in which the parameters of the tax system are allowed to vary with age. We do not study fully optimal Mirrleesian tax system design, but instead restrict attention to the parametric class of income tax and transfer systems given by

$$T(y) = y - \lambda y^{1-\tau} \tag{1}$$

where y is pre-tax income and $T(y)$ is taxes net of transfers. The parameter τ controls the progressivity of the tax system, with $\tau = 0$ corresponding to a flat tax rate and $\tau > 0$ ($\tau < 0$) implying a progressive (regressive) tax and transfer system. Conditional on τ , the parameter λ controls the level of taxation. This class of tax systems has a long tradition in public finance. See, for example, Musgrave (1959), Kakwani (1977) and, more recently, Bénabou (2000, 2002) and in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017). Note that equation (1) implies a log-linear relation between disposable income $y - T(y)$ and gross income y with slope $1 - \tau$.

The key innovation in the present paper is to let the parameters λ and τ in eq. (1) be conditioned on age, subject to an economy-wide government budget constraint. By allowing for age variation in λ and τ , both the level and the progressivity of the tax schedule can be made age dependent.

In Heathcote et al. (2017), we document that the parametric class in eq. (1) provides a remarkably good approximation of the actual tax and transfer scheme in the U.S. for households aged 25-60. In particular, eq. (1) implies that after-tax earnings should be a log-linear function of pre-tax earnings. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Heathcote et al. (2017) show that a linear regression of the logarithm of post-government earnings on the logarithm of pre-government average earnings yields a very good fit, with an R^2 of 0.93: when plotting average pre-government against post-government earnings for each percentile of the sample,




Figure 1: The coefficient τ estimated from a regression of log disposable income $y - T(y)$ on log gross income y , where intercept and slope are both allowed to vary with age. The straight line is the estimated $\tau^{US} = 0.181$ when age dependence is not allowed in the regression. See Heathcote et al. (2017) for details on the 2000-2006 PSID data used this estimation, and on the construction of y and $T(y)$ at the household level.

the relationship is virtually log-linear.

There, we did not investigate whether the current tax/transfer system de facto features elements of age dependence in progressivity. For example, one may think that certain transfers (e.g., UI benefits, child benefits) and certain provisions (e.g., mortgage interest and medical expenditure deductions) would effectively induce some age dependence. We thus repeated this estimation allowing the intercept and the slope parameters of the regression to depend on age. Figure 1 plots the estimated τ for each age group together with the estimated age-invariant $\tau^{US} = 0.181$. The main finding is that there seems to be no significant age-dependence in progressivity embedded in the current U.S. system.

The aim of this paper is to understand whether there is scope for improving the current U.S. tax and transfer system by introducing explicit age dependence. Our environment, which closely follows Heathcote et al. (2017), is an overlapping-generations model in which individuals care about consumption, leisure, and a public good. They make an irreversible skill investments when young, and make a labor-leisure choice in each period of working life. Individuals differ ex ante in their learning ability and in their willingness to work. Those with higher learning ability invest in higher skills, and those with a lower utility cost of effort work more hours. Skills are imperfect substitutes, and the price of skills is an equilibrium outcome. Deterministic life-cycle profiles for labor productivity and for the disutility of work generate age variation in average

wages, hours, and consumption. During working life, individuals also face shocks to their productivity that can only be partially insured privately. The uninsurable (and permanent) component of these wage shocks pass through to consumption, generating a rising age profile for within-cohort consumption inequality, as in the data.

Tax progressivity compresses ex post dispersion in consumption. Thus, the social insurance embedded in the tax and transfer system partially offsets inequality in initial conditions and also provides a substitute for missing private insurance against life-cycle shocks. In addition, net tax revenue allows the government to provide the public good. However, tax progressivity discourages labor supply and skill investment. Because the tax system affects the equilibrium skill distribution, tax parameters influence pre-tax skill prices as well as after-tax returns.

Most of our analysis focuses on a version of the model in which there are no markets for inter-temporal borrowing and lending. In this environment, we are able to derive a closed-form solution for an equally-weighted steady-state social welfare function, which we use to build intuition about the drivers of optimal age-variation in tax progressivity. Toward the end of the paper, we extend the analysis to allow for life-cycle borrowing and lending. In this case, we must solve for equilibrium allocations numerically, but the optimal policy turns out to be quite similar.

The shape of the optimal age profile for the tax progressivity parameter τ trades off two key forces.

First, age is informative about the *dispersion* of productivity. Dispersion in productivity is increasing with age because individuals face permanent idiosyncratic shocks that cumulate over the life cycle. To the extent that these shocks are privately uninsurable, they will translate into increasing consumption dispersion with age. The planner has an incentive to target redistribution to where inequality is concentrated, namely among the old. This is a force for having *progressivity increase with age*.

Second, age is informative about the *average* cost of producing output, since wages net of the disutility of work are increasing during the first decades of working life. The planner has an incentive to smooth marginal tax rates by age, and given a rising life-cycle profile of wages coupled with a generally progressive tax system, this tax smoothing motive is a force for *progressivity to fall with age*.

Given the age profile for τ that optimally balances these forces, the optimal age profile for the tax level parameter λ (which controls the average level of taxation) equates average consumption by age. This convenient separation between the roles of τ and λ arises because our utility specification, consistent with balanced growth,

implies that λ has no impact on either skill investment or labor supply.

Our quantitative analysis, with the model calibrated to the U.S. economy, implies that, on their own, life-cycle variation in uninsurable risk, productivity, and discounting each call for significant variation in tax progressivity over the life cycle, with correspondingly sizable welfare gains. When all factors are combined and transitional dynamics are taken into account, the three effects imply an optimal profile for progressivity τ that is U-shaped in age.

In this economy without intertemporal trade, much of the welfare gains from age-dependent taxation accrue because the planner lets the average tax rate increase with age in order to redistribute from the (more productive) old to the (less productive) young. It is therefore natural to ask whether in an economy with borrowing and saving, where households can smooth consumption on their own, the optimal age profile for progressivity would be affected.

To answer this question, we extend our model to allow households to trade a bond in zero net supply and solve numerically for allocations and for the optimal age dependent tax system. With a value for the borrowing limit calibrated based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (roughly equal to twice individual annual income, hence quite generous), the optimal age profile for τ is remarkably close to the one for the baseline economy without intertemporal trade. The welfare gains of moving from the current age-invariant tax system to the optimal age-varying one are of the order of two percent of lifetime consumption.

Finally, we recognize that because skill investment is irreversible, a tax reform induces transitional dynamics. In the economy without borrowing and lending we are able to compute the full transitional dynamics for the Ramsey planner who sets both age and time dependent progressivity. Here, the planner has an incentive to try to expropriate past sunk skill investments. Thus optimal progressivity is set high for the existing cohorts who have already made their skill investment decision. Because of this expropriation, the planner can afford a low level of taxation and progressivity for the new cohorts that overlap with the existing ones. As the existing cohorts disappear, the planner gradually increases optimal progressivity over time. Throughout the transition, the average level of progressivity changes, but the age profile within each cohort remains U shaped.

We are not the first to study motives for age dependence in the optimal design of tax schedules. Several antecedents of ours follow the Ramsey tradition. Erosa and Gervais (2002) analyze optimal taxation in a life-cycle economy without any sources

of within-cohort heterogeneity (i.e., all inequality is between age groups). They focus on models in which the age dependence in average tax rates is driven by the fact that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply varies over the life cycle. This channel depends on preference specifications. In the baseline model, we have abstracted from this channel by choosing a specification in which the Frisch elasticity is constant. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) study optimal taxation within a Gouveia-Strauss class of non-linear tax functions. While richer than ours, this class of functions is less analytically tractable. They do not explicitly model age dependence, but they point out that a positive tax on capital income can stand in for age-dependent taxes because the age profile of wealth is correlated with that of productivity. Karabarbounis (2017) explores optimal age-varying taxation numerically using the same functional form for the net tax and transfer system as we do. However, he restricts attention to optimal age-variation in the λ parameter – which controls the level of taxes – while assuming a common value for the progressivity parameter τ .

A more recent literature studies the role of age variation in the Mirrlees optimal taxation framework. Three papers are especially related to our work. The first paper is by Weinzierl (2011), who focuses on the rising age profile of wages, and on how these profiles differ across skill groups. His key finding, namely that optimal average and marginal tax rates are both rising with age, is qualitatively similar to ours when the only operational channel is life-cycle productivity. The second related paper is Farhi and Werning (2013), who analyze taxation in a dynamic life-cycle economy. They focus on the role of persistent productivity shocks. In their numerical example, the fully optimal history-dependent tax schedule displays the same qualitative features as our model when our risk channel is the only one operative: average wedges increase with age, average labor earnings are falling with age, and average consumption is constant. These findings are mirrored in the work of Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2016), who focus on the additional effect of skewness of wage shocks. Ndiaye (2017) extends Farhi and Werning to model a discrete retirement choice, which reduces optimal marginal tax rates around the age of retirement when labor supply is relatively elastic.

More recently, the Mirrleesian strand of the optimal tax literature has begun incorporating endogenous human capital accumulation into the optimal design problem.¹ Most closely related to ours are the papers by Best and Kleven (2013) and Stantcheva (2017). Best and Kleven (2013) extend the canonical Mirrleesian framework to incorporate endogenous on-the-job learning in a model where working more hours increases

¹See, for example, Kapička (2015), and Findeisen and Sachs (2016).

productivity throughout one’s career. This mechanism makes the labor supply elasticity lower for the young (whose return to work accrues also in the future) and offers an argument for decreasing marginal taxes with age. In our paper, we abstract from learning by working and highlight the role of skill acquisition before entry in the labor market. Stantcheva (2017) studies optimal Mirrleesian taxation over the life cycle in a model where individuals can endogenously accumulate human capital by spending on education. Her analysis has a different focus from ours for two reasons. First, she studies the role of human capital in increasing or reducing wage risk, depending on whether or not human capital is a complement to exogenous –and risky– labor productivity. Second, we model the skill investment cost entirely in utility terms and thus in our model there is no scope for education subsidies or income contingent loans which emerge as part of the constrained-efficient solution in Stantcheva’s framework.

Interestingly, recent contributions in this literature have demonstrated that indexing tax rates by age can capture most of the potential welfare gains from fully optimal, history-dependent policies (e.g., Farhi and Werning 2013; Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski 2016; Stantcheva 2017; and Weinzierl, 2011).

With respect to this existing set of results, our contribution is threefold. First, our closed-form expression for social welfare as a function of τ and the structural parameters of the model describing preferences, technology, ex ante heterogeneity, and ex-post uncertainty leads to a transparent characterization. Each term in our welfare expression has an economic interpretation and embodies one of the channels shaping the optimal progressivity trade-off discussed above. Second, we find that the life-cycle channel is quantitatively most important in the first half of the working life, when average wages are rising fast, while the uninsurable risk matters more later in life as permanent shocks cumulate. This distinction explains our novel result that optimal progressivity is U-shaped in age. Third, we identify a new motive for age variation in taxation that hinges on the presence of endogenous and irreversible skill investment. This new channel induces age dependence in optimal progressivity even with a flat age-wage profile and no uninsurable risk.

The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 lay out the economic environment and solve for the competitive equilibrium given a tax policy. Section 4 derives analytical properties of optimal taxes in steady state and during the transition. Section 6 studies the quantitative implications of allowing for age variation in taxes and quantifies the welfare gain of introducing such fiscal tools. Section 7 develops the extension of the model with intertemporal trade. 8 concludes the paper.

2 Economic Environment

Demographics: The model has a standard over-lapping generations structure. Agents enter the economy at age $a = 0$ and live for A periods. The total population is of mass one, and thus each age group is of mass $1/A$. There are no intergenerational links. We index agents by $i \in [0, 1]$. To simplify notation, we will abstract from time subscripts until we explore transition from one tax system to another in Section 5.2.

Life cycle: Upon birth, individuals have a chance to invest in skills s_i . Once the individual has chosen s_i , he or she enters the labor market. The individual provides $h_i \geq 0$ hours of labor supply, consumes a private good c_i , and enjoys a publicly provided good G .² Each period he or she faces stochastic fluctuations in labor productivity z_i .

Preferences: Expected lifetime utility over private consumption, hours worked, publicly provided goods, and skill investment effort for individual i is given by

$$U_i = -v_i(s_i) + \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^A} \right) \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \beta^a u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G), \quad (2)$$

where $\beta \leq 1$ is the discount factor, common to all individuals, and the expectation is taken over future idiosyncratic productivity shocks, whose process is described below. The disutility of the initial skill investment $s_i \geq 0$ takes the form

$$v_i(s_i) = \frac{(\kappa_i)^{-1/\psi}}{1 + 1/\psi} (s_i)^{1+1/\psi}, \quad (3)$$

where the parameter $\psi \geq 0$ controls the elasticity of skill investment with respect to the marginal return to skill, and $\kappa_i \geq 0$ is an individual-specific parameter that determines the utility cost of acquiring skills. The larger is κ_i , the smaller is the cost, so one can think of κ_i as indexing innate learning ability. We assume that $\kappa_i \sim \text{Exp}(\eta)$, an exponential distribution with parameter η . As we demonstrate below, exponentially distributed ability yields Pareto right tails in the equilibrium wage and earnings distributions. Skill investment decisions are irreversible, and thus skills are fixed through the life cycle.³

² G has two possible interpretations. The first is that it is a pure public good, such as national defense or the judicial system. The second is that it is an excludable good produced by the government and distributed uniformly across households, such as public education.

³The baseline model in Heathcote et al. (2017) assumes reversible skill investment. Given reversible investment, the skill investment decision is essentially static, whereas in the present model it will be a dynamic decision.

The period utility function u_i is

$$u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G) = \log c_{ia} - \frac{\exp[(1 + \sigma)(\bar{\varphi}_a + \varphi_i)]}{1 + \sigma} (h_{ia})^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G, \quad (4)$$

where $\exp[(1 + \sigma)(\varphi_i + \bar{\varphi}_a)]$ measures the disutility of work effort. The profile $\{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$ captures the common and deterministic evolution in the disutility of work as individuals age. The parameter φ_i is a fixed individual effect that is normally distributed: $\varphi_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\frac{v_\varphi}{2}, v_\varphi)$, where v_φ denotes the cross-sectional variance. We assume that κ_i and φ_i are uncorrelated. The parameter $\sigma > 0$ determines aversion to hours fluctuations. Finally, $\chi \geq 0$ measures the taste for the publicly-provided good G relative to private consumption.

Technology: Output Y is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of effective hours supplied by the continuum of skill types $s \in [0, \infty)$,

$$Y = \left(\int_0^\infty [\bar{N}(s) \cdot m(s)]^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} ds \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}, \quad (5)$$

where $\theta > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution across skill types, $\bar{N}(s)$ denotes average effective hours worked by individuals of skill type s , and $m(s)$ is the density of individuals with skill type s . Note that all skill levels enter symmetrically in the production technology, and thus any equilibrium differences in skill prices will reflect relative scarcity.

Labor productivity and earnings: Log individual labor efficiency z_{ia} is the sum of three orthogonal components, x_a , α_{ia} , and ε_{ia} ,

$$z_{ia} = x_a + \alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia}. \quad (6)$$

The first component x_a captures the deterministic age profile of labor productivity, common for all individuals. The second component α_{ia} captures idiosyncratic shocks that cannot be insured privately, and follows the unit root process $\alpha_{ia} = \alpha_{i,a-1} + \omega_{ia}$, with i.i.d. innovation $\omega_{ia} \sim \mathcal{N}(-\frac{v_\omega}{2}, v_\omega)$ and initial value $\alpha_{i0} = 0$. The third component ε_{ia} captures idiosyncratic shocks that can be insured privately. The only property of the time series process for ε_{ia} that will matter for our welfare expressions and optimal taxation results is the age profile for the cross-sectional variance, v_{ε_a} . For expositional simplicity we will therefore assume, without loss of generality, that shocks to ε are drawn independently over time from a Normal distribution, $\varepsilon_{ia} \sim$

$\mathcal{N}(-v_{\varepsilon a}/2, v_{\varepsilon a})$, where $v_{\varepsilon 0}$ captures the variance at age zero.

A standard law of large numbers ensures that none of the individual-level shocks induce any aggregate uncertainty in the economy.

Individual earnings y_{ia} are, therefore, the product of four components:

$$y_{ia} = \underbrace{p(s_i)}_{\text{skill price}} \times \underbrace{\exp(x_a)}_{\text{age-productivity profile}} \times \underbrace{\exp(\alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia})}_{\text{labor market shocks}} \times \underbrace{h_{ia}}_{\text{hours}}. \quad (7)$$

The first component $p(s_i)$ is the equilibrium price for the type of labor supplied by an individual with skills s_i ; the second component is the life-cycle profile of average labor efficiency; the third component is individual stochastic labor efficiency; and the fourth component is the number of hours worked by the individual. Thus, individual earnings are determined by (i) skill investments made before labor market entry, in turn reflecting innate learning ability κ_i ; (ii) productivity that grows exogenously with experience; (iii) fortune in labor market outcomes determined by the realization of idiosyncratic efficiency shocks; and (iv) work effort, reflecting, in part, innate and age-varying taste for leisure, defined by φ_i and $\bar{\varphi}_a$. Taxation affects the equilibrium pre-tax earnings distribution by changing skill investment choices, and thus skill prices, and by changing labor supply decisions.

Financial assets: We adopt a simplified version of the partial-insurance structure developed in Heathcote et al. (2014a). There is a full set of state-contingent claims for each realization of the ε shock, implying that variation in ε is fully insurable. These claims are traded within the period. Let $B_{ia}(\varepsilon)$ and $Q(\varepsilon)$ denote the quantity and the price, respectively, of insurance claims purchased that pay one unit of consumption if and only if $\varepsilon \in \mathbf{e} \subseteq \mathbb{R}$.⁴ In Section 7 we introduce borrowing and lending, solve for the equilibrium numerically, and explore how this alternative market structure changes optimal tax policy.⁵

Labor and goods markets: The final consumption good and all types of labor services are traded in competitive markets. The final good is the numéraire of the economy.

⁴An alternative way to decentralize insurance with respect to ε is to assume that individuals belong to large families, and that shocks to α are common across members of a given family, while shocks to ε are purely idiosyncratic and thus can be pooled within the family.

⁵In Heathcote et al. (2014), we allowed agents to trade a single non-contingent bond and showed that there is an equilibrium in which this bond is not traded, given that idiosyncratic wage shocks follow a unit root process. This result does not generalize to the present model because age variation in efficiency and disutility ($x_a, \bar{\varphi}_a$) and in the tax parameters τ_a and λ_a introduce motives for intertemporal borrowing and lending.

Government: The government runs a tax and transfer scheme and provides each household with an amount of goods or services equal to G . This public good can only be provided by the government which transforms final goods into G one for one. Let g denote government expenditures as a fraction of aggregate output (i.e., $G = gY$).

Let $T_a(y)$ be net tax revenues at income level y for age group a . We study optimal policies within the class of tax and transfer schemes defined by the function

$$T_a(y) = y - \lambda_a y^{1-\tau_a}, \quad (8)$$

where the parameters τ_a and λ_a are specific to age group a . The specification of eq. (8) with age-invariant parameters has a long tradition in public finance (Feldstein 1969; Persson 1983; Bénabou 2000 and 2002; Heathcote et al. 2014 and 2017). Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2016) show that in a static environment this functional form closely approximates the fully optimal Mirrleesian policy.

The parameter τ_a determines the degree of progressivity of the tax system and is the key object of interest in our analysis. There are two ways to see why τ_a is a natural index of progressivity. First, eq. (8) implies the following mapping between individual disposable (post-government) earnings \tilde{y} and pre-government earnings y :

$$\tilde{y} = \lambda_a y^{1-\tau_a}. \quad (9)$$

Thus, $(1 - \tau_a)$ measures the elasticity of disposable to pre-tax income. Second, a tax scheme is commonly labeled progressive (regressive) if the ratio of marginal to average tax rates is larger (smaller) than one for every level of income y . Within our class, we have

$$\frac{1 - T'_a(y)}{1 - T_a(y)/y} = 1 - \tau_a. \quad (10)$$

When $\tau_a > 0$, marginal rates always exceed average rates, and the tax system is therefore progressive. Conversely, when $\tau_a < 0$, the tax system is regressive. The case $\tau_a = 0$ implies that marginal and average tax rates are equal: the system is a flat tax with rate $1 - \lambda_a$.

Given τ_a , the second parameter, λ_a , shifts the tax function and determines the average level of taxation in the economy. At the break-even income level $y_a^0 = (\lambda_a)^{\frac{1}{\tau_a}} > 0$, the average tax rate is zero and the marginal tax rate is τ_a for that age group. If the system is progressive (regressive), then at every income level below (above) y_a^0 , the average tax rate is negative and households obtain a net transfer from the government.

Thus, this function is best seen as a *tax and transfer* schedule, a property that has implications for the empirical measurement of τ_a . The income-weighted average marginal tax rate (MTR) at age a given this tax and transfer schedule is

$$\mathbb{E}[MTR_a] = 1 - \lambda_a(1 - \tau_a) \frac{\int (y_{ia})^{1-\tau_a} di}{\int y_{ia} di}. \quad (11)$$

The government must run a balanced budget, and the government budget constraint is therefore

$$g \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int y_{ia} di = \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int [y_{ia} - \lambda_a (y_{ia})^{1-\tau_a}] di. \quad (12)$$

The government chooses g and the sequences $\{\tau_a, \lambda_a\}_{a=0}^{A-1}$, with one instrument being determined residually by eq. (B3). Since the budget constraint holds at the aggregate level (not at the level of each age group), the government can redistribute both within and between age groups.

The rate of transformation between private and public consumption is one, and thus the aggregate resource constraint for the economy (recall population has measure 1 so aggregates equal averages) is

$$Y = G + \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int_0^1 c_{ia} di. \quad (13)$$

2.1 Individual problem

At age $a = 0$, the individual chooses a skill level, given her idiosyncratic draw (κ_i, φ_i) . Combining eqs. (2) and (3), the first-order necessary and sufficient condition for the skill choice is

$$\frac{\partial v_i(s_i)}{\partial s_i} = \left(\frac{s_i}{\kappa_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^A} \right) \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \beta^a \frac{\partial u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G)}{\partial s_i}. \quad (14)$$

Thus, the marginal disutility of skill investment for an individual with learning ability κ_i must equal the discounted present value of the corresponding expected benefits in the form of higher lifetime wages. Recall that initial skill investments are irreversible, and thus agents cannot supplement or unwind past skill investments over the rest of their life cycle.

At the beginning of every period of working life a , the innovation ω_{ia} to the random walk shock α_{ia} is realized. Then, the insurance markets against the ε_{ia} shocks open

and the individual buys insurance claims $B(\cdot)$. Finally, ε_{ia} is realized, insurance claims pay out, and the individual chooses hours h_{ia} , receives wage payments, and chooses consumption expenditures c_{ia} . Thus, the individual budget constraint in the middle of the period, when the insurance purchases are made, is

$$\int_{\varepsilon} Q(\varepsilon) B_{ia}(\varepsilon) d\varepsilon = 0, \quad (15)$$

and the budget constraint at the end of the period, after the realization of ε_{ia} , is

$$c_{ia} = \lambda_a [p(s_i) \exp(x_a + \alpha_{ia} + \varepsilon_{ia}) h_{ia}]^{1-\tau_a} + B(\varepsilon_{ia}). \quad (16)$$

Given an initial skill choice s_i , the problem for an agent is to choose insurance purchases, consumption, and hours worked in order to maximize lifetime utility (2) subject to sequences of budget constraints (15)-(16), taking as given the process for efficiency units described in eq. (6). In addition, agents face non-negativity constraints on consumption and hours worked.

3 Equilibrium

We now adopt a recursive formulation to define a stationary competitive equilibrium for our economy. The state vector for the skill accumulation decision at age $a = 0$ is just the pair of fixed individual effects (κ, φ) . At subsequent ages, the state vector for the beginning-of-the-period decision when insurance claims are purchased is (φ, s, a, α) . The individual state vector for the end-of-period consumption and labor supply decisions is $(\varphi, s, a, \alpha, \varepsilon)$.⁶ Note that age is a state variable for two reasons: (i) labor productivity and the disutility of work vary with age, and (ii) the parameters of the tax system potentially vary with age. What makes the model tractable, in spite of all the heterogeneity and risk it features, is that all the individual states are exogenous.

We now define a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for our economy. Stationarity requires that equilibrium skill prices are constant over time, which in turn requires an invariant skill distribution $m(s)$. A stationary skill distribution is consistent with a time-invariant tax schedule, which is the focus of our steady-state welfare analysis. However, when we later consider optimal once-and-for-all tax reforms and incorporate the transition from the current tax system, the economy-wide skill

⁶Since equilibrium insurance payout $B(\varepsilon; \varphi, s, a, \alpha)$ are a function of all the other individual states, they are redundant and in what follows we omit them from the state vector.

distribution will vary deterministically over time. In this case, an additional assumption is required to preserve tractability. We return to the transition case in Section 5.2.

Given a tax/transfer system $(\{\tau_a\}, \{\lambda_a\})$, a *stationary recursive competitive equilibrium* for our economy is a public good provision level g , asset prices $Q(\cdot)$, skill prices $p(s)$, decision rules $s(\kappa, \varphi)$, $c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha, \varepsilon)$, $h(\varphi, s, a, \alpha, \varepsilon)$, and $B(\cdot; \varphi, s, a, \alpha)$, effective hours by skill $\bar{N}(s)$, and a skill density $m(s)$ such that:

1. Households solve the problem described in Section 2.1, and $s(\kappa, \varphi)$, $c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha, \varepsilon)$, $h(\varphi, s, a, \alpha, \varepsilon)$, and $B(\cdot; \varphi, s, a, \alpha)$ are the associated decision rules.
2. Labor markets for each skill type clear and $p(s)$ is the value of the marginal product from an additional unit of effective hours of skill type s :

$$p(s) = \left(\frac{Y}{\bar{N}(s) \cdot m(s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}.$$

3. Insurance markets clear and the prices $Q(\cdot)$ of insurance claims equal the probabilities that the realization for ε is in the corresponding set.
4. The government budget is balanced: g satisfies eq. (B3).

Propositions 1 and 2 below describe the equilibrium allocations and skill prices in closed form. The benefits from analytical tractability is evident in Propositions 3 and 4, where we derive a set of results for optimal taxation based on a closed-form expression for social welfare. In what follows, we make explicit the dependence of equilibrium allocations and prices on $(\{\tau_a\}, \{\lambda_a\})$ in preparation for our analysis of the optimal taxation problem. Moreover, from now on we express the arguments in the decision rules using the minimum set of payoff-relevant state variables.

Proposition 1 [hours and consumption]. *The equilibrium allocations of hours worked and consumption are given by*

$$\log h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon) = \frac{\log(1 - \tau_a)}{1 + \sigma} - (\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{\sigma + \tau_a} \right) \varepsilon - \frac{1}{\sigma + \tau_a} \mathcal{C}_a, \quad (17)$$

$$\log c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha) = \log \lambda_a + (1 - \tau_a) \left[\log p(s) + x_a + \alpha + \frac{\log(1 - \tau_a)}{1 + \sigma} - (\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a) \right] + \mathcal{C}_a, \quad (18)$$

where $\mathcal{C}_a = (v_{\varepsilon a}/2) \cdot (1 - \tau_a) (1 - 2\tau_a - \sigma\tau_a) / (\sigma + \tau_a)$.

With logarithmic utility and zero individual wealth, the income and substitution effects on labor supply from differences in skill levels s , experience x_a , and uninsurable shocks α exactly offset, and hours worked are therefore independent of (s, x_a, α) and λ_a (the level of taxation) and depend on age only through the age-dependent progressivity rate τ_a and the constant \mathcal{C}_a . The hours allocation is composed of four terms. The first term captures the effect of taxes on labor supply in the absence of within-age heterogeneity. This can be interpreted as the hours of a “representative agent” of age a . This term falls with progressivity. The second captures the fact that a higher disutility of work leads an agent to choose lower hours. The third term captures that the response of hours worked to an insurable shock ε . Note that it has no income effect precisely because it is insurable. The response here is proportional to what we label the tax-modified Frisch elasticity $(1 - \tau_a)/(\sigma + \tau_a)$. This elasticity collapses to the standard Frisch elasticity $1/\sigma$ when $\tau_a = 0$. Note that a progressive system ($\tau_a > 0$) dampens the response of hours to insurable shocks. The fourth term captures the welfare-improving effect of insurable wage variation. As illustrated by Heathcote et al. (2008), greater dispersion of insurable shocks allows agents to work more when they are more productive and take more leisure when they are less productive, thereby raising average productivity, average leisure, and welfare. Progressivity weakens this effect because it reduces the covariance between hours and wages.

Consumption is increasing in the skill level s (because the skill price $p(s)$ is increasing in s), in the age profile of efficiency units x_a , and in the uninsurable component of wages α . Since hours worked are decreasing in the disutility of work, so are earnings and consumption. The redistributive role of progressive taxation is evident from the fact that a larger τ_a shrinks the pass-through to consumption from heterogeneity in initial conditions s and φ and from realizations of uninsurable shocks α and efficiency units x_a . A lower level of taxation (higher λ_a) increases consumption. Insurable variation in productivity has a positive level effect on average consumption in addition to average leisure. Again, higher progressivity weakens this effect. Because of the assumed separability between consumption and leisure in preferences, consumption is independent of the insurable shock ε .

Proposition 2 [skill price and skill choice]. *In a stationary recursive equilibrium, skill prices are given by*

$$\log p(s) = \pi_0(\bar{\tau}) + \pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \cdot s, \quad (19)$$

where $\bar{\tau}$ is discounted average progressivity, $\bar{\tau} = \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^A} \right) \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \beta^a \tau_a$, and the functions

π_1 and π_0 are given by

$$\pi_1(\bar{\tau}) = \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} (1-\bar{\tau})^{-\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \quad (20)$$

$$\pi_0(\bar{\tau}) = \frac{1}{\theta-1} \left\{ \frac{1}{1+\psi} \left[\psi \log\left(\frac{1-\bar{\tau}}{\theta}\right) - \log(\eta) \right] + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) \right\}. \quad (21)$$

The skill investment allocation is given by

$$s(\kappa, \bar{\tau}) = [(1-\bar{\tau})\pi_1(\bar{\tau})]^\psi \cdot \kappa = \left[\frac{\eta}{\theta}(1-\bar{\tau})\right]^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \cdot \kappa, \quad (22)$$

and the equilibrium skill density $m(s)$ is exponential with parameter $\eta^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} [\theta/(1-\bar{\tau})]^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}$.

Note, first, that the log of the equilibrium skill price takes a ‘‘Mincerian’’ form in the sense that it is an affine function of s . The constant $\pi_0(\bar{\tau})$ is the base log price of the lowest skill level ($s=0$), and $\pi_1(\bar{\tau})$ is the pre-tax marginal return to skill.

Eq. (20) indicates that higher progressivity increases the equilibrium *pre-tax* marginal return $\pi_1(\bar{\tau})$. The reason is that increasing progressivity compresses the skill distribution toward zero, and as high skill types become more scarce, imperfect substitutability in production drives up the pre-tax return to skill. Thus, our model features a ‘‘Stiglitz effect’’ (Stiglitz 1985). The larger is ψ , the more sensitive is skill investment to a given increase in $\bar{\tau}$, and thus the larger is the increase in the pre-tax skill premium.

Note that the only aspect of the policy sequence $(\{\tau_a\}, \{\lambda_a\})$ that matters for the skill investment decision and the skill price function is discounted average progressivity, $\bar{\tau}$. Moreover, skill investment is also independent of initial heterogeneity in (φ, ε_0) , of the age profiles $(x_a, \bar{\varphi}_a)$, and of risk $(v_\alpha, v_\varepsilon)$. The logic is that, with log utility, the welfare gain from additional skill investment is proportional to the log change in earnings such investment would induce, and this log change is independent of all idiosyncratic states.

Corollary 2.1 [distribution of skill prices]. *In a stationary equilibrium, the distribution of log skill premia $\pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \cdot s(\kappa; \bar{\tau})$ is exponential with parameter θ . Thus, the variance of log skill prices is*

$$\text{var}(\log p(s)) = \frac{1}{\theta^2}.$$

The distribution of skill prices $p(s)$ in levels is Pareto with scale (lower bound) parameter $\exp(\pi_0(\bar{\tau}))$ and Pareto parameter θ .

Log skill premia are exponentially distributed because the log skill price is affine in skill s (eq. 19) and skills retain the exponential shape of the distribution of learning ability κ (eq. 22). It is interesting that inequality in skill prices is independent of the policy sequence $(\{\tau_a\}, \{\lambda_a\})$. The reason is that progressivity sets in motion two offsetting forces. On the one hand, as discussed earlier, higher progressivity increases the equilibrium skill premium $\pi_1(\bar{\tau})$, which tends to raise inequality in skill prices (the Stiglitz effect). On the other hand, higher progressivity compresses the distribution of skill quantities. These two forces exactly cancel out under our specification of preferences and technology.

Since the exponent of an exponentially distributed random variable is Pareto, the distribution of skill prices in levels is Pareto with parameter θ . The other stochastic components of wages (and hours worked) are lognormal, and thus the equilibrium distributions of wages, earnings, and consumption are Pareto-lognormal. In particular, because the Pareto component dominates at the top, they have Pareto right tails, a robust feature of their empirical counterparts (see, e.g., Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011). We now describe how taxation affects aggregate quantities in our model.

Corollary 2.2 [aggregate quantities]. *Average hours worked, average effective hours and average output are given by $H(\{\tau_a\}) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} H(a, \tau_a)$, $\bar{N}(\{\tau_a\}) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} N(a, \tau_a)$, and $Y(\{\tau_a\}) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau})$, where:*

$$H(a, \tau_a) = \mathbb{E}[h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon)] \tag{23}$$

$$= (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp(-\bar{\varphi}_a) \cdot \exp\left[\frac{(1 - \tau_a)(2\tau_a + \sigma(1 + \tau_a))v_{\varepsilon a}}{(\sigma + \tau_a)^2} \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2}\right].$$

$$N(a, \tau_a) = \mathbb{E}[\exp(x_a + \alpha + \varepsilon)h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon)] \tag{24}$$

$$= (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp\left[x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{(\sigma + \tau_a)^2}(\sigma + 2\tau_a + \sigma\tau_a)\right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2}\right].$$

$$Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) = \mathbb{E}[p(s, \bar{\tau})] \cdot N(a, \tau_a), \tag{25}$$

with $\mathbb{E}[p(s, \bar{\tau})] = \exp(\pi_0(\bar{\tau})) \cdot \theta / (\theta - 1)$.

4 Social welfare function

The baseline utilitarian social welfare function we use to evaluate alternative policies puts equal weight on all agents within a cohort. In our context, where agents have different disutilities of work effort, we define equal weights to mean that the planner cares equally about the utility from consumption of all agents. Thus, the contribution

to social welfare from any given cohort is the within-cohort average value of remaining expected lifetime utility, where eq. (2) defines individual expected lifetime utility at age zero. The overlapping-generations structure of the model also requires us to take a stand on how the government weights cohorts that enter the economy at different dates. We assume that the planner discounts lifetime utility of future generations at the same rate β as individuals discount utility over the life cycle.

We start by focusing on optimal steady state policy, defined as the optimal time-invariant policy $\left(\{\tau_a, \lambda_a\}_{a=0}^{A-1}, G\right)$ that maximizes welfare in the associated steady state. In a steady state, expected lifetime utility is identical for each cohort. Moreover, given the assumption that the planner discounts across generations at rate β , average social welfare $\mathcal{W}^{ss}(\{\tau_a, \lambda_a\}, g)$ is simply equal to average utility in a cross-section:

$$\mathcal{W}^{ss}(\{\tau_a, \lambda_a\}, G) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \mathbb{E}[u(c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha), h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon), G)] - \mathbb{E}[v(s(\kappa), \kappa)], \quad (26)$$

where the first expectation is taken with respect to the equilibrium cross-sectional distribution of $(\varphi, s, \alpha, \varepsilon)$ conditional on a , and the second expectation is with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of (s, κ) . The ‘Ramsey problem’ of the government is to choose $\left(\{\tau_a, \lambda_a\}_{a=0}^{A-1}, G\right)$ in order to maximize (26) subject to the government budget constraint (B3), where lifetime utilities are given by (2), equilibrium allocations are given by (17), (18) and (22), and equilibrium skill prices are given by (19).

In Section 5.2 we will consider optimal time-varying policies that maximize welfare incorporating transition from the current tax system. In particular, we will assume an unanticipated policy change at date $t = 0$ from a pre-existing age- and time-invariant policy to a new policy regime in which the new policy parameters can vary freely by both age and time. The irreversibility of the existing stock of skills induces transitional dynamics towards the new steady state.

There are two special cases in which policies that maximize steady state welfare are identical – in welfare terms – to those that maximize welfare incorporating transition. The first is the case in which $\beta \rightarrow 1$. In this case, there is a transition to the new steady state, but because the planner is perfectly patient, existing cohorts receive zero weight in social welfare relative to the planner’s concern for future cohorts. Thus, the planner effectively seeks to maximize steady-state welfare.⁷ In particular, note that when $\beta = 1$ social welfare is simply expected lifetime utility for a cohort entering in

⁷Note that here we are assuming that under the optimal policy the economy does indeed converge to a steady state.

the new steady state, U^{ss} . Then note that in the expression for lifetime utility (eq. 2), the weight $\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^A}\beta^a \rightarrow \frac{1}{A}$ as $\beta \rightarrow 1$.

The second special case in which incorporating transition makes no difference is the case in which skills are perfect substitutes ($\theta \rightarrow \infty$) so that there is no skill investment in equilibrium. In this case, transition in response to a change in the tax system is instantaneous, and social welfare incorporating transition is therefore equal to average period utility in the cross section – that is, equal to steady-state welfare.⁸

5 Optimal Age-Dependent Taxes: Characterization

For ease of exposition, it is convenient to begin by abstracting from transitional dynamics, and to consider optimal policy design in steady state with $\beta = 1$. This approach has also the advantage that we can derive a number of analytical results for optimal taxation. Recall that given $\beta = 1$, transition is irrelevant for welfare, so the policy that is optimal in steady state can also be interpreted as a policy that maximizes welfare incorporating transition.

5.1 Steady-state welfare

We start by characterizing the optimal choices of g and $\{\lambda_a\}$ for any given sequence of age-dependent progressivity $\{\tau_a\}$.

Proposition 3 [optimal g and $\{\lambda_a\}$]. *For any given sequence $\{\tau_a\}$: (i) The optimal output share of government expenditures g^* is given by*

$$g^* = \frac{\chi}{1 + \chi}.$$

(ii) *The optimal sequence $\{\lambda_a^*\}$ equalizes average consumption across age groups.*

Part (i) re-establishes a result in Heathcote et al. (2017) in our more general environment with an age-dependent tax system. The optimal fraction of output devoted to public goods is independent of how much inequality there is in the economy and independent of the progressivity of the tax system. It only depends only on households' relative taste for the public good χ . Since g does not appear in the equilibrium allocations for hours worked or skill investment, changing g will not affect aggregate income

⁸Another way to achieve an instantaneous transition to the new steady state is to assume that skill investment is fully reversible at any age and date. In our view, irreversible skill investment is the more realistic case.

or its distribution across households. As a consequence, the government's only concern in choosing g is to optimally divide output between private and public consumption, exactly as in a representative agent version of our economy. In particular, the planner chooses public spending so as to equate the marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption to the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods, the so-called 'Samuelson condition.'

The result in part (ii) states that the planner modulates the level of taxation for each age group $\{\lambda_a\}$ in order to equate the marginal utility of average consumption (and hence consumption, with separable utility) across age groups. This result indicates that the government, through the sequence of $\{\lambda_a\}$ can effectively replicate the role of life-cycle borrowing and saving, absent in the model by assumption, in smoothing predictable life-cycle income variation.

Exploiting these two results, one can substitute the optimal decisions for g^* and $\{\lambda_a^*\}$ into \mathcal{W}^{ss} and, by plugging in the closed-form expressions described above for equilibrium allocations, one can express steady state welfare analytically as a function of model parameters and of the vector of age-dependent progressivity $\{\tau_a\}$ as follows (up to an irrelevant constant):

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{W}^{ss}(\{\tau_a\}) = & -\frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\frac{1 - \tau_a}{1 + \sigma}}_{\text{Disutility of labor}} & (27) \\
& + (1 + \chi) \log \underbrace{\left\{ \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp \left[x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a + \left(\frac{\tau_a (1 + \hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a^2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2} \right] \right\}}_{\text{Effective hours } \bar{N}_a} \\
& + (1 + \chi) \underbrace{\frac{1}{(1 + \psi)(\theta - 1)} \left[\psi \log(1 - \bar{\tau}) + \log \left(\frac{1}{\eta \theta^\psi} \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right)^{\theta(1+\psi)} \right) \right]}_{\text{Productivity: } \log(\text{average skill price}) = \log(E[p(s)])} \\
& - \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{1 - \bar{\tau}}{\theta}}_{\text{Avg. education cost}} + \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\left[\log \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{\theta} \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{\theta} \right) \right]}_{\text{Consumption dispersion across skills}} \\
& - \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} (1 - \tau_a)^2 (v_\varphi + av_\omega)}_{\text{Cons. dispersion due to unins. shocks and preference heterogeneity}} .
\end{aligned}$$

Each term in this welfare function has the economic interpretation described under each bracket. For more details, see Heathcote et al. (2017). The following proposition

establishes some properties of $\mathcal{W}^{ss}(\{\tau_a\})$ and of optimal age-dependent progressivity.

Proposition 4 [optimal age dependent progressivity]. *The social welfare function $W^{ss}(\{\tau_a\})$ is differentiable and globally concave in τ_a provided that σ is sufficiently large (a sufficient condition is that $\sigma \geq 2$). Moreover:*

(i) *The necessary and sufficient first-order condition $\partial \mathcal{W}^{ss}(\{\tau_a\}) / \partial \tau_a = 0$ implicitly determining the optimal τ_a^* can be stated analytically as:*

$$0 = \frac{1}{\theta - 1 + \tau_a^*} - \frac{1}{\theta} + (1 - \tau_a^*)(v_\varphi + av_\omega) + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} + \quad (28)$$

$$- \left[\left(\frac{1 + \chi}{\theta - 1} \right) \frac{1}{1 - \bar{\tau}(\{\tau_a^*\})} - \frac{1}{\theta} \right] \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi}$$

$$- \left(\frac{1 + \chi}{1 + \sigma} \right) \left[\frac{1}{1 - \tau_a^*} + \left(\frac{\sigma + 1}{\sigma + \tau_a^*} \right)^3 \tau_a^* v_{\varepsilon a} \right] \frac{N(a, \tau_a^*)}{\bar{N}(\{\tau_a^*\})},$$

(ii) *The optimal sequence $\{\tau_a^*\}$ is age invariant if the following four conditions simultaneously hold: (1) uninsurable risk does not change over the life cycle ($v_\omega = 0$), (2) insurable risk does not change over the life cycle ($v_{\varepsilon a}$ is constant), (3) the age profiles of efficiency units and disutility of work $\{x_a\}, \{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$ are constant.*

(iii) *Relative to the parameterization described in (ii), introducing permanent uninsurable risk ($v_\omega > 0$) translates into an optimal profile $\{\tau_a^*\}$ that is increasing in age.*

(iv) *Relative to the parameterization described in (ii), introducing age-invariant insurable risk ($v_{\varepsilon 0} > 0$) maintains a flat profile for τ_a^* but it pushes it toward zero. If the variance of insurable risk increases with age ($v_{\varepsilon, a+1} > v_{\varepsilon, a}$) and if $\tau_a^* > 0$ at age a , then $\tau_{a+1}^* < \tau_a^*$.*

(v) *Relative to the parameterization described in (ii), introducing age variation in efficiency units net of disutility $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$ translates into an optimal profile $\{\tau_a^*\}$ that is the mirror image of the profile for $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$.*

The Appendix features the closed form expression for the steady-state welfare function which yields the first-order condition in part (i). Each term in this welfare function can be given an intuitive economic interpretation, along the lines of the analysis contained in Heathcote et al. (2017). The Appendix also contain a formal proof of this proposition: in what follows, we offer some intuition for results (ii)-(iv).

(ii) In this special case with $\beta = 1$, the FOC simplifies to an expression where age a does not appear, hence τ_a^* is constant.⁹ Without loss of generality, to simplify

⁹Note that as $\beta \rightarrow 1$, $\bar{\tau} \rightarrow A^{-1} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} \tau_a$.

the exposition, consider the case $\theta \rightarrow \infty$ for which the FOC simplifies to

$$0 = (1 - \tau^*) v_\varphi + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} - \left(\frac{1 + \chi}{1 + \sigma} \right) \frac{1}{1 - \tau^*}.$$

where τ^* is the optimal age-invariant τ . It is immediate that τ^* is increasing in preference heterogeneity v_φ , and is decreasing in the taste for the public good χ . Note that when $v_\varphi = 0$, $\tau^* = -\chi$. As we show in Heathcote et al. (2017), in this representative agent version of the model (without any source of ex-ante or ex-post heterogeneity) a regressive tax system induces higher labor supply and thereby corrects a public good externality.

(iii) Now consider the role of uninsurable risk. To isolate this force, we focus on the case where this is the only source of heterogeneity and $\chi = 0$. The first-order condition (28) then simplifies to

$$0 = (1 - \tau_a^*) a v_\omega + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} \left[1 - \frac{(1 - \tau_a^*)^{-\frac{\sigma}{1+\sigma}}}{A^{-1} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} (1 - \tau_j^*)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}}} \right].$$

When $v_\omega > 0$, the first term is increasing in age a , and to satisfy the first-order condition τ_a^* must therefore be rising in age (so as to reduce the first term and make the second term more negative). The intuition is that permanent uninsurable risk cumulates with age and the planner wants to provide more within-group risk sharing when uninsurable risk is larger. Therefore, when $v_\omega > 0$, optimal progressivity increases with age, *ceteris paribus*. We label this force the *uninsurable risk channel*.

This result is reminiscent of findings in the recent literature on dynamic Mirrleesian optimal taxation, according to which, when income shocks are persistent, the optimal average effective marginal tax rate has a positive drift over the life cycle. Farhi and Werning (2013) analyze Mirrlees taxation in a dynamic life-cycle economy. Their environment is a special case of ours, with no endogenous skill accumulation.¹⁰ In their numerical example, in which average labor productivity does not vary with age, the optimal history-dependent tax scheme has similar qualitative features to the optimal policy in our model (see Farhi and Werning 2013, Figure 2). Namely, the average effective marginal tax rate is increasing in age, average output is decreasing in age, and consumption is invariant to age.¹¹

¹⁰They also assume no preference heterogeneity and no valued government expenditures.

¹¹Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2016) show that with negatively skewed log-income shocks, the positive drift in the labor wedge is stronger in the left tail of the income distribution.

(iv) Now consider the role of insurable risk. Assume the other conditions of part (ii) of Proposition 4 are satisfied. The social welfare first-order condition (A16) is then

$$0 = (1 - \tau_a^*) v_\varphi + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} - \left(\frac{1 + \chi}{1 + \sigma} \right) \left[\frac{1}{1 - \tau_a^*} + \left(\frac{\sigma + 1}{\sigma + \tau_a^*} \right)^3 \tau_a^* v_{\varepsilon a} \right] \frac{N(a, \tau_a^*)}{\bar{N}(\{\tau_a\})}.$$

First, suppose $v_{\varepsilon a}$ is constant to isolate the role of age-invariant insurable wage variation $v_{\varepsilon 0}$. It is immediate that there is no motive for age variation in τ_a , i.e., $\tau_a^* = \tau^*$. In addition, if $\tau^* > 0$, then increasing $v_{\varepsilon 0}$ will reduce optimal progressivity, while if $\tau^* < 0$, increasing $v_{\varepsilon 0}$ will increase optimal progressivity. The intuition is that when dispersion in insurable risk increases, the cost of setting τ away from zero and distorting efficient labor supply allocations increases.

Now, consider the impact of insurable risk that increases with age between age a and $a + 1$, $v_{\varepsilon, a+1} > v_{\varepsilon a}$. Suppose parameter values are such that τ_a^* is positive, and consider the optimal value for progressivity at age $a + 1$, τ_{a+1}^* . It is clear that the derivative of the social welfare function at $a + 1$ evaluated at τ_a^* is negative (since $N(a, \tau_a^*)$ and $v_{\varepsilon a}$ are both increasing in a). We have already established that the social welfare expression is concave in τ_a for each age a . It follows that the optimal degree of progressivity at age $a + 1$ must be less than at age a , i.e., $\tau_{a+1}^* < \tau_a^*$, so that the $\{\tau_a^*\}$ profile is downward-sloping between a and $a + 1$. The intuition is that when the dispersion of the insurable risk increases with age, the cost of setting τ_a positive and thereby distorting labor supply increases. We label this force the *insurable risk channel*.

(v) Now consider the role of the life-cycle profiles of efficiency units and disutility of work. What matters is the shape of the net profile, $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$. To isolate the impact of this model ingredient, we eliminate all sources of within-age heterogeneity ($\theta \rightarrow 0$, $v_\varphi = v_{\varepsilon a} = v_\omega = 0$). The optimal value for τ at age a , τ_a^* , is then the solution to the following simplified version of the first-order condition (28) where we have substituted in the expression for effective hours (25):

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - \tau_a^* &= \left[\frac{(1 + \chi) \exp(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a)}{A^{-1} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} (1 - \tau_j^*)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp(x_j - \bar{\varphi}_a)} \right]^{\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma}} \\ &= (1 + \chi) \frac{\exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma}(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a)\right)}{A^{-1} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} \exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma}(x_j - \bar{\varphi}_j)\right)} \end{aligned}$$

This optimality condition illustrates that *ceteris paribus* the optimal τ_a^* is lower the larger is $x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a$. Moreover, this effect is stronger the higher is the Frisch elasticity (i.e.,

the lower is σ). The intuition is that, absent age variation in τ , hours worked will be independent of productivity given our utility function and tax system. The planner can therefore increase aggregate labor productivity, and welfare, by having agents working longer hours when they are more productive and it is less costly for them to supply labor. When the profile for $x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a$ is upward sloping, this introduces a force for having progressivity decline with age. We label this force the *life-cycle channel*.

Another way to understand this result is that the planner wants to smooth the labor wedge (and thus the effective marginal tax rate) over the life cycle. The effective marginal tax rate at age a in this version of the model simplifies to $1 - \lambda_a(1 - \tau_a)y_a^{-\tau_a}$, where earnings y_a are given by $\exp(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a)(1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}}$. When $x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a$ and thus earnings are increasing with age, the planner wants to have λ_a decrease with age in order to equate consumption across age groups. Absent age variation in τ_a this would imply increasing marginal tax rates. But the planner can smooth marginal tax rates by simultaneously letting τ_a decrease with age. This result is formalized in the following corollary.

Corollary 4.1 [optimal age-dependent taxation with life cycle only]. *Assume that $\theta \rightarrow \infty$, and $v_\varphi = v_{\varepsilon_a} = v_\omega = 0$ so that the only heterogeneity in the economy is between ages and driven by the profile of $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$. Then the optimal profiles $\{\tau_a^*, \lambda_a^*\}$ implement the first best. In particular, they equate both the labor wedge and consumption across age groups. The labor wedge is equal to one at all ages (the marginal tax rate is zero). The average value for τ_a , $A^{-1} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \tau_a^*$, is equal to $-\chi$.*

In light of this last set of results on the role of the life cycle, it is clear that the life-cycle productivity channel would be weaker if we introduced opportunities for intertemporal trade. In particular, if households could borrow and lend freely, then hours would tend to naturally covary positively with productivity over the life cycle, even absent age variation in τ_a . Similarly, the more easily consumption can be smoothed intertemporally through markets, the less λ_a needs to vary across ages.¹² Section 7 contains an extension where we allow individuals to access a non-state-contingent bond subject to a credit limit.

¹²This effect would also not necessarily be operative if the age-wage profile were endogenous. Examples of endogenous age-wage profiles are models with learning by doing, as in Imai and Keane (2004) and models in which skill investments take time away from work, as in Ben-Porath (1967).

5.2 Welfare with discounting and transitional dynamics

The steady state welfare expression is tractable, making it easy to understand various forces driving age variation in tax parameters. However, a complete welfare analysis requires incorporating discounting and the transition, because skill investment is an irreversible and a dynamic forward-looking decision. Because of this irreversibility, a standard issue inherent in models with sunk investments arises: in the short run, the government will be tempted to heavily tax high-skill individuals because such taxation is not distortionary *ex post*. This result is related to the temptation to tax initial physical capital in the neoclassical growth model (see also, e.g. Hassler et al. 2008 for an analysis of Ramsey taxation of human capital).

We therefore now assume $\beta < 1$ and consider an unanticipated policy change at date $t = 0$ from a pre-existing age- and time-invariant policy $\Gamma_{-1} = (\lambda_{-1}, \tau_{-1}, G_{-1})$ to a new policy regime in which the new policy parameters can vary freely by both age and time. Let $\Gamma_t = \{\lambda_{a,t+a}, \tau_{a,t+a}, G_{t+a}\}_{a=0}^{A-1}$ denote the tax and spending policy that will apply to the cohort born at date t , and let $U_t(\Gamma_t)$ denote the corresponding expected lifetime utility.

Social welfare can be written as

$$\mathcal{W}(\{\Gamma_t\}_{t=-(A-1)}^{\infty}; \Gamma_{-1}) \equiv (1 - \beta) \left[\sum_{t=-(A-1)}^{-1} \beta^t U_t^{old}(\Gamma_t; \Gamma_{-1}) + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t(\Gamma_t) \right], \quad (29)$$

The superscript ‘old’ distinguishes the existing cohorts ($t < 0$) already alive at the time of the reform – whose skill investments were made under the old age-invariant government policy Γ_{-1} – from future cohorts ($t \geq 0$) whose skill investments are made under the new optimal system. Note that remaining lifetime utility U_t^{old} for the old does not include any skill investment costs. Those investments were made in the past, and are sunk from the point of view of the government choosing a new policy.

To preserve tractability, we need to make one additional assumption relative to the baseline model, namely that production is segregated across islands defined by birth cohort. This assumption is required because each cohort now faces a potentially cohort-specific profile for progressivity, and thus the distribution for skill investment will be cohort-specific. The segregation assumption ensures that the distribution of skills within each age-group island is always exponential.¹³ There is still a single economy-

¹³Note that the key to tractability when analyzing the market for skills is that the distribution of skills is exponential (see Proposition 2). The problem with having different cohorts working in the same labor market would be that different cohorts potentially make human capital investments,

wide government budget constraint, so the planner can use the tax and transfer system to reshuffle resources across islands.

The equilibrium hours worked and consumption allocations in this version of the economy are analogous to those described above for the steady state version, with the only difference being that the fiscal policy parameters in eqs. (17)-(18) are now indexed by both age and time. Skill investment decisions are modified as follows. Let

$$\bar{\tau}_{a,t} = \mathbb{E}_{t-a} \left[\frac{(1-\beta)}{(1-\beta^A)} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} \beta^j \tau_{j,t-a+j} \right] \quad (30)$$

denote the expected discounted sequence for progressivity for the cohort entering the economy at date $t - a$. Note that for $t - a < 0$, $\bar{\tau}_{a,t} = \tau_{-1}$, while for $t - a \geq 0$, $\bar{\tau}_{a,t} = \frac{(1-\beta)}{(1-\beta^A)} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} \beta^j \tau_{j,t-a+j}$.

Skill investment choices and skill prices for any cohort are given by the same expressions as in the baseline model, except that both are now cohort specific, and depend on the expected sequence for progressivity $\bar{\tau}_{a,t}$. Because skill investment choices are irreversible, unanticipated changes to the tax system have no impact on the skill distribution or skill prices for cohorts entering before date 0.

The Ramsey problem for the planner is now to choose $\left\{ \left\{ \lambda_{a,t+a}, \tau_{a,t+a} \right\}_{a=\max\{0,-t\}}^{A-1} \right\}_{t=-(A-1)}^{\infty}$ and $\{G_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ to maximize (29) given the expressions for equilibrium allocations and the government budget constraint.

How does incorporating transition change the optimal policy prescription? First, our steady state characterizations for optimal spending and for the optimal tax level parameters $\lambda_{a,t}$ extend directly to the case incorporating transition.

Proposition 5 [optimal age dependent taxation with transition]. *Taking the transition into account, the optimal tax system has the following properties:*

- (i) *At every date t , the optimal sequence $\{\lambda_{a,t}^*\}$ equalizes average consumption across age groups.*
- (ii) *The optimal output share of government expenditures g_t^* is constant and given by*

$$g_t^* = \frac{\chi}{1 + \chi}.$$

The logic for part (i) is that, as in the steady state, the $\lambda_{a,t}$ parameters have no effect on labor supply or skill investment. The intuition for part (ii) is related:

implying different skill distributions, and a combined overall distribution of skills that would no longer be exponential (the sum of exponential random variables is not an exponential).

given that the average level of taxation does not affect output, it is optimal to set the level of government spending to equate the marginal utilities of public and private consumption.

To characterize the impact of incorporating transition on the optimal age profile of progressivity we focus now on a special case of the model in which heterogeneity in skills is the only source of heterogeneity. This strips out other sources of age variation in optimal progressivity, and allows us to focus on incentives of the planner to exploit the fact that past skill investments are sunk, and therefore insensitive to changes in the tax system. This adds a new driver shaping optimal progressivity, which we label the *sunk skill investment channel*. To obtain the sharpest characterization of this effect, we also assume inelastic labor supply.

Proposition 6 [optimal taxation with transition and inelastic labor supply].

If (i) $v_\varphi = v_\omega = v_{\varepsilon a} = 0$, (ii) the age profiles for efficiency and disutility of work are flat, and (iii) $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$ (labor supply is inelastic), then the optimal policy has the following properties: $\tau_{a,t}^* = 1$ for all $a > t$, and $\tau_{0+j,t+j}^* = \tau_{0,t}^* < 1$ for all $j = 1, \dots, A-1$ and for all $t \geq 0$.

This result states that it is optimal to impose maximally progressive taxes on all cohorts who entered the economy before the tax reform at date 0, whose past skill investments are sunk. This eliminates within-age-group consumption inequality for these cohorts, without imposing any distortions. For cohorts who enter the economy after the reform, optimal progressivity is constant over the life-cycle and less than one. It is not optimal to push progressivity to the maximum, because for these cohorts progressivity reduces skill investment. Why is progressivity constant over the life-cycle? Consider the trade-offs from a marginal increase in $\tau_{1,t+1}$ relative to $\tau_{0,t}$, starting from a flat profile. Skill investment at t is less sensitive by a factor β to $\tau_{1,t+1}$ relative to $\tau_{0,t}$ (see eq. 30). At the same time, the gain in terms of reduced consumption inequality from increasing $\tau_{1,t+1}$ relative to $\tau_{0,t}$ is also discounted by a factor β , since it enters social welfare at $t+1$ rather than at t .¹⁴

The characterization in Proposition 6 parallels the well known result that in models with physical capital, the Ramsey planner wants a declining path for capital taxes in order to expropriate existing sunk capital without excessively discouraging new investment. In our economy, the planner effectively expropriates the returns to past skill investments, without discouraging future skill investment. However, the key to

¹⁴Note that while optimal progressivity is constant within each cohort, it potentially varies across cohorts during transition.

achieving this, in the context of our OLG economy, is to have progressivity vary by cohort, rather than by time, because human capital is non-tradable, and the age of the potential human capital investor perfectly delineates whether or not the investment is sunk.

The optimal policy described in Proposition 6 dictates very different optimal progressivity values for cohorts entering the economy before versus after the reform. We have also explored the optimal policy when the planner can allow progressivity to vary by age but not by time / cohort. In particular, at the time of tax reform the planner has to choose a single age profile $\{\tau_a\}$ that will apply at every date. We retain the assumption that the other fiscal parameter $\lambda_{a,t}$ can vary freely by age and time. The key result in this case is that when $\beta < 1$, and given the parametric assumptions listed in Proposition 6, the optimal policy incorporating transition features an increasing profile for τ_a . Given Proposition 6 this result should come as no surprise: an increasing age profile for τ_a is a poor man's approximation to the ideal policy, which dictates high progressivity for the old cohorts, and low progressivity for new young cohorts.

In the next section we will quantitatively explore optimal taxation –incorporating transition– in a calibrated version of the model, which features flexible labor supply and a variety of sources of heterogeneity.

6 Quantitative Analysis

In this section, we describe the model parameterization and explore the quantitative implications of the theory. We begin with the problem of the planner that maximizes steady-state welfare under $\beta = 1$, as in Section 4. Next, we solve for the optimal age-dependent tax system that incorporates discounting and transitional dynamics.

6.1 Parameterization

The parameterization strategy closely follows Heathcote et al. (2017). The model period is one year. Some of the parameters are set outside the model. For our steady state analysis, we focus on the case $\beta = 1$, since in this case ignoring transition is innocuous. When we move to explore transition we set $\beta = 0.97$, so that the path for policy and allocations during transition matters for social welfare.

Households live for $A = 36$ years, envisioning an age range between 25 and 60. The motivation for this choice is that our focus is on the design of a tax and transfer

Parameter	Description	Value
A	Years of working life	35
β	Discount factor	0.97
σ	Inverse of Frisch elasticity	2
χ	Relative taste for public good	0.233
θ	Elasticity of substitution across skills	3.124
ψ	Elasticity of skill investment to return	0.65
v_φ	Heterogeneity in disutility of work	0.036
v_ω	Variance of uninsurable productivity shock	0.058
$v_{\varepsilon 0}$	Initial variance in insurable productivity	0.090
Δv_ε	Growth in variance of insurable productivity	0.044
$\{x_a\}$	Age profile for productivity	See Fig. 2
$\{\varphi_a\}$	Age profile for disutility of work	See Fig. 2
τ^{US}	U.S. rate of progressivity	0.181

Table 1: Model parameterization (period = 1 year)

system for the working-age population.¹⁵ The preference weight on public good χ is identified directly from the size of the U.S. government as a share of GDP, assuming that the choice of public good provision in the data is optimal: given $g = 0.19$, we obtain $\chi = 0.233$.¹⁶ For calibration, we need the actual value of τ in the US system. Based on the estimates of Heathcote et al. (2017), we set $\tau^{US} = 0.181$ and assume λ^{US} is such that the budget is balanced given g .¹⁷ We set $\sigma = 2$, a value broadly consistent with the microeconomic evidence on the Frisch elasticity (see, e.g., Keane 2011).

Other parameters are structurally estimated from the model. In Heathcote et al. (2017) we show that one can identify and estimate the elasticity of substitution between skills θ , preference heterogeneity v_φ , and the variances of wage risk v_ω , $v_{\varepsilon a}$, using

¹⁵See Ndiaye (2018) for a thorough analysis of optimal age-dependent taxation in a model that incorporates the retirement decision.

¹⁶Heathcote et al. (2017) show that the fraction of output devoted to public goods is also $\frac{\chi}{1+\chi}$ when it is chosen by the median voter in the economy.

¹⁷For this exercise, Heathcote et al. (2017) use data from the PSID for survey years 2000-2006, in combination with the NBER's TAXSIM program. They restrict attention to households aged 25-60 with positive labor income. When measuring pre-government gross household income, Heathcote et al. (2017) include labor earnings, private transfers (alimony, child support, help from relatives, miscellaneous transfers, private retirement income, annuities, and other retirement income), plus income from interest, dividends, and rents. To construct taxable income, for each household in the data they compute the four major categories of itemized deductions in the U.S. tax code – medical expenses, mortgage interest, state taxes paid, and charitable contributions – and subtract them from gross income.

Post-government income \tilde{y} equals pre-government income plus public cash transfers (AFDC/TANF, SSI and other welfare receipts, Social Security benefits, unemployment benefits, workers' compensation, and veterans' pensions), minus federal, payroll, and state income taxes. Transfers are measured directly from the PSID, while taxes are computed using TAXSIM.

cross-sectional within-age variances and covariances of male wages, male hours, and equivalized household consumption, which we measure from the the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for survey years 2000-2006. The identification follows from the closed-form expressions for wages, hours and consumption derived above.

To give a flavor of the identification, consider the following four moments:

$$\begin{aligned}
var_a(\log w_{ia}) &= \frac{1}{\theta^2} + v_\omega a + v_{\varepsilon a} & (31) \\
var_a(\log h_{ia}) &= v_\varphi + \left(\frac{1 - \tau^{US}}{\sigma + \tau^{US}}\right)^2 v_{\varepsilon a} \\
var_a(\log c_{ia}) &= (1 - \tau^{US})^2 \left(v_\varphi + \frac{1}{\theta^2} + v_\omega a\right) \\
cov_a(\log h_{ia}, \log w_{ia}) &= \left(\frac{1 - \tau^{US}}{\sigma + \tau^{US}}\right) v_{\varepsilon a}
\end{aligned}$$

The moments $cov_a(\log h_{ia}, \log w_{ia})$ observed at ages $a = 0, \dots, A - 1$ identify $v_{\varepsilon a}$. Since in the data the profile for this variance turns out to increase with age nearly linearly, we estimate freely the initial variance at age 25, $v_{\varepsilon 0}$, and then impose linearity ex ante. From $var_a(\log h_{ia})$ we then identify v_φ . The value for $var_0(\log c_{i0})$ identifies θ since $v_{\omega 0} = 0$ (a normalization). Then, the change in $var_a(\log w_{ia})$ over the life cycle identifies v_ω . This is just one of the many possible combinations of moments that yield identification. Our formal estimation procedure also allows for classical measurement error in all variables and is based on an estimator that minimizes the distance between age-specific covariances in the model and the data. See Heathcote et al. (2017) for additional details.

The parameter ψ controls the elasticity of the return to skills π_1 to τ and θ , where the return to skills is increasing in progressivity and decreasing in skill substitutability (see equation 20). In Heathcote et al. (2017), we exploit changes in π_1 , τ and θ over time, which we can measure from PSID data between the early 1970s and the early 2000s, to estimate ψ .

The only additions relative to the parameterization in Heathcote et al. (2017) are the age profiles of productivity and disutility of work. We estimate the life-cycle profile of individual hourly wages and hours from our same PSID sample for years 2000-2006. The left panel of Figure 2 plots both profiles, interpolated using a cubic function of age. The wage profile maps directly into the efficiency profile for $\{x_a\}$. Given $\{x_a\}$ and the other parameter values, from the expression for average hours worked by age




Figure 2: Left panel: life-cycle profile of individual wages and hours. Right panel: implied profiles for x_a , $\bar{\varphi}_a$, and their difference.




Figure 3: Means (left panel) and variances of logs (right panel) over the life cycle

in equation (24), we can recover residually the profile for disutility of work $\{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$.

The right panel of Figure 2 plots the profiles for $\{x_a\}$ and $\{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$ and for $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$, which is the one relevant for optimal age-dependence in progressivity. Note that this latter age profile is strongly hump shaped, a feature that will be quantitatively important. It is worth noting that our approach to identifying $\{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$ hinges on our assumption of no inter-temporal borrowing and lending. If households could perfectly smooth consumption by borrowing and lending, one would naturally expect co-variation between hours and wages over the life-cycle, implying a smaller role for $\bar{\varphi}_a$ in generating age variation in hours worked. We will therefore also consider optimal policy assuming no age variation in preferences.¹⁸

¹⁸With free borrowing and lending, one would expect life-cycle growth in hours to be proportional to life-cycle growth in wages, absent age-variation in preferences. In addition, the Frisch elasticity

Table 1 summarizes the parameter values. Figure 3 shows that the implied means and variances of logarithms for wages, hours, earnings, and consumption by age align well with the ones estimated from cross-sectional data (see, e.g., Heathcote et al. 2014).

6.2 Results: steady-state welfare

In line with the analytical results in Section 4, we start by analyzing optimal taxation from a steady-state welfare point of view.

Recall that Proposition 4 identified four different forces that shape the optimal age profile of tax progressivity in steady state: discounting, uninsurable risk, insurable risk, and life-cycle productivity. To understand the quantitative role of each of these, we start from an economy where none of these channels is active, the one described in point (ii) of Proposition 4.

6.2.1 Channels that do not induce age dependence

Figure 4 illustrates optimal progressivity $\{\tau_a^*\}$ and the implied income-weighted average marginal tax rate by age (left panels) together with earnings, hours, and consumption by age (right panels).

The top panel represents optimal policy in an representative-agent version of our economy, with all the sources of heterogeneity shut down, i.e. $\theta = \infty$, $v_\varphi = v_{\varepsilon a} = v_\omega = 0$, $\{x_a, \bar{\varphi}_a\}$ constant, and $\beta = 1$. In this economy, $\tau^* = -\chi$.

Next, in the middle panel, we add heterogeneity in the disutility of work by setting v_φ to its estimated value. Since this form of initial heterogeneity translates into consumption dispersion, the planner wants to increase progressivity to redistribute from the lucky individuals born with a low disutility of work to the unlucky ones who have a higher disutility and who thus work and earn less. Since this form of heterogeneity is innate and does not vary by age, optimal progressivity remains flat.

In the bottom panel, we activate skill investment by setting θ to its estimated value, and thus introduce heterogeneity in skills. The optimal $\{\tau_a^*\}$ profile remains flat but further increases in value. Two contrasting forces emerge when we add skill investment: on the one hand, the planner can encourage skill accumulation via a less progressive tax system. On the other hand, the utilitarian planner also wants to reduce consumption inequality generated by heterogeneity in skills and to do so, it must

of labor supply would determine the constant of proportionality. Figure 3 indicates that hours grow roughly half as much as wages between ages 25 and 45, which is consistent – given the joint assumptions of no preference variation and free borrowing and lending – with our assumed Frisch elasticity of 0.5.




Figure 4: Left column: Optimal progressivity and income weighted average marginal tax rate. Right column: Average earnings (Y), hours (H), and consumption (C) by age. Top row: Representative agent model. Middle row: Previous case plus heterogeneity in disutility of work. Bottom row: Previous case plus heterogeneity from skill investment.

choose a progressive system. Given our parameter values, this latter force dominates and optimal progressivity rises.

Next, we introduce the channels that induce age dependence in optimal progressivity.

6.2.2 Uninsurable risk channel

Part (iii) of Proposition 4 states that, since uninsurable risk in the form of permanent shocks cumulates over the life cycle, the planner has an incentive to increase tax progressivity over the life cycle. To introduce this effect, we set the amount of uninsurable risk v_ω to its calibrated value.

The top row of Figure 5 illustrates that the addition of uninsurable risk has two effects. First, the average level of optimal progressivity rises. Second, as expected, its profile becomes steeper.

6.2.3 Insurable risk channel

According to part (iv) of Proposition 4, age-invariant insurable risk ($v_{\varepsilon 0} > 0$) pushes optimal progressivity toward zero, while if the variance of insurable wage risk increases with age, the planner has an incentive to tilt the schedule for optimal progressivity downward. The last row of Figure 5 illustrates that when we introduce our estimates for insurable risk, the profile of optimal progressivity does indeed tilt in a clockwise direction. As a result, the life-cycle profiles for hours and earnings become flatter.

6.2.4 Life-cycle channel

We now add the last motive for age-varying progressivity identified in Proposition 4: age-varying profiles for labor efficiency and the disutility of work. Figure 6 plots two cases. In the top panels, the productivity and disutility profiles $\{x_a\}$ and $\{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$ are both switched on. Recall that these two ingredients enter the expression for social welfare only via their net effect, $x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a$.¹⁹ In the bottom panels, only the labor productivity profile $\{x_a\}$ is active.

Recall that the profile for $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$ is generally increasing and strongly hump-shaped (see Figure 2). Thus, optimal progressivity becomes both flatter and more U-shaped when this life-cycle channel is activated, relative to the same economy without age variation in wages or preferences (see the bottom panels of Figure 5). The

¹⁹The analytical expression for steady-state welfare is in equation (A15) in the Appendix.




Figure 5: Left column: Optimal progressivity and income weighted average marginal tax rate. Right column: Average earnings (Y), hours (H), and consumption (C) by age. Top row: Previous case plus uninsurable risk. Bottom row: Previous case plus insurable risk.




Figure 6: Left column: Optimal progressivity and income weighted average marginal tax rate. Previous case plus life cycle channel, i.e. all channels operational with steady-state welfare. Right column: Average earnings (Y), hours (H), and consumption (C) by age. Top row: age profile for disutility of work as estimated in the data. Bottom row: age profile for disutility of work constant.




Figure 7: Marginal tax rates at different ages for the optimal age-dependent policy with $\beta = 1$, i.e. those that maximize steady-state welfare.

intuition is that life-cycle earnings have a pronounced hump-shape in this calibration. To counteract earnings inequality by age and equate average consumption across age groups, the planner sets a U-shaped age profile for λ_a . Absent age-variation in τ_a , this would translate into a strongly hump-shaped profile for average marginal tax rates. By simultaneously setting a U-shaped profile for τ_a , the planner can moderate the average marginal tax rate at peak-productivity years. The desire to smooth taxes by age is familiar from the dynamic Mirrlees literature (Farhi and Werning, 2012). The bottom panels of Figure 6 show that the life-cycle channel is weaker when we shut down age variation in preferences.

All channels are now operative, so this economy should be viewed as our benchmark when focusing on steady-state welfare. Note, however, that the quantitative importance of the life-cycle channel is sensitive to the assumed market structure. As we will see in Section 7 allowing for borrowing and lending dampens this channel.

6.2.5 Optimal age-dependent marginal tax rates

Figure 7 plots the marginal tax rates implied by the tax system described in the top panels of Figure 6 for three age groups. The optimal age-dependent tax system dictates essentially a flat tax for middle-aged workers, and a highly progressive schedule for young and old. Note that even though the degree of optimal progressivity is lower for the old than for the young (the curve is flatter), marginal (and average) tax rates are

	Benchmark	U.S. BL	Natural BL
(λ^*, τ^*) constant	0.04	0.16	0.22
λ^* age-varying, τ^* constant	3.00	1.78	1.07
λ^* constant, τ^* age-varying	2.26	0.88	0.40
(λ^*, τ^*) age-varying	3.70	2.04	1.08

Table 2: All numbers in the table are welfare gains expressed as additional lifetime consumption (pct points) relative to the existing tax/transfer system. The column ‘Benchmark’ refers to the benchmark economy without intertemporal trade. The column ‘U.S. BL’ refers to the economy with borrowing and lending under the calibrated borrowing limit for the U.S. economy (2 times annual earnings). The column ‘Natural BL’ refers to the economy with borrowing and lending under the natural borrowing limit.

much higher for the old for a wide income range. Mechanically, this reflects the fact that the old face smaller values for λ_a in order to redistribute income to the young and thereby equalize consumption across ages.

6.2.6 Welfare gains from tax reforms

We now present the welfare gains of switching from the existing tax/transfer system to the optimal age dependent system in steps. As with all the results presented to this point, we focus on the case $\beta = 1$, so that we can safely ignore transition when comparing different tax systems.

First, we report the gains of switching to the optimal age-invariant system. Next we consider the gains of switching to a system where we allow for age variation in λ_a , but not in τ_a . Then we explore the opposite configuration. Finally, we compute the gains from switching to the fully age-dependent system. All these welfare gains refer to steady-state welfare and are computed in terms of lifetime consumption-equivalent variation. The first column of Table 2 summarizes these results.

The welfare gains of moving from the existing tax system (with $\tau^{US} = 0.181$) to the optimal age-invariant tax schedule are small. Moving to the fully optimal tax system delivers welfare gains of 3.7 percent of consumption. If only one tax parameter is allowed to vary by age, welfare gains are smaller.

One finding that is important to note is that a large portion of the welfare gains

arise from endowing the planner with the ability to use the tax system to redistribute across age groups, so as to equate expected consumption by age. In particular, the specification in which λ can vary freely by age but τ cannot, achieves over 80 percent of the maximum welfare gains from tax reform. There are two ways in which our baseline parameterization likely exaggerates the potential welfare gains from redistribution across age groups. First, our baseline parameterization assumes age-invariant utility from consumption: introducing age-varying utility would imply smaller potential gains from redistribution across age-groups. We study this case in the next section. Second, our baseline parameterization assumes no borrowing and lending, giving the government a crucial role in smoothing consumption over the life-cycle. The second and third columns of Table 2 indicate that the marginal welfare gains from introducing age variation in the tax system are much smaller when households can borrow and lend to smooth consumption. We will describe those experiments in Section 7.

6.3 Results: transitional dynamics

We now compute the age-dependent tax system that maximizes welfare taking into account transitional dynamics and the sunk investment channel, i.e., the fact that cohorts born before the reform cannot adjust skills in response to a surprise change in the tax system. In particular, consider a tax reform at date 0 which implements a flexible age and time specific tax policy $\{\lambda_{a,t}, \tau_{a,t}, G_t\}$ for $a = 0, \dots, A - 1$ and for $t = 0, \dots, \infty$. We set the annual discount factor to $\beta = 0.97$.

The importance of the sunk investment channel depends on the tax system in place in the initial steady state. We assume that this system features the age-invariant value for progressivity $\tau^{US} = 0.181$ and the age-invariant value for λ that balances the budget with g set at the estimated value for the U.S. economy.

We should emphasize that this is an ambitious exercise, because there are a large number of policy parameters to optimize over. Doing so is only feasible because, conditional on the tax parameters, equilibrium allocations can be characterized in closed form. In addition the problem is slightly simplified because, by virtue of Proposition 5, we know that the planner will optimally set $\{\lambda_{a,t}\}$ such that (i) consumption is equalized across age groups at each date, and (ii) the ratio of government spending to output is always equal to $\chi/(1 + \chi)$. Still, to economize slightly on the number of policy parameters to solve for, we assume a three-year period length with each cohort active for $A = 12$ periods, and adjust other parameters accordingly.²⁰

²⁰We assume that the economy converges to a new steady state within 156 periods, and thus solve




Figure 8: Optimal age and time dependent progressivity incorporating transition. Skills are the only source of heterogeneity. Labor supply is inelastic. $\beta = 0.97$.

We plot optimal policy for three parameterizations. The first (Figure 8) corresponds to the case described in Proposition 6 with inelastic labor supply, and none of the sources of heterogeneity beside differences in skills. The second (Figure 9) is identical, except that we introduce flexible labor supply. The third parameterization (Figure 10) is exactly our baseline, incorporating all sources of heterogeneity (but with $\beta = 0.97$ rather than $\beta = 1$). In both plots, each different colored line plots the sequence for $\{\tau_{a,t+a}\}$ for a particular cohort indexed by t . The line starts at the date t that the cohort enters the economy, and ends at $t + 11$. Lines for cohorts that entered the economy prior to the reform at date 0 are shorter: there is a single point for the cohort that entered at $t = -11$.

Consider first the case in which skill is the only source of heterogeneity and labor supply is inelastic. Figure 8 offers a visual illustration of Proposition 6. The planner sets $\tau_{a,t} = 1$ for cohorts entering prior to the reform, and for cohorts entering post reform progressivity is constant over the life-cycle. In this example there is also very little variation in progressivity across cohorts, but that result is a numerical accident, and reflects the fact that value for progressivity in the final steady state is not far from the estimated value for the United States.

When we introduce flexible labor supply (Figure 9) the optimal policy still involves relatively high values for progressivity for cohorts entering prior to the reform, and lower values for cohorts entering after the reform. However, flexible labor supply does change the picture in two ways. First, it is no longer optimal to set $\tau_{a,t} = 1$ for cohorts

for $12 \times 156 = 1,872$ values for τ .




Figure 9: Optimal age and time dependent progressivity incorporating transition. Skills are the only source of heterogeneity. Labor supply is elastic. $\beta = 0.97$.

entering prior to the reform, because even though these cohorts skill investments are sunk, their labor supply still responds negatively to progressivity. Second, the cohort specific profiles for $\tau_{a,t}$ are generally upward sloping (rather than flat) until all the cohorts alive at the time of the reform have exited the economy. The logic for this result is that aggregate output gradually increases during the post-reform transition, as successive cohorts make skill investments given expected progressivity values $\bar{\tau}_{a,t}$ that are much lower than in the pre-reform steady state. As output increases over time, the planner gradually becomes less focussed on stimulating additional output (via low values for progressivity), and more focussed on reducing inequality (via high values for progressivity). Thus during transition, optimal progressivity increases both within cohorts (the upward sloping profiles) and between profiles (each successive cohorts profile starts at a higher level).²¹

Now consider optimal policy incorporating transition for the baseline model. The optimal policy now looks like a mix of Figures 6 and 9. For any given cohort, the optimal profile $\{\tau_{a,t+a}\}$ is U-shaped, as in Figure 6. Moving across cohorts, it is clear that on average progressivity is higher for cohorts entering prior to the reform, and lower for cohorts entering later. In addition, progressivity generally increases modestly

²¹The planner's first order conditions can be used to establish the result that age profiles for progressivity are upward sloping when output is rising. Contemplate a candidate optimal policy with the property $\tau_{0,t} = \tau_{1,t+1}$ such that the first-order condition for $\tau_{0,t}$ (eq. A26) is satisfied. Now consider the first order condition for $\tau_{1,t+1}$. Substituting eq. (A28) into eq. (A27) it is clear that on the margin, it will be welfare-improving to increase $\tau_{1,t+1}$ above $\tau_{0,t}$ if and only if the second term on the right-hand side of eq. (A27) is positive, which will be the case when $Y_t < Y_{t+1}$. Thus, if a cohort will live through a period of rising output, it will optimally face an increasing age profile for progressivity.




Figure 10: Optimal age and time varying progressivity incorporating transition. Baseline calibration. $\beta = 0.97$.

over time post reform.

6.4 Extension I: heterogeneity in the taste for consumption

In this section, we generalize our baseline model by introducing an additional source of heterogeneity across individuals, life-cycle variation in the taste for consumption. The most straightforward way to interpret this additional model ingredient—one that we will use to calibrate this version of the model—is that household composition changes over the life cycle, as individuals form couples, have children, children grow, and eventually leave to form households of their own.

The immediate implication for the planner is that a certain amount of consumption dispersion over the life-cycle is efficient. This force reduces the desire to redistribute across ages through λ_a which, in turn, weakens the life-cycle channel, i.e. the channel that makes optimal progressivity markedly U shaped.

We modify our period utility to:

$$u_i(c_{ia}, h_{ia}, G) = \gamma_a \log c_{ia} - \frac{\exp[(1 + \sigma)(\bar{\varphi}_a + \varphi_i)]}{1 + \sigma} (h_{ia})^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G, \quad (32)$$

where $\gamma_a > 0$ shifts the marginal utility of consumption at age a . A higher value for γ_a implies higher marginal value of consuming a unit of consumption and thus a higher level of optimal consumption expenditures.

By following the same steps we delineated to construct the steady-state welfare function in the baseline case, we obtain an analogous welfare expression for the case

$\beta = 1$ which we can compare to equation 26 to gain a better understanding of how life-cycle variation in taste for leisure affects the planner incentives to introduce some age dependence in the degree of tax progressivity. The modified expression for steady-state welfare is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{W}(g, \boldsymbol{\tau}) = & -\frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\frac{1 - \tau_a}{1 + \sigma} \exp((1 + \sigma) \gamma_a)}_{\text{Disutility of labor}} \tag{33} \\
& + (1 + \chi) \log \left\{ \underbrace{\sum_{a=0}^{A-1} (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp \left[x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a + \gamma_a + \left(\frac{\tau_a (1 + \hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a^2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2} \right]}_{\text{Effective hours } \bar{N}_a} \right\} \\
& + (1 + \chi) \underbrace{\frac{1}{(1 + \psi)(\theta - 1)} \left[\psi \log(1 - \bar{\tau}) + \log \left(\frac{1}{\eta \theta^\psi} \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right)^{\theta(1+\psi)} \right) \right]}_{\text{Productivity: } \log(\text{average skill price}) = \log(E(p(s)))} \\
& - \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \frac{1 - \bar{\tau}}{\theta}}_{\text{Avg. education cost}} + \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \exp((1 + \sigma) \gamma_a) \underbrace{\left[\log \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{\theta} \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{\theta} \right) \right]}_{\text{Consumption dispersion across skills}} \\
& - \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \exp((1 + \sigma) \gamma_a) \cdot \frac{1}{2} \underbrace{(1 - \tau_a)^2 (v_\varphi + a v_\omega)}_{\text{Cons. dispersion due to unins. shocks and preference heterogeneity}}
\end{aligned}$$

The age-dependent utility shifter γ_a affects the individual labor supply decision: at ages when γ_a is high, individuals choose to work more to consume more. As a result, γ_a enters the two terms in the welfare function which capture the average disutility of work and the effective hours worked by each skill type. Moreover, γ_a shifts the relative marginal utility of consumption across ages and, as a result, it modifies the cost of consumption dispersion between and within skill types, the last two terms of the welfare function.

We now turn to the parameterization of this model. It is immediate to see from the optimal individual allocations that γ_a and $\bar{\varphi}_a$ cannot be separately identified from hours worked (see Appendix B). We therefore resort to the interpretation of the term $(1 + \sigma)(\gamma_a - \gamma_{a-1})$ as the percentage change in the consumption equivalence scale between ages a and $a - 1$ due to changes in family size. Given $\sigma = 2$, we estimate the age profile for γ_a from Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) who compute an average across the most commonly used equivalence scales. Then, given the vector of $\{\gamma_a\}$, we estimate residually $\{\bar{\varphi}_a\}$ from the age profile of hours worked, as for the




Figure 11: Optimal age dependent progressivity with age variation in the taste for consumption.

baseline calibration.

The age profile of equivalence scales increases by roughly 25% from age 25 to age 50 and declines moderately after then. As a result, the implied estimated path for the utility shifter follows a similar profile. From the view point of the planner who has to set tax rates optimally, it means that older households should receive higher consumption. Relative to the benchmark case, the planner will therefore redistribute less across ages and, as a consequence, choose a flatter profile for both λ_a and τ_a . Figure 11 depicts the optimal age-dependent progressivity in this case.

6.5 Extension II: late-in-life labor supply

In this section, we analyze two extensions of the baseline model that aim to capture some features of the late life-cycle that are missing in the baseline model. First, we allow elderly workers to become more elastic to changes in after-tax wages as they approach full retirement. Second, we allow for the presence of a period (exogenous) retirement where the individual is entitled to a given pension and the government can choose how to tax it.

6.5.1 Age-Dependent Frisch Elasticity

As reported by Blundell et al. (2016), direct evidence on labor supply elasticities around retirement age is scarce. The few estimates cited in their survey suggest that the Frisch elasticity may be up to three points higher at age 60-65 compared to age 45.

Here, we wish to explore in a simple way what is the impact of this higher sensitivity




Figure 12: Optimal age dependent progressivity when the Frisch elasticity of labor supply increases after age 45.

to taxes at older ages for the optimal profile of progressivity. We thus assume that the Frisch elasticity is constant before age 45 (and equal to its baseline value of 0.5) and afterwards it increases linearly until age 60, when it reaches a value of 1.5. Since labor supply distortions are larger in the later part of the life cycle, the planner faces a higher cost of progressivity for elderly workers. Figure 12 illustrates that this force limits the rise in τ after age 45. For example, in the baseline at age 60 the optimal τ equals 0.17, whereas in this extension it is roughly zero. Thus, this *late-life labor supply elasticity channel* is quite powerful in moderating the rise in optimal progressivity for the elderly. Note, however, that the average marginal tax rate is basically unchanged between the baseline and this extension. Since the optimal τ_a is lower for the elderly, it means that the optimal λ_a is higher. The reason is that output is decreasing in σ and τ_a and, as a result, now the elderly produce more output. The planner has therefore an incentive to increase λ_a to redistribute some of this additional income to younger households to equate consumption across cohorts.

6.5.2 Exogenous Retirement

We now add a retirement period to the baseline model. We still assume exogenous retirement at age 60, but extend the life cycle by 10 years. During this retirement period, each worker i is entitled to a pension proportional to an index of lifetime worker's earnings equal to $y_i^R = p(s_i) \exp(x_{A-1} + \alpha_{i,A-1} - \bar{\varphi}_{A-1} - \varphi_i)$. This index is proportional to worker's productivity at the end of her career and, through the disutility of work terms, it also contains a proxy for average hours over the working




Figure 13: Optimal age dependent progressivity with retirement.

life (recall Corollary 2.2).²²

The government takes this pension as given and chooses how to tax it, and the individual during retirement receives after-tax pension income $\lambda_a(y_i^R)^{1-\tau_a}$.²³ We continue assuming the government balances the budget at every period. To make this extension as comparable as possible with the baseline, we reset χ so that the government has to finance pension outlays which are comparable in size with the optimal expenditures chosen in the baseline.

Because there are no distortions to labor supply during retirement and the government wants to equate consumption across ages, one would be tempted to conjecture that the optimal τ_a in retirement would approach one. However, such extreme progressivity would offset any pension gain from skill acquisition and would create a strong disincentive early in life when the dynamics skill investment choice is made. Figure 13 illustrates that this disincentive is rather strong: at retirement the optimal value of τ_a jumps up discretely since labor supply distortions disappear (and the marginal tax rate more doubles), but it stays well below one.

²²The way we specified the index implies that the government could condition taxes on the various components of earnings (skills, disutility, shocks) in the last period of one's career, but we assume the government sticks to taxing y also at age $A - 1$.

²³We could introduce a replacement rate that multiplies the index y_i^R but it is clear that the government can always undo it through the choice of λ_a , thus we omit it from the model altogether.

7 An economy with intertemporal trade

The main limitation of the benchmark model is that, to preserve analytical tractability, we shut down borrowing and lending. The risk sharing allowed in the model against insurable shocks offers some private redistribution within age groups, but only the planner can redistribute resources across age groups. Thus, one driver of age-variation in optimal taxation is the planner's desire to facilitate inter-temporal consumption smoothing.

The key concern is that, if private saving and borrowing were allowed, households would use financial markets to smooth consumption intertemporally, and the life-cycle channel in the design of optimal taxes would therefore be weakened. The extent to which the optimal policy will change will depend on the generosity of borrowing limits.

In this section, we extend the benchmark model by allowing households to trade a risk-free bond in zero net supply, with the interest rate r determined in the stationary equilibrium of the model. At the same time, we shut down insurable risk (i.e., we set $v_{\varepsilon_a} = 0$). In this model, wealth b is a state variable for the individual and the steady-state features a non-degenerate wealth distribution. As a result, both the equilibrium and, more importantly, the optimal age-dependent tax system have to be computed numerically. The latter problem is rather complicated since in principle one has to choose a vector of $A = 36$ values for τ_a , one for each age, in order to maximize equilibrium welfare.

Having introduced wealth and savings we need to decide how to tax them. We assume that taxable income at age a includes capital income rb_a , but that savings $b_{a+1} - b_a$ are tax-deductible. Thus, the parametric tax / transfer function now applies to taxable income $p(s) \exp(x_a + \alpha)h_a + rb_a - (b_{a+1} - b_a)$ and the individual budget constraint therefore becomes:

$$c_a = \lambda_a [p(s) \exp(x_a + \alpha)h_a + (1 + r)b_a - b_{a+1}]^{1-\tau_a}$$

This assumption is convenient because it allows us to retain a closed form solution for the equilibrium skill price function $p(s)$.

The dynamic program of the working age household characterizing optimal consumption/saving and labor supply decisions has five state variables: age a , skills s , disutility of work φ , permanent productivity shocks α , and wealth b . The second

assumption we make is that the borrowing limit for an individual can be written as:

$$b_{a+1}(s, \alpha, \varphi) \geq -\bar{b}_a \cdot p(s) \exp(\alpha - \varphi)$$

where $\bar{b}_a^{\text{nat}}(\cdot)$ denotes the natural borrowing limit. If the borrowing constraint has this form, we can show that optimal individual saving and labor supply decisions are the solution to a simpler household problem with two states, age and normalized wealth, defined as wealth relative to the adjustment factor $p(s) \exp(\alpha - \varphi)$.

Every other element of the baseline model is unchanged. The parameterization is the same as the one in Table 1 with the exception that the variances of the insurable risk terms are zero at each age.

The only new parameters in this extended model are the age-dependent borrowing limits. When the borrowing limits \bar{b}_a are set to zero at all ages, the wealth distribution is degenerate at zero, since assets are in zero net supply. In this case the equilibrium coincides with the one of the benchmark model (modulo the absence of insurable risk). The loosest possible limits are natural borrowing constraints: in this case, the only binding constraint over the life cycle is $b_{A+1} \geq 0$, i.e. a No-Ponzi condition stating that the household cannot die with negative wealth.²⁴

To set borrowing limits that realistically capture how much *consumer credit* households can access we adopt the following strategy. We use cross-sectional data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the year 2012 (2013 survey) for households aged 25-60, as in the model. The SCF has information on credit limits on all credit cards and on HELOCs. We begin by adding up all these limits.

The SCF also contains information on the residual value of existing installment loans for vehicles, boats, and other durables, and on residual values of other loans, such as borrowing against IRAs. We multiply the value of these loans by a factor of two to reflect the fact that on average households are half-way through their repayment.

We sum up these two numbers obtained from credit limits and existing loans and express this total borrowing limit as a fraction of household labor income. Our calculations imply that almost 20 percent of U.S. households have a credit limit of zero. Conditional on borrowing, the median credit limit is about 0.5 times annual earnings. To demonstrate that our results from the benchmark economy are robust to introducing extensive borrowing and saving we set the credit limit to twice annual household earnings, which corresponds roughly to the 90th-95th percentile of the distribution of

²⁴In practice, to solve the model numerically, it is useful to compute what the natural borrowing limit is at each age to make sure the lower bound for the asset grid is not too tight.




Figure 14: Left panel: Means of wages, earnings, consumption, and hours worked over the life cycle. Right panel: average wealth-income ratio over the life cycle

credit limits.

Finally, to keep the Ramsey problem of the government manageable instead of optimizing over the full vector of τ_a for each age, we approximate the τ_a function with a Chebyshev polynomial of order three and optimize over its four coefficients.²⁵. Moreover, we assume that the planner maximizes steady-state welfare under $\beta = 1$.

7.1 Results

We begin by reporting the age profile for wages, hours worked, and consumption (left panel) and for wealth (right panel) in the economy with τ^{US} and with the U.S. credit limit in Figure 14. Overall, these paths are not too different from those in our baseline economy (recall Figure 3) which is reassuring. The age profile of wealth demonstrates that in the model young households borrow extensively against future earnings. After age 45, when the productivity profile levels off they, on average, become net savers and start lending to the young.

Figure ?? summarizes our findings on the optimal tax scheme in this extended economy with intertemporal trade. The left column illustrates the results when the interest rate is determined in equilibrium to clear the bond market. Each panel has three lines, corresponding to the three cases: autarky, the natural borrowing limit, and the calibrated borrowing limit for the US economy.

The left panel shows that the age profile for τ_a^* in the autarky case essentially

²⁵We verified that polynomials of higher degree yields only negligible welfare gains




Figure 15: Left panel: Uninsurable risk channel only. Middle panel: Life cycle channel only. Right-panel: Both channels active. In each panel the three lines correspond to a zero borrowing limit (autarky), an ad-hoc borrowing limit estimated from SCF data, and the natural borrowing limit. In all three cases, the interest rate is the market-clearing one.

coincides with that in our benchmark model modulo, again, the absence of insurable risk. Under the natural borrowing limit, the U-shape in progressivity disappears and the optimal age-profile for τ_a is much flatter. The optimal profile for progressivity under the U.S. borrowing limits sits in between these two extremes, but it is much closer to the autarky/benchmark case in that it is flatter but retains a pronounced U shape. Thus, the tractable autarky case offers quantitatively useful guidance about optimal policy even in the more realistic, but less tractable, model with borrowing and lending.

The left and middle panel isolate, respectively, the role of the uninsurable risk and the life-cycle channel and help understanding the differences between these three cases. The left panel shows that in all three economies the uninsurable risk channel is equally strong: because of the permanent nature of risk, allowing for intertemporal trade does not improve smoothing of these shocks relative to autarky. The middle panel, instead, demonstrates that the life-cycle channel operates very differently, depending on market structure. Under the natural borrowing limit, every agent is on her Euler equation. The equilibrium interest rate is positive and exceeds the household's rate of time preference and hence, absent age variation in either λ_a or τ_a , households would choose life-cycle consumption growing at a constant rate. However, the planner wants to equate consumption across ages, and thus it chooses a path for λ_a decreasing at a




Figure 16: Left panel: Uninsurable risk channel only. Middle panel: Life cycle channel only. Right-panel: Both channels active. In each panel the three lines correspond to a zero borrowing limit (autarky), an ad-hoc borrowing limit estimated from SCF data, and the natural borrowing limit. In all three cases, the interest rate is set exogenously so that $\beta R = 1$.

constant rate to offset this incentive and induce a constant consumption path. Since λ_a is decreasing in age, also τ_a must decrease in age to smooth labor supply distortions over the life cycle. The U.S. economy sits in between this case and the autarky case where τ_a has a strong U shape.

To further understand the role of the interest rate, the right column of Figure 16 explores an economy where we set exogenously the interest rate to zero to align the intertemporal consumption allocation incentives of the individual with the desire to equalize consumption across ages of the planner ($\beta R = 1$). The middle panel, with the life-cycle channel only, shows indeed that in the natural borrowing limit case the profile for τ_a is flat: there is no reason to let λ_a vary with age, and thus no reason for age varying τ_a either. Since the risk channel operates as usual (top panel), when both risk and life-cycle are present, the optimal profile for τ_a is now more upward sloping later in the life cycle. The bottom line, though, is that as for the endogenous interest rate case, the U.S. economy remains very close to to autarky.

The last two columns of Table 2 summarize the welfare gains from switching to the optimal tax system in under the US and natural borrowing limit. Under the U.S. borrowing limit, the gains from moving to an age-dependent tax system are somewhat smaller than in the autarky case, but still substantial at around 2 percent of lifetime consumption.

8 Conclusions

This paper has developed an equilibrium framework to study the optimal degree of progressivity in the tax and transfer system over the life cycle. The framework, which builds on Heathcote et al. (2017), restricts the policy space to a particular functional form for the tax and transfer schedule which has been shown to provide a good representation of the U.S. tax and transfer system and which has the important advantage of making the model fully tractable. The main innovation in this paper is to allow for age-dependent tax progressivity.

We show that the optimal degree of age dependence in progressivity is driven by several forces. First, the fact that uninsurable wage dispersion is rising with age is a force toward making the tax system increasingly progressive with age. Second, the fact that average labor productivity is generally increasing over the life cycle is a force toward making optimal tax progressivity decline with age, a form of tax smoothing. The third motive driving age dependence in progressivity is that the planner, at the time of the tax reform, can tax the sunk skill investment of the existing cohorts by raising progressivity for the old without distorting too much the human capital decisions of the young because they discount the future time at which the higher progressivity will hit them.

When calibrating the analytically tractable economy without intertemporal trade to the U.S. we find that when all of these channels are operative and the optimal age profile for tax progressivity is markedly U-shaped. This U shape survives in a more realistic version of the model with borrowing and saving and plausibly calibrated credit constraints. Welfare gains of switching from the current system (not too far from the optimal age-invariant one) to the optimal age-dependent system exceed 2 percent of lifetime consumption.

References

- AKERLOF, G. A. (1978): “The Economics of ‘Tagging’ as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning,” *American Economic Review*, 68(1), 8–19.
- ATKINSON, A. B., T. PIKETTY, AND E. SAEZ (2011): “Top Incomes in the Long Run of History,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(1), 3–71.
- BANKS, J., AND P. DIAMOND (2010): “The Base for Direct Taxation,” in *Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review*, ed. by J. Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. Johnson, G. Myles, and J. Poterba. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- BEN-PORATH, Y. (1967): “The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 75(4, Part 1), 352–365.
- BÉNABOU, R. (2000): “Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract,” *American Economic Review*, 90(1), 96–129.
- (2002): “Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?,” *Econometrica*, 70(2), 481–517.
- BEST, M. C., AND H. J. KLEVEN (2013): “Optimal Income Taxation with Career Effects of Work Effort,” Mimeo, Princeton University.
- BLUNDELL, R., E. FRENCH, AND G. TETLOW (2016): “Retirement Incentives and Labor Supply,” in *Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging*, vol. 1, pp. 457–566. Elsevier.
- CONESA, J. C., S. KITAO, AND D. KRUEGER (2009): “Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea after All!,” *American Economic Review*, 99(1), 25–48.
- EROSA, A., AND M. GERVAIS (2002): “Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 105(2), 338–369.
- FARHI, E., AND I. WERNING (2013): “Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 80(2), 596–635.
- FELDSTEIN, M. S. (1969): “The Effects of Taxation on Risk Taking,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 77(5), 755–764.
- FERNANDEZ-VILLAYERDE, J., AND D. KRUEGER (2011): “Consumption and Saving over the Life Cycle: How Important are Consumer Durables?,” *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 15(5).
- FINDEISEN, S., AND D. SACHS (2016): “Education and Optimal Dynamic Taxation: The Role of Income-Contingent Student Loans,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 138(1), 1–21.
- GOLOSOV, M., M. TROSHKIN, AND A. TSYVINSKI (2016): “Redistribution and Social Insurance,” *American Economic Review*, 106(2), 359–386.
- HASSLER, J., P. KRUSELL, K. STORESLETTEN, AND F. ZILIBOTTI (2008): “On the Optimal Timing of Capital Taxation,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 55(4), 692–709.

- HEATHCOTE, J., K. STORESLETTEN, AND G. L. VIOLANTE (2008): “Insurance and Opportunities: A Welfare Analysis of Labor Market Risk,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 55(3), 501–525.
- (2014): “Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework,” *American Economic Review*, 104(7), 2075–2126.
- (2017): “Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- HEATHCOTE, J., AND H. TSUJIYAMA (2016): “Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey,” *Mimeo*.
- IMAI, S., AND M. P. KEANE (2004): “Intertemporal Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation,” *International Economic Review*, 45(2), 601–641.
- KAKWANI, N. C. (1977): “Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison,” *Economic Journal*, 87(345), 71–80.
- KAPIČKA, M. (2015): “Optimal Mirrleesian Taxation in a Ben-Porath Economy,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 7(2), 219–248.
- KARABARBOUNIS, M. (2016): “A Road Map for Efficiently Taxing Heterogeneous Agents,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 8(2), 182–214.
- KEANE, M. P. (2011): “Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(4), 961–1075.
- MUSGRAVE, R. A. (1959): *The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- NDIAYE, A. (2017): “Flexible Retirement and Optimal Taxation,” *Mimeo*, Northwestern University.
- PERSSON, M. (1983): “The Distribution of Abilities and the Progressive Income Tax,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 22(1), 73–88.
- STANTCHEVA, S. (forthcoming): “Optimal Taxation and Human Capital Policies over the Life Cycle,” *Journal of Political Economy*.
- STIGLITZ, J. E. (1985): “Equilibrium Wage Distributions,” *Economic Journal*, 95(379), 595–618.
- WEINZIERL, M. (2011): “The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Taxes,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4), 1490–1518.

Appendix

A Proofs

This appendix proves all of the results in the main body of the paper.

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 [hours and consumption]

We only sketch this proof, since it follows the ones in Heathcote et al. (2014, 2017) which both contain more comprehensive versions. We solve the model by segmenting production on “islands” indexed by age a and by the uninsurable triplet (φ, α, s) . The (a, φ, α, s) island planner’s problem, taking the island specific skill prices $p_a(s)$ and the aggregate fiscal variables $(G, \{\lambda_a\}, \{\tau_a\})$ as given, is:

$$\max_{\{c_a, h_a\}} \int \left\{ \log c_a - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)]}{1+\sigma} h_a(\varepsilon)^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G \right\} dF_\varepsilon$$

subject to the island-level resource constraint (the equivalent of the no-bond trading assumption):

$$c_a = \lambda_a \int \exp[(1-\tau_a)(p(s) + x_a + \alpha_a + \varepsilon)] h_a(\varepsilon)^{1-\tau_a} dF_\varepsilon.$$

The first-order conditions with respect to c_a and $h_a(\varepsilon)$ are, respectively,

$$c_a^{-1} = M$$

$$\exp[(1+\sigma)(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)] h(\varepsilon)^\sigma = M \lambda_a (1-\tau_a) \exp((p(s) + x_a + \alpha)(1-\tau_a)) \exp(\varepsilon(1-\tau_a)) h(\varepsilon)^{-\tau_a}$$

where M is the multiplier on the island resource constraint. Combining the two conditions gives

$$h(\varepsilon) = c_a^{-\frac{1}{\sigma+\tau_a}} (\lambda_a (1-\tau_a))^{\frac{1}{\sigma+\tau_a}} \exp\left(-\frac{(1+\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau_a)}(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)\right) \exp\left((p(s) + \alpha + x_a + \varepsilon) \frac{(1-\tau_a)}{(\sigma+\tau_a)}\right) \quad (\text{A1})$$

Note that from the first-order conditions, c_a is the same for all agents on the island, and as such it cannot depend on ε . Using this fact, and substituting (A1) into the planner’s island-specific resource constraint, yields

$$c_a = \lambda_a c_a^{-\frac{1-\tau_a}{\sigma+\tau_a}} (\lambda_a (1-\tau_a))^{\frac{1-\tau_a}{\sigma+\tau_a}} \exp\left(-\frac{(1-\tau_a)(1+\sigma)}{(\sigma+\tau_a)}(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)\right) \cdot \int \exp[(1-\tau_a)(p(s) + x_a + \alpha_a + \varepsilon)] \left[\exp\left((p(s) + \alpha + x_a + \varepsilon) \frac{(1-\tau_a)^2}{(\sigma+\tau_a)}\right) \right] dF_\varepsilon.$$

After a few steps of algebra, one obtains the expression for allocations in Proposition 1.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 [skill price and skill choice]

The education cost is given by $v(s) = \frac{\kappa^{-1/\psi}}{1+1/\psi} (s)^{1+1/\psi}$, where κ is exponentially distributed, $\kappa \sim \eta \exp(-\eta\kappa)$. Recall from eq. (14) in the main text that the optimality condition for skill investment is

$$v'(s) = \left(\frac{s}{\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^A} \right) \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \beta^a \frac{\partial u(c(\varphi, \alpha, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}), h(\varphi; \tau_a), g)}{\partial s}. \quad (\text{A2})$$

The skill level s affects only the consumption allocation (not the hours allocation) and only through the price $p(s; \{\tau_a\})$. Hence, using (18), (A2) can be simplified as

$$\left(\frac{s}{\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} = \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \beta^a (1-\tau_a) \frac{\partial \log p(s; \{\tau_a\})}{\partial s}.$$

We now guess that the skill price function is log-linear in the skill choice,

$$\log p(s; \{\tau_a\}) = \pi_0(\{\tau_a\}) + \pi_1(\{\tau_a\}) \cdot s, \quad (\text{A3})$$

which implies that the skill allocation has the form²⁶

$$s(\kappa; \{\tau_a\}) = [\pi_1(\{\tau_a\}) \cdot (1-\bar{\tau})]^\psi \cdot \kappa, \quad (\text{A4})$$

where $\bar{\tau}$ can be interpreted as a discounted expected progressivity rate,

$$\bar{\tau} \equiv \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^A}\right) \sum_{a=0}^{\infty} \beta^a \tau_a$$

Since the exponential distribution is closed under scaling, skills inherit the exponential density shape from κ , with parameter $\zeta \equiv \eta [(1-\bar{\tau}) \pi_1(\{\tau_a\})]^{-\psi}$, and its density is $m(s) = \zeta \exp(-\zeta s)$. We now turn to the production side of the economy. Effective hours worked \bar{N} are independent of skill type s (see Proposition 1). Aggregate output is therefore

$$Y = \left\{ \int_0^\infty [\bar{N} \cdot m(s)]^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} ds \right\}^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}.$$

²⁶To see this, note that per assumption $\partial \log p(s; \{\tau_a\}) / \partial s = \pi_1(\{\tau_a\})$, so (A2) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{s}{\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} &= (1-\beta\delta) \sum_{a=0}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^a (1-\tau_a) \pi_1(\{\tau_a\}) \\ &= \pi_1(\{\tau_a\}) \left(1 - (1-\beta\delta) \sum_{a=0}^{\infty} (\beta\delta)^a \tau_a \right). \end{aligned}$$

The (log of the) hourly skill price $p(s)$ is the (log of the) marginal product of an extra effective hour supplied by a worker with skill s , or

$$\begin{aligned}\log p(s) &= \log \left[\frac{\partial Y}{\partial [\bar{N} \cdot m(s)]} \right] = \frac{1}{\theta} \log Y - \frac{1}{\theta} \log [\bar{N} \cdot m(s)] \\ &= \frac{1}{\theta} \log \left(\frac{Y}{\bar{N}} \right) - \frac{1}{\theta} \log \zeta + \frac{\zeta}{\theta} s.\end{aligned}\tag{A5}$$

Equating coefficients across equations (A3) and (A5) implies $\pi_1(\{\tau_a\}) = \frac{\zeta}{\theta} = \frac{\eta}{\theta} [(1 - \bar{\tau}) \pi_1(\{\tau_a\})]^{-\psi}$, which yields

$$\pi_1(\{\tau_a\}) = \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} (1 - \bar{\tau})^{-\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}}\tag{A6}$$

and thus the equilibrium density of s is

$$m(s) = (\eta)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} \left(\frac{\theta}{1 - \bar{\tau}} \right)^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \exp \left(- (\eta)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} \left(\frac{\theta}{1 - \bar{\tau}} \right)^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} s \right).\tag{A7}$$

Similarly, the base skill price is

$$\pi_0(\{\tau_a\}) = \frac{1}{\theta} \log \left(\frac{Y}{\bar{N}} \right) - \frac{\log \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)}{\theta(1 + \psi)} + \frac{\psi}{\theta(1 + \psi)} \log(1 - \bar{\tau}).\tag{A8}$$

We derive a fully structural expression for $\pi_0(\{\tau_a\})$ below in the proof of Corollary 2.2 when we solve for Y and \bar{N} explicitly. From now on, we drop the vector notation $\{\tau_a\}$ and simply express the equilibrium functions as functions of $\bar{\tau}$, i.e., $s(\kappa, \bar{\tau})$, $\pi_1(\bar{\tau})$, and $\pi_0(\bar{\tau})$.

A.3 Proof of Corollary 2.1 [distribution of skill prices]

The log of the skill premium for an agent with ability κ is

$$\pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \cdot s(\kappa; \bar{\tau}) = \pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \cdot [(1 - \bar{\tau}) \pi_1(\bar{\tau})]^\psi \cdot \kappa = \frac{\eta}{\theta} \cdot \kappa,$$

where the first equality uses (A4), and the second equality follows from (A6). Thus, log skill premia are exponentially distributed with parameter θ . The variance of log skill prices is

$$\text{var}(\log p(s; \bar{\tau})) = \text{var}(\pi_0(\bar{\tau}) + \pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \cdot s(\kappa; \bar{\tau})) = \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} \right)^2 \text{var}(\kappa) = \frac{1}{\theta^2}.$$

Since log skill premia are exponentially distributed, the distribution of skill prices in levels is Pareto. The scale (lower bound) parameter is $\exp(\pi_0(\bar{\tau}))$ and the Pareto parameter is θ .

A.4 Proof of Corollary 2.2 [aggregate quantities]

From equation (17) and the assumption that φ and ε are independent, aggregate hours worked by individuals of age a are

$$H(a, \tau_a) = \mathbb{E}[h(\varphi, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a)] = \int \int h(\varphi, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a) dF(\varphi) dF_a(\varepsilon) \quad (\text{A9})$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \exp\left(\frac{\log(1 - \tau_a)}{(1 + \hat{\sigma}_a)(1 - \tau_a)} - \frac{(1 - \tau_a(1 + \hat{\sigma}_a))}{(\hat{\sigma}_a)^2} \cdot \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2}\right) \\ &\quad \cdot \int \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\hat{\sigma}_a}\right) dF_a(\varepsilon) \int \exp(-(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)) dF(\varphi) \\ &= (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp(-\bar{\varphi}_a) \cdot \exp\left[\left(\frac{\tau_a(1 + \hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a^2} - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_a}\right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2}\right]. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A10})$$

Since α , ε , and φ are independent, it follows that $N(a, \tau_a) = \exp(x_a) \cdot \mathbb{E}[\exp(\alpha)] \cdot \mathbb{E}[\exp(\varepsilon)h(\varphi, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a)] = \exp(x_a) (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left[\left(\frac{\tau_a(1 + \hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a^2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_a}\right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2}\right]$, and therefore

$$N(a, \tau_a) = \exp\left(x_a + \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{\hat{\sigma}_a}\right) \cdot H(a, \tau_a). \quad (\text{A11})$$

Finally, average output of age group a is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) &= \mathbb{E}(y(\varphi, \alpha, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a, \bar{\tau})) = \mathbb{E}[p(s; \bar{\tau}) \exp(x_a + \alpha) h(\varphi, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a)] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[p(s; \bar{\tau})] \cdot N(a, \tau_a), \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[p(s; \bar{\tau})] &= \mathbb{E}[\exp(\pi_0(\bar{\tau}) + \pi_1(\bar{\tau})s)] \\ &= \exp(\pi_0(\bar{\tau})) \cdot \mathbb{E}\left\{\exp\left(\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right) \cdot \kappa\right)\right\} = \exp(\pi_0(\bar{\tau})) \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus:

$$\begin{aligned} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) &= \left[\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}} \left(\frac{1 - \bar{\tau}}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta - 1)}} \left(\frac{1}{\eta}\right)^{\frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta - 1)}} \right] \\ &\quad \cdot (1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left[\left(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\right) + \left(\frac{\tau_a(1 + \hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a^2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_a}\right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2}\right]. \end{aligned}$$

A.5 Proof of Proposition 3 [optimal choice of g and λ]

It is useful to begin by computing:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{Y}(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) := & \int (y_{i,a})^{1-\tau_a} di = \mathcal{K}(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) \\ & \cdot \exp\left(-\tau_a(1-\tau_a)a\frac{v_\omega}{2} + \frac{(1-\tau_a)(1-\tau_a(1+\hat{\sigma}_a))v_{\varepsilon a}}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \frac{v_\varphi}{2}\right) \end{aligned}$$

where, after some tedious algebra, one obtains:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) = & (1-\tau_a)^{\frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma}} \exp\left((1-\tau_a)(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a) - \tau_a(1-\tau_a)\frac{v_\varphi}{2}\right) \\ & \cdot (1-\bar{\tau})^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}\frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1}\right)^{\frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta-1}} \cdot \left(\frac{\theta}{\eta}\right)^{\frac{1-\tau_a}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}} \cdot \frac{\theta}{\theta + \tau_a - 1}. \end{aligned}$$

It is also useful, for what follows, define the short-hand notation

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a) & : = u(c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha), h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon)), \\ \bar{v}(\bar{\tau}) & : = \mathbb{E}[v(s(\kappa, \bar{\tau}), \kappa)]. \end{aligned}$$

Recall that welfare in steady state is given by:

$$\mathcal{W}^{ss}(g, \{\lambda_a, \tau_a\}) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \mathbb{E}[u(c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha), h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon), G)] - \mathbb{E}[v(s(\kappa, \bar{\tau}), \kappa)].$$

Thus, the Ramsey planner's problem can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{g, \lambda_a, \tau_a\}} \mathcal{W}^{ss}(g, \{\lambda_a, \tau_a\}) & = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \bar{u}(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a) + \chi \log\left(g \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau})\right) - \bar{v}(\bar{\tau}) \\ & \text{subject to} \\ \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \lambda_a \tilde{Y}(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) & = (1-g) \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}). \end{aligned} \tag{A12}$$

Letting ϑ denote the multiplier on the government budget constraint, and recognizing that $\partial \bar{u}(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a) / \partial \lambda_a = \lambda_a^{-1}$ from (18), the first-order condition with respect to λ_a yields:

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_a} = \vartheta \cdot \tilde{Y}(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}). \tag{A13}$$

Since $C_a = \lambda_a \tilde{Y}(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau})$, this first order condition implies that average consumption is

equalized across ages:

$$\vartheta^{-1} = C = (1 - g) \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}). \quad (\text{A14})$$

Consider now the first-order condition with respect to g :

$$\frac{\chi}{g} = \vartheta \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y(a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}).$$

using (A14) into the above equation, yields

$$g^* = \frac{\chi}{1 + \chi}.$$

A.6 Proof of Proposition 4 [optimal age-dependent progressivity]

To derive the exact analytical expression for the social welfare function in steady state, we analyze each of its components one at the time. The first term in (A12) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) &= \int \int \int \log c(a, \varphi, \alpha, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) dF_s dF_\alpha^a dF_\varphi \\ &\quad - \int \int \frac{\exp((1 + \sigma)(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)) h(\varphi, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a)^{1+\sigma}}{1 + \sigma} dF_\varphi dF_{\varepsilon a}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that average log consumption for age group a is:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbb{E}[\log c(a, \varphi, \alpha_a, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) | a] \\ &= \{\mathbb{E}[\log c(a, \varphi, \alpha_a, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) | a] - \log C(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau})\} + \log C(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbb{E}[\log c(a, \varphi, \alpha_a, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) | a] \\ &= \log \lambda_a + (1 - \tau_a) \left(-\frac{v_\omega a}{2} - \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + (1 - \tau_a)(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a) + \frac{1 - \tau_a}{1 + \sigma} \log(1 - \tau_a) \\ &\quad + (1 - \tau_a) \frac{(1 - \tau_a(1 + \hat{\sigma}_a))}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \cdot \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2} + (1 - \tau_a) \mathbb{E}[\log p(s; \bar{\tau})] \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[\log p(s; \bar{\tau})] &= \pi_0(\bar{\tau}) + \pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \mathbb{E}[s] \\
\pi_0(\bar{\tau}) &= \frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \log(1-\bar{\tau}) + \frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta}\right) + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \log\left(\frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) \\
\pi_1(\bar{\tau}) \mathbb{E}[s] &= \left[\left(\frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\psi}} (1-\bar{\tau})^{-\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \right] \left[\frac{\eta}{\theta} (1-\bar{\tau})^{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi}} \cdot \eta^{-1} = \frac{1}{\theta} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E}[\log c(a, \varphi, \alpha_a, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) | a] \\
= &\log \lambda_a - (1-\tau_a) \left(\frac{v_\omega a}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + \frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau_a) + (1-\tau_a)(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a) + (1-\tau_a) \frac{(1-\tau_a(1+\hat{\sigma}_a))}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \cdot \frac{v_\varepsilon a}{2} \\
&+ \frac{\psi(1-\tau_a)}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \log(1-\bar{\tau}) + \frac{(1-\tau_a)}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta}\right) \\
&+ \frac{(1-\tau_a)}{\theta-1} \log\left(\frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) + (1-\tau_a) \left(\frac{1}{\theta}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

Moreover:

$$\begin{aligned}
\log C(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) &= \log \lambda_a - \tau_a(1-\tau_a) a \frac{v_\omega}{2} + \left((1-\tau_a) \frac{1-\tau_a(1+\hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \frac{v_\varepsilon}{2} \right) \\
&+ \frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma} \log(1-\tau_a) + (1-\tau_a)(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a) \\
&- \tau_a(1-\tau_a) \frac{v_\varphi}{2} + \frac{(1-\tau_a)\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \log(1-\bar{\tau}) \\
&+ \frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta-1} \log\left(\frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) + \frac{1-\tau_a}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\eta}\right) + \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta+\tau_a-1}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the difference between these two terms is:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E}[\log c(a, \varphi, \alpha_a, s; \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) | a] - \log C(a, \lambda_a, \tau_a, \bar{\tau}) \\
= &-(1-\tau_a)^2 \left(\frac{v_\omega a}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + \frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta} - \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta+\tau_a-1}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

and combining all these terms:

$$\frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \bar{u}_a = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \left[-(1-\tau_a)^2 \left(\frac{v_\omega a}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + \frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta} - \log\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta+\tau_a-1}\right) + \log C(a) \right].$$

Average disutility of hours worked in age group a is:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \int \int \frac{\exp((1+\sigma)(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)) h(\varphi, \varepsilon, a; \tau_a)^{1+\sigma}}{1+\sigma} dF_\varphi dF_{\varepsilon a} \\
&= \frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma} \int \exp((1+\sigma)(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)) \exp(-(1+\sigma)(\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a)) dF_\varphi \\
&\quad \cdot \int \left[\exp\left(-\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat{\sigma}(1-\tau_a)} \mathcal{C}_a\right) \exp\left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\hat{\sigma}} \varepsilon\right) \right] dF_{\varepsilon a} \\
&= \frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma}.
\end{aligned}$$

The average cost of skill investment in each cohort of newborn is:

$$\bar{v}(\bar{\tau}) = \int v(\kappa; \bar{\tau}) dF_\kappa = \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \left(\frac{1-\bar{\tau}}{\theta} \right).$$

Combining these components, and noting that as $\beta \rightarrow 1$ the constant $(1-\beta)/(1-\beta^A) \rightarrow 1/A$, we can rewrite the social welfare function (up to a constant) only as a function of $\{\tau_a\}$ as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{W}^{ss}(g, \{\tau_a\}) &= \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \bar{u}_a - \bar{v} + \chi \log \left(g \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y_a \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \left[-(1-\tau_a)^2 \left(\frac{v_\omega a}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + \frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta} - \log \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta + \tau_a - 1} \right) + \log C(a) \right] \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma} - \left(\frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \right) \left(\frac{1-\bar{\tau}}{\theta} \right) + \chi \log g + \chi \log \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y_a \\
&= \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \left[-(1-\tau_a)^2 \left(\frac{v_\omega a}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + \frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta} - \log \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta + \tau_a - 1} \right) \right] + \log(1-g) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma} - \left(\frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \right) \left(\frac{1-\bar{\tau}}{\theta} \right) + \chi \log g + (1+\chi) \log \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y_a
\end{aligned}$$

where the last step above uses equation (A14) which combines the optimality condition for λ_a (stating that consumption is equalized across ages) and the government budget constraint.

Substituting the expression for Y_a ((25)) into the above expression for $\mathcal{W}^{ss}(g, \{\lambda_a, \tau_a\})$

we arrive at:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{W}^{ss}(g, \{\tau_a\}) &= \log(1-g) + \chi \log g - \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\frac{1-\tau_a}{1+\sigma}}_{\text{Disutility of labor}} \tag{A15} \\
&+ (1+\chi) \log \left\{ \underbrace{\sum_{a=0}^{A-1} (1-\tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \exp \left[x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a + \left(\frac{\tau_a(1+\hat{\sigma}_a)}{\hat{\sigma}_a^2} + \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_a} \right) \frac{v_{\varepsilon a}}{2} \right]}_{\text{Effective hours } \bar{N}_a} \right\} \\
&+ (1+\chi) \underbrace{\frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)} \left[\psi \log(1-\bar{\tau}) + \log \left(\frac{1}{\eta\theta\psi} \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right)^{\theta(1+\psi)} \right) \right]}_{\text{Productivity: } \log(\text{average skill price}) = \log(E[p(s)])} \\
&- \underbrace{\frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \frac{1-\bar{\tau}}{\theta}}_{\text{Avg. education cost}} + \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\left[\log \left(1 - \left(\frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta} \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1-\tau_a}{\theta} \right) \right]}_{\text{Cost of consumption dispersion across skills}} \\
&- \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} (1-\tau_a)^2 (v_\varphi + av_\omega)}_{\text{Cons. dispersion due to unins. shocks and preference heterogeneity}} .
\end{aligned}$$

Each term in this welfare function has the economic interpretation described under each bracket. For more details, see Heathcote et al. (2017). This welfare expression is only a function of g and $\{\tau_a\}$. The optimal choice of public good yields $g^* = \chi / (1 + \chi)$, which proves statement (i) of the proposition. Substituting this optimal choice back into (A15), yields an expression for welfare that is only a function of the sequence $\{\tau_a\}$. Given the sequence of optimal age-dependent progressivity obtained from maximizing (A15), the optimal sequence of $\{\lambda_a\}$ can be recovered residually from (A13).

Taking the first-order condition of (A15) with respect to τ_a (i.e., setting $\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}^{ss}}{\partial \tau_a} = 0$), we arrive at equation (28) in the main text. Standard algebra yields the second-order condition

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{W}^{ss}}{\partial^2 \tau_a} &= -\frac{1}{(\theta-1+\tau_a)^2} - (v_\varphi + av_\omega) \\
&- \left(\frac{1+\chi}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \right) \frac{(\delta\beta^2)^a}{(1-\bar{\tau})^2} \\
&- \left(\frac{1+\chi}{1+\sigma} \right) \left(\frac{N_a}{\bar{N}} \right) \cdot \left[\frac{1}{(1-\tau_a)^2} + (\sigma+1)^3 \frac{\sigma-2\tau_a}{(\sigma+\tau_a)^4} v_{\varepsilon a} \right] \\
&+ \left(\frac{1+\chi}{1+\sigma} \right) \left(\frac{1}{1-\tau_a} + \left(\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma+\tau_a} \right)^3 \tau_a v_{\varepsilon a} \right) \frac{1}{\bar{N}} \left[1 - \left(\frac{N_a}{\bar{N}} \right) \frac{1}{A} \right] \frac{\partial N_a}{\partial \tau_a}.
\end{aligned}$$

Clearly, the first two terms are negative. The last term is always negative since $\bar{N}A \geq N_a$ and $\frac{\partial N_a}{\partial \tau_a} < 0$, recall equation (25). Therefore, a sufficient condition for the third term to be

negative is that $\sigma \geq 2$. This establishes that the social welfare function is globally concave in $\{\tau_a\}$ when $\sigma \geq 2$, so the first-order condition (A16) is necessary and sufficient to characterize the optimal τ_a .

(i) Simple differentiation establishes that this optimality condition is:

$$\begin{aligned}
0 = & \frac{1}{\theta - 1 + \tau_a} - \frac{1}{\theta} + (1 - \tau_a)(v_\varphi + av_\omega) + \frac{1}{1 + \sigma} + \\
& - \left[\left(\frac{1 + \chi}{\theta - 1} \right) \frac{1}{1 - \bar{\tau}} - \frac{1}{\theta} \right] \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \beta^a \\
& - \left(\frac{1 + \chi}{1 + \sigma} \right) \left[\frac{1}{1 - \tau_a} + \left(\frac{\sigma + 1}{\sigma + \tau_a} \right)^3 \tau_a v_{\varepsilon a} \right] \frac{N(a, \tau_a)}{\bar{N}(\{\tau_a\})}.
\end{aligned} \tag{A16}$$

where the expressions for $N(a, \tau_a)$ and $\bar{N}(\{\tau_a\})$ are given in Corollary 2.2.

(ii) By inspecting (A16), it is immediate to see that age a does not enter as an argument in the first-order condition provided that $v_\omega = 0$, the sequences $\{v_{\varepsilon a}\}$ and $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$ are constant, and one of the following conditions is satisfied: either $\beta \rightarrow 1$ or $\theta \rightarrow \infty$. Therefore, the sequence of optimal τ_a must be independent of age in this case. As a consequence, $\tilde{Y}(a)$ is age-invariant and hence, from the FOC (A13) also the optimal λ_a^* must be independent of age.

(iii) Relative to the benchmark in (ii), when $v_\omega > 0$, the optimal τ_a^* is increasing with age since a larger value for av_ω must be balanced by a lower value for $(1 - \tau_a)$.

(iv) Relative to the benchmark in (ii), when $v_{\varepsilon a}$ increasing in age between age a and $a + 1$, it is easy to see that $\tau_a^* > \tau_{a+1}^*$.

(v) Relative to the benchmark in (ii), the optimal τ_a^* is increasing with age also when $\beta < 1$ and $\theta < \infty$. To see this, note that the term on the second line,

$$- \left(\frac{1 + \chi}{\theta - 1} \frac{1 - \beta\delta}{1 - \delta} \frac{1}{1 - \bar{\tau}} - \frac{1}{\theta} \right) \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} (\beta)^a$$

is negative and increasing in a when $\beta < 1$ and $\bar{\tau} \geq 0$. Thus, when a increases, the other terms must fall. Note that the terms $\frac{1}{\theta - 1 + \tau_a}$, $(1 - \tau_a)(v_\varphi + av_\omega)$, and the term in the third line are all decreasing in τ_a . It follows that τ_a must increase with age.

(vi) Relative to the benchmark in (ii), when $\{x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a\}$ is increasing with age $N(a)/\bar{N}$ is increasing in age in the last term of (A16). Thus a lower value of $(1 - \tau_a)^{-1}$ is needed to counterbalance this force which implies that the optimal τ_a^* is decreasing in age.

A.7 Proof of Corollary 4.1 [optimal age-dependent taxation with life cycle only]

When individuals differ only by age, the equilibrium expressions for hours and earnings simplify to

$$h(a) = \exp(-\varphi_a)(1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}}, \quad (\text{A17})$$

$$w(a)h(a) = N_a(\tau_a) = \exp(x_a - \varphi_a)(1 - \tau_a)^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}}. \quad (\text{A18})$$

Under the assumptions stated in the corollary, the first order condition for optimal progressivity at age a is

$$1 - \tau_a^* = (1 + \chi) \frac{N_a(\tau_a^*)}{N(\bar{\tau}(\{\tau_a^*\}))}. \quad (\text{A19})$$

Equations A18 and A19 combined imply

$$1 - \tau_a^* = \left[(1 + \chi) \frac{\exp(x_a - \bar{\varphi}_a)}{N(\bar{\tau}(\{\tau_a^*\}))} \right]^{\frac{1+\sigma}{\sigma}}. \quad (\text{A20})$$

Recall that the planner wants to choose the sequence $\{\lambda_a\}$ to equate consumption across age groups. Thus it will set λ_a^* s.t.

$$c(a) = \lambda_a^* N_a(\tau_a^*)^{1-\tau_a^*} = C$$

which implies

$$\lambda_a^* = \frac{C}{N_a(\tau_a^*)^{1-\tau_a^*}}.$$

The intra-temporal FOC at age a is

$$\frac{\lambda_a (1 - \tau_a) (w(a)h(a))^{-\tau_a} w(a)}{C} = \exp(-(1 + \sigma)\bar{\varphi}_a) h(a)^\sigma$$

and since $w(a)h(a) = N_a(\tau_a)$, the labor wedge in this intra-temporal FOC is

$$\begin{aligned} LW_a &= \lambda_a (1 - \tau_a) N_a(\tau_a)^{-\tau_a} \\ &= \frac{C}{N_a(\tau_a)} (1 - \tau_a) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A21})$$

Now plug the expression for $N_a(\tau_a)$ (A18) and the solution for $(1 - \tau_a^*)$ (A20) into (A21), which gives

$$LW_a = \frac{1 + \chi}{N(\bar{\tau}(\{\tau_a^*\}))} C,$$

which demonstrates that the labor wedge is independent of age. Moreover, from the resource

constraint and the optimal public good provision condition, we know that

$$C(1 + \chi) = Y = N(\bar{\tau}(\{\tau_a^*\}))$$

which implies that $LW_a = 1$ (i.e., the effective marginal tax rate is zero).

Because the optimal tax and transfer scheme leaves labor supply undistorted and equates consumption across age groups, it implements the first best allocation.

Finally, from equation (A21), imposing $LW_a = 1$ and averaging across age groups, gives

$$Y = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} N_a(\tau_a(\{\tau_a^*\})) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} C(1 - \tau_a^*)$$

Then, using $\frac{C}{Y} = \frac{1}{1+\chi}$, we get the expression for the optimal average degree of tax progressivity

$$\frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \tau_a^* = -\chi.$$

A.8 Proof of Proposition 5 [optimal age dependent taxation with transition]

First, note that the derivations and expressions for equilibrium allocations, conditional on a given fiscal policy, are identical to those in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2. The analysis only differs once we start constructing the expression for social welfare, because allocations and policies now vary by time. Define

$$Y_{a,t} = \mathbb{E} [p_{a,t}(s; \bar{\tau}_{a,t}) \exp(x_a + \alpha) h_{a,t}(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau_{a,t})]$$

$$C_{a,t} = \lambda_{a,t} \tilde{Y}_{a,t}$$

where

$$\tilde{Y}_{a,t} = \mathbb{E} \left[(p_{a,t}(s; \bar{\tau}_{a,t}) \exp(x_a + \alpha) h_{a,t}(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau_{a,t}))^{1-\tau_{a,t}} \right]$$

and let

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y_{a,t} \\ \tilde{Y}_t &= \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \tilde{Y}_{a,t} \end{aligned}$$

denote the corresponding population averages.

The government budget constraint can be written as

$$(1 - g_t) Y_t = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \lambda_{a,t} \tilde{Y}_{a,t} \quad (\text{A22})$$

Given the allocations described, we can assemble the components of social welfare in eq. (29).

Expected utility from consumption for age group a at date t (ignoring the term $\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^A} \beta^a$ in eq. (2), which pre-multiplies all the utility components involving consumption, hours and public consumption is)

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [\log c_{a,t}(\varphi, \alpha, s; \lambda_{a,t}, \tau_{a,t}, \bar{\tau}_{a,t})] &= \{ \mathbb{E} [\log c_{a,t}(\varphi, \alpha, s)] - \log C_{a,t} \} + \log C_{a,t} \quad (\text{A23}) \\ &= -(1 - \tau_{a,t})^2 \left(\frac{v_\omega a}{2} + \frac{v_\varphi}{2} \right) + \log \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{a,t}}{\theta} \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{a,t}}{\theta} \right) \\ &\quad + \log \lambda_{a,t} + \log \tilde{Y}_{a,t} \end{aligned}$$

Expected utility from public good provision is

$$\chi \log (g_t Y_t) \quad (\text{A24})$$

Expected disutility from hours worked for age group a at date t is:

$$-\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\exp [(1 + \sigma) (\bar{\varphi}_a + \varphi)]}{1 + \sigma} h_{a,t}(\varphi, \varepsilon; \tau_{a,t})^{1+\sigma} \right] = -\frac{1 - \tau_{a,t}}{1 + \sigma}$$

The expected utility contribution from skill investment for age group a at date t is

$$-\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\kappa^{-(1/\psi)}}{1 + 1/\psi} s(\bar{\tau}_{a,t})^{1+1/\psi} \right] = -\frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \left(\frac{1 - \bar{\tau}_{a,t}}{\theta} \right).$$

We can now compute total welfare for the planner, as of date 0, using equations (2) and (29).

Note first that the policy parameters $\lambda_{a,t}$ only appear in the terms involving expected utility from consumption and the government budget constraint. Let ζ_t denote the multiplier on this constraint (eq: A22).

The first-order condition with respect to $\lambda_{a,t}$ is

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_{a,t}} = \zeta_t \tilde{Y}_{a,t} = \zeta_t \frac{C_{a,t}}{\lambda_{a,t}}$$

which implies

$$C_{a,t} = \frac{1}{\zeta_t}.$$

Thus, given $\tilde{Y}_{a,t}$ (which is independent of $\lambda_{a,t}$), the policy parameter $\lambda_{a,t}$ is set so that average consumption for age group a is independent of age and only varies with time. This value for $C_{a,t}$ is uniquely pinned down from the government budget constraint, given a value for g_t :

$$C_{a,t} = C_t = (1 - g_t)Y_t \quad (\text{A25})$$

which implies

$$\lambda_{a,t} = \frac{(1 - g_t)Y_t}{\tilde{Y}_{a,t}}.$$

With the expression for $C_{a,t}$ in eq. A25 substituted into the first row of eq. A23, $\lambda_{a,t}$ no longer appears in any of the terms in social welfare.

Now consider the optimality condition for g_t . Note that g_t appears in the form $\chi \log g_t$ in the contribution from publicly-provided goods (eq. A24), and in the form $\log(1 - g_t)$ in the contribution from the level of average private consumption. The first-order condition with respect to g_t immediately implies the result $g_t = \frac{\chi}{1+\chi}$.

A.9 Proof of Proposition 6 [optimal taxation with transition and inelastic labor supply]

We now write out all the terms in social welfare explicitly. To start with, we allow for flexible labor supply ($\sigma < \infty$). In order to economize on space, we assume only people live for only two periods: the generalization to $A > 1$ is straightforward.

The date t component of social welfare in the expression eq. (29) (ignoring the terms $\chi \log g_t$ and $\log(1 - g_t)$ which do not involve any $\tau_{a,t}$ parameters) is

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^2} \right) \left(\log \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{1,t}}{\theta} \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{1,t}}{\theta} \right) - \frac{1 - \tau_{1,t}}{1 + \sigma} + (1 + \chi) \log \left\{ \frac{1}{2} (Y_{0,t} + Y_{1,t}) \right\} \right) \\ & + \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^2} \right) \left(\log \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{0,t}}{\theta} \right) \right) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{0,t}}{\theta} \right) - \frac{1 - \tau_{0,t}}{1 + \sigma} + (1 + \chi) \log \left\{ \frac{1}{2} (Y_{0,t} + Y_{1,t}) \right\} \right) \\ & - \frac{\psi}{1 + \psi} \left(\frac{1 - \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta^2} (\tau_{0,t} + \beta E_t[\tau_{1,t+1}]) \right)}{\theta} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where the first line reflects the contribution to welfare from the old, and the second and third lines the contribution from the young.

Output of the young and old at t is given by

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{0,t} &= (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \mathbb{E}_t[p_{0,t}] \\ Y_{1,t} &= (1 - \tau_{1,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{t-1}[p_{1,t}] \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\mathbb{E}_t[p_{0,t}] = \mathbb{E}_t[p_{1,t+1}] = \left[\left(\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{1 - \frac{(1-\beta)}{(1-\beta^2)}(\tau_{0,t} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[\tau_{1,t+1}])}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{\psi}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}} \left(\frac{1}{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{(1+\psi)(\theta-1)}} \right]$$

Note that $Y_t = \frac{1}{2}(Y_{0,t} + Y_{1,t})$ depends on $\tau_{0,t}$, $\mathbb{E}_t[\tau_{1,t+1}]$, $\tau_{1,t}$ and $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\tau_{1,t}]$.

At $t = 0$ (the time of the reform) only three tax parameters ($\tau_{0,0}$, $\tau_{1,1}$, $\tau_{1,0}$) affect contemporaneous output:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \log Y_0}{\partial \tau_{0,0}} &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{0,0})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_0[p_{0,0}] + (1 - \tau_{0,0})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_0[p_{0,0}]}{\partial \tau_{0,0}}}{2 Y_0} : \text{young adjust hours \& skill inv. at } t = 0 \\ \frac{\partial \log Y_0}{\partial \tau_{1,1}} &= \frac{1 (1 - \tau_{1,1})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_0[p_{1,1}]}{\partial \tau_{1,1}}}{2 Y_0} : \text{young adjust skill investment at } t = 0 \text{ in response to } \tau_{1,1} \\ \frac{\partial \log Y_0}{\partial \tau_{1,0}} &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{1,0})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_{-1}[p_{1,0}(\tau_{-1})]}{2 Y_0} : \text{old adjust hours at } t = 0 \end{aligned}$$

In contrast, for a generic date $t > 0$, output depends on four different parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}] + (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}]}{\partial \tau_{0,t}}}{2 Y_t} : \text{young adjust hours \& skill inv. at } t \\ \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} &= \frac{1 (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}]}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}}}{2 Y_t} : \text{young adjust skill investment at } t \\ \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t}} &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{1,t})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t}] + (1 - \tau_{1,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t}]}{\partial \tau_{1,t}}}{2 Y_t} : \text{old adjust hours at } t \text{ \& skill inv. at } t - 1 \\ \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t-1}} &= \frac{1 (1 - \tau_{1,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t}]}{\partial \tau_{0,t-1}}}{2 Y_t} : \text{old adjust hours at } t \text{ \& skill inv. at } t - 1 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, in general $\tau_{0,t}$ affects both Y_t and Y_{t+1} , while $\tau_{1,t}$ affects Y_t and Y_{t-1} .

Consider the generic first-order condition for $\tau_{0,t}$ for all $t \geq 0$. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) (1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} & : \text{ effect on old at } t \\
+ \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) & \left(\frac{\frac{1}{\theta}}{1-\left(\frac{1-\tau_{0,t}}{\theta}\right)} - \frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\sigma} + (1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} \right) + \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \frac{\left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2}\right)}{\theta} & : \text{ effect on young at } t \\
& + \beta \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) \left((1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} \right) & : \text{ effect on old at } t+1 \\
& + \beta \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) \left((1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} \right) & : \text{ effect on young at } t+1 \\
& & = 0
\end{aligned}$$

The terms here are readily interpretable. Increasing $\tau_{0,t}$ reduces skill investment at t , which reduces output at $t+1$. This reduces welfare for young and old at $t+1$ (the last two lines). Increasing $\tau_{0,t}$ also reduces output at t , both through the skill investment channel, and by reducing labor supply of the young. This accounts for the first line, and the term involving output in the second line. Finally, increasing $\tau_{0,t}$ compresses consumption inequality among the young at t , reduces hours worked by the young at t , and reduces skill investment costs by the young at t . These are the remaining terms in the second line.

Now consider the generic first-order condition for $\tau_{1,t+1}$ for $t \geq 0$. This condition is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) (1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} & : \text{ effect on old at } t \\
& + \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) (1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} + \beta \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \left(\frac{\left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2}\right)}{\theta} \right) & : \text{ effect on young at } t \\
+ \beta \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) & \left(\frac{\frac{1}{\theta}}{1-\left(\frac{1-\tau_{1,t+1}}{\theta}\right)} - \frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\sigma} + (1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} \right) & : \text{ effect on old at } t+1 \\
& + \beta \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^2} \right) \left((1+\chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} \right) & : \text{ effect on young at } t+1
\end{aligned}$$

We can write these two first-order conditions more compactly as

$$2(1+\chi) \left(\frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} + \beta \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} \right) + \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \frac{1}{\theta} + \left(\frac{1}{(\theta-1+\tau_{0,t})} - \frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\sigma} \right) = 0 \quad (\text{A26})$$

$$2(1+\chi) \left(\frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} + \beta \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} \right) + \beta \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \frac{1}{\theta} + \beta \left(\frac{1}{(\theta-1+\tau_{1,t+1})} - \frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\sigma} \right) = 0 \quad (\text{A27})$$

Now note that:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} + \beta \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}] + (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}]}{\partial \tau_{0,t}}}{Y_t} + \beta \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{1,t+1})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t+1}]}{\partial \tau_{0,t}}}{Y_{t+1}} \\ \frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} + \beta \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}]}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}}}{Y_t} + \beta \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{1,t+1})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t+1}] + (1 - \tau_{1,t+1})^{\frac{1}{1+\sigma}} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t+1}]}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}}}{Y_{t+1}} \\ \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t+1}]}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} &= \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}]}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} = \beta \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{1,t+1}]}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} = \beta \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}]}{\partial \tau_{0,t}}\end{aligned}$$

which jointly imply

$$\frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} + \beta \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{1,t+1}} = \beta \left(\frac{\partial \log Y_t}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} + \beta \frac{\partial \log Y_{t+1}}{\partial \tau_{0,t}} \right) + \beta \frac{1}{1+\sigma} \mathbb{E}[p_{0,t}] \left(\frac{(1 - \tau_{0,t})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}}}{Y_t} - \frac{(1 - \tau_{1,t+1})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}}}{Y_{t+1}} \right) \quad (\text{A28})$$

Now consider the case with inelastic labor supply, so that $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$. The second term on the right-hand side of the above equation drops out. Then substituting this equation into the the first-order condition for $\tau_{1,t+1}$ (eq. A27), it is clear that the first-order conditions for $\tau_{0,t}$ and $\tau_{1,t+1}$ are exactly symmetric, except that all the terms in the latter are multiplied by β .

It follows that the optimal value for $\tau_{0,t}$ is equal to the optimal value for $\tau_{1,t+1}$. Note, finally, that the optimal value for these policy parameters must be strictly less than one. The reason is that from the first-order condition eq. (A26) the marginal value of consumption compression at $\tau_{0,t} = 1$ is zero, while the marginal cost in terms of reduced skill investment and output is strictly positive.

Now consider the optimal choice for $\tau_{1,0}$, progressivity for the old at the time of the tax reform, which is the only choice we have not explored so far. The first-order condition here is:

$$\left(\frac{1}{(\theta - 1 + \tau_{1,0})} - \frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\sigma} + (1 + \chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_0}{\partial \tau_{1,0}} \right) + (1 + \chi) \frac{\partial \log Y_0}{\partial \tau_{1,0}} = 0$$

where

$$\frac{\partial \log Y_0}{\partial \tau_{1,0}} = \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma} (1 - \tau_{1,0})^{\frac{-\sigma}{1+\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_{-1}[p_{1,0}]}{Y_t}$$

Here, an increase in $\tau_{1,0}$ reduces consumption inequality among the old, and reduces the old's labor supply, which translates into reduced output and thus consumption and government spending for both the young and the old at date 0.

With inelastic labor supply, the first-order condition simplifies further to

$$\frac{1}{(\theta - 1 + \tau_{1,0})} - \frac{1}{\theta} = 0$$

which immediately implies $\tau_{1,0} = 1$.

A.10 Extension to age variation in the taste for leisure

By following the same steps of the proof of Proposition 1, we arrive at the new allocations:

$$\log h(\varphi, a, \varepsilon) = \frac{\log(1 - \tau_a)}{1 + \sigma} - (\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a - \gamma_a) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_a}{\sigma + \tau_a} \right) \varepsilon - \frac{1}{\sigma + \tau_a} \mathcal{C}_a, \quad (\text{A29})$$

$$\log c(\varphi, s, a, \alpha) = \log \lambda_a + (1 - \tau_a) \left[\log p(s) + x_a + \alpha + \frac{\log(1 - \tau_a)}{1 + \sigma} - (\varphi + \bar{\varphi}_a - \gamma_a) \right] + \mathcal{C}_a, \quad (\text{A30})$$

The equilibrium skill prices $p(s)$ remain unchanged. By following the same derivations needed to obtain the steady-state welfare expression (27), we arrive at the modified expression (33) in the main text.

B Extension to borrowing and saving

This appendix describes the extension of the benchmark model to an economy where households are allowed to trade a risk-free bond in zero net supply.

B.1 Economic Environment

The economic environment is virtually identical to the one in the main text. We therefore only highlight what differs.

Financial assets: The main difference from the benchmark model consists in the ability of households to save in a risk-free asset b with gross return $R = 1 + r$. Short positions are allowed up to an exogenous limit $-\bar{b}_a$, where $b_A \geq 0$, i.e. a No-Ponzi condition stating that the household cannot die with negative wealth needs to hold. Assets are in zero net supply, i.e. $B = 0$. Thus, when $\bar{b}_a = 0$ for all a , the only equilibrium is autarky and the benchmark model becomes a special case of this general model.

Government: We assume that the tax base is total income net of saving, i.e., expenditures, or

$$m_{i,a} = p(s_i) \exp(z_{i,a}) h_{i,a} + r b_{i,a} - (b_{i,a+1} - b_{i,a}). \quad (\text{B1})$$

As we will see, this assumption is convenient because it allows us to simplify the model and retain the closed form solution for the equilibrium skill price function $p(s)$. The tax and transfer scheme is defined as in the main text, i.e.

$$T_a(m_{i,a}) = m_{i,a} - \lambda_a m_{i,a}^{1-\tau_a}. \quad (\text{B2})$$

We abstract from the possibility that the government can issue debt or save. The government budget constraint therefore reads as

$$g \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int y_{i,a} di_a = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int [m_{i,a} - \lambda_a (m_{i,a})^{1-\tau_a}] di_a. \quad (\text{B3})$$

B.2 Solution to the household problem

The agent chooses skills at age 0. Abstract from this choice for now and consider an individual with skill level s . After the skill choice, the household solves

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{b_{a+1}\}_{a=0}^{A-1}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left(\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta^A} \right) \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \beta^a \left[\log c_a - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)(\bar{\varphi}_a + \varphi)]}{1+\sigma} h_a^{1+\sigma} + \chi \log G \right] \\ & s.t \\ c &= \lambda_a [p(s) \exp(z_a) h_a + Rb_a - b_{a+1}]^{1-\tau_a} \\ b_{a+1} &\geq -\bar{b}_a \end{aligned}$$

The FOC for hours worked and the Euler Equation are:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(1-\tau_a)p(s)\exp(z_a)}{p(s)\exp(z_a)h_a + Rb_a - b_{a+1}} &= \exp[(1+\sigma)(\Psi_a + \varphi)] h_a^\sigma \\ \frac{(1-\tau_a)}{p(s)\exp(z_a)h_a + Rb_a - b_{a+1}} &\geq \beta R \mathbb{E}_a \left[\frac{(1-\tau_{a+1})}{p(s)\exp(z_{a+1})h_{a+1} + Rb_{a+1} - b_{a+2}} \right] \\ &= \text{if } b_{a+1} \geq -\bar{b}_a \end{aligned}$$

The properties of decision rules we are looking for is h_a independent of s , which implies (from the labor supply FOC) that $Rb_a - b_{a+1}$ must be proportional to $p(s)$. As long as b_a is proportional to $p(s)$ for all a this will work. Note that this also seems a reasonable candidate for the solution to the inter-temporal FOC. In the same step, we can normalize the decision rules for hours and saving with respect to the disutility of work φ and the permanent shock α_a .

Define:

$$\hat{h}_a = h_a \cdot \exp(\varphi) \tag{B4}$$

$$\hat{b}_a = b_a \cdot \frac{\exp(\varphi)}{\exp(\alpha_a) p(s)} \tag{B5}$$

$$\hat{b}_{a+1}^* = b_{a+1} \cdot \frac{\exp(\varphi)}{\exp(\alpha_a) p(s)} \tag{B6}$$

$$\hat{b}_{a+1} = \frac{\hat{b}_{a+1}^*}{\exp(\omega_{a+1})} \tag{B7}$$

With some algebra it can be easily shown that the two FOCs can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(1 - \tau_a) \exp(x_a)}{\exp(x_a) \hat{h}_a + R \hat{b}_a - \hat{b}_{a+1}^*} &= \exp[(1 + \sigma) \Psi_a] \hat{h}_a^\sigma \\ \frac{1}{\exp(x_a) \hat{h}_a + R \hat{b}_a - \hat{b}_{a+1}^*} &\geq \beta R \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{a+1}}{1 - \tau_a} \right) \mathbb{E}_a \left[\frac{1}{\exp(\omega_{a+1}) \left(\exp(x_{a+1}) \hat{h}_{a+1} + R \hat{b}_{a+1} - \hat{b}_{a+2}^* \right)} \right] \\ &= \text{if } \hat{b}_{a+1}^* \geq -\bar{b}_a \end{aligned}$$

where note that for this normalization to work, the original borrowing limit has to be written as:

$$b_{a+1} \geq -\bar{b}_a \left[\frac{p(s) \exp(\alpha_a)}{\exp(\varphi)} \right] \quad (\text{B8})$$

a borrowing limit stated in terms of the normalized saving function that depends neither on s nor on α_a . Finally note that solving this system only requires the state variable \hat{b}_a and we can use a backstepping algorithm starting from the known fact that $\hat{b}_A = 0$.

In particular, from the household problem, we obtain policy functions $\hat{h}_a(\hat{b}_a; \tau_a)$, $\hat{b}_{a+1}^*(\hat{b}_a; \tau)$, $\hat{c}_a(\hat{b}_a; \tau)$, where $\hat{c}_a := \exp(x_a) \hat{h}_a + R \hat{b}_a - \hat{b}_{a+1}^*$. From these decisions, by rescaling back to the original states, we can obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} h_a(b_a; \varphi, \tau_a) &= \hat{h}_a(\hat{b}_a \cdot \exp(\alpha_a) \cdot p(s) \exp(-\varphi); \tau_a) \exp(-\varphi) \\ b_{a+1}(b_a; \alpha_a, s, \varphi, \tau) &= \exp(\alpha_a) \cdot p(s) \exp(-\varphi) \cdot \hat{b}_{a+1}^*(\hat{b}_a \cdot \exp(\alpha_a) \cdot p(s) \exp(-\varphi); \tau) \\ c_a(b_a; \alpha_a, s, \varphi, \tau) &= \lambda_a [p(s) \exp(\alpha_a) \exp(-\varphi)]^{1-\tau_a} \hat{c}_a(\hat{b}_a; \tau)^{1-\tau_a} \end{aligned}$$

where the last one is obtained residually from the budget constraint.

B.3 The wealth distribution

Suppose we have come up with an interest rate such that

$$\sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int_{\hat{b}_a} \hat{b}_{a+1}^*(\hat{b}_a) dF_{\hat{b}_a} = 0$$

it can be shown that the true bond market clears, i.e.

$$\sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \int_{b_a} \int_s \int_{\alpha_a} \int_{\varphi} b_{a+1}(b_a; \alpha_a, s, \varphi, \tau) dF_s dF_{\alpha_0} dF_{\varphi} dF_{b_a} = 0$$

If we denote the distribution for an individual of age a $\mu_a(\hat{b}; \tau)$, we know that $\mu_0(\hat{b} = 0) = 1$, i.e. all the mass is at $b = 0$ (individuals are born with zero wealth). We can therefore

easily initiate the recursion and move forward using the household's policy functions.

B.4 Welfare

The planner maximizes welfare:

$$\mathcal{W}(g, \lambda_a, \tau_a) = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} \bar{u}_a - \bar{v} + \chi \log \left(g \cdot \sum_{a=0}^{A-1} Y_a \right)$$

where $\bar{v} = \frac{\psi}{1+\psi} \left(\frac{1-\bar{\tau}}{\theta} \right)$ is the average education cost for the newborn and the period utility term is

$$\bar{u}_a = \int \left[\log(c_{i,a}) - \frac{\exp[(1+\sigma)(\bar{\varphi}_a + \varphi)]}{1+\sigma} h_{i,a}^{1+\sigma} \right] di_a$$

B.5 Computation

To find the optimal tax function we start by setting $g = \chi/(1+\chi)$, the optimal solution, and approximate the τ_a function with a Chebyshev polynomial of order three. We then maximize the welfare function with respect to the four parameters of the Chebyshev polynomial. The formal algorithm is as follows:

1. Guess coefficients of Chebyshev polynomial $\{p_j\}_{j=0}^3$
2. Evaluate the Chebyshev polynomial to get the full vector $\{\tau_a\}_{a=0}^{A-1}$
 - a. Guess an interest rate, R
 - b. Given R and τ , solve the household problem using the endogenous grid method
 - c. Compute the asset distribution $\{\mu_a(\hat{b})\}_{a=0}^{A-1}$ and total asset demand
 - d. If asset demand is zero go to 3, otherwise update R and go back to b
3. Given the solution to the household problem compute welfare
4. If welfare is maximized stop, otherwise update $\{p_j\}_{j=0}^3$ and go back to 2

To solve the household problem we use a grid with 50 points on $[-\bar{b}_a, b_{max}]$ with $b_{max} = 10$ (further increasing the number of grid points or b_{max} has no effect on results). To compute the asset distribution we use the histogram method on the same grid used for the household problem with 3000 grid points. Finally, we approximate the ω distribution using Gaussian quadrature with 9 Gauss-Hermite nodes.