



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK *of* NEW YORK

# International spillovers of monetary and prudential policies: evidence and implications

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May 2018 : Third Annual ECB Macroprudential and Research Conference (Frankfurt)

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## Sorting through the themes in the conference program

- Presentations focused on interplay of macro-pru and monetary policy
  - ✓ Lars Svensson on future prospects
  - ✓ Loretta Mester on limits and overlaps
  - ✓ Alejandro Van der Ghote on (domestic) coordination
- How large are *international* spillovers of policy?
  - ✓ Long history in international capital flows, asset price co-movements
- What consequences for domestic and international policy?
  - ✓ Monetary policy: theoretical arguments, but no international mandate
  - ✓ Macro-pru: mandate newer, so consider coordination / reciprocity?
  - ✓ What specific macro-pru policies might be candidates, given fact of international spillovers?

# My remarks on international spillovers and implications

## 1. How large are international spillovers of policy?

- Evidence type 1. Size and importance of the global factor, with emphasis on US monetary policy as driver. Global liquidity, international capital flows and currency depreciation.
- Evidence type 2. Micro-banking data and the International Banking Research Network. Evidence of prudential and monetary spillovers through domestic and foreign bank lending, with roles for specific counterparty or currency exposures.

## 2. Implications for international policy coordination or response?

- Difficulty of designing reciprocity given mixed directional prudential policy spillovers.
- Positive international stability effects from structural prudential toolkit supporting resiliency and shock absorbing capacity of institutions and reduces amplitude of transmission.

**1. How large are international spillovers of policy?**



## Evidence type 1. Size and importance of the global factor

**IMPORTANT.** Rey at Jackson Hole 2013. BIS, Borio and Shin.

- Risk sentiment (VIX), US MP; leverage and international credit channels.
- Largest for credit, asset prices, mortgage spreads, term premia.

**MORE EPISODIC, LESS GENERALIZED.** Avdjiev, Gambacorta, Goldberg, Schiaffi 2017. Goldberg and Krogstrup 2018. Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012.

- Time varying. Strongest US MP post crisis, role of synchronized policy cycle; composition and balance sheet condition of lenders.
- Differentiated. By country types, banking system characteristics, and across core versus periphery locations from perspective of global banks.

**OVERSTATED.** Cerutti, Claessens, Rose 2017. Obstfeld, Ostry, Qureshi 2017.

- “Low” explanatory power of global in international capital flows data: FDI, Portfolio Debt, Portfolio Equity, Credit; AEs, EMs; inflows, outflows.
- Broad insulating power of flexible exchange rates retained. Still, a potential role for capital flow management instruments and macroprudential policies.

## **Global factor: a significant but not dominant driver of capital flows**

Cerutti, Claessens and Rose 2017 (CCR): generously defined, global factor accounts for < 25 % of quarterly variation in international capital flow data.

Goldberg and Krogstrup 2018: new Exchange Market Pressure index.

- “Super exchange rate” combines exchange rate and foreign exchange intervention into single measure in units of currency depreciation
- Cross-country panel, 48 countries, 2001m1-2017m10
- Control for domestic monetary policy, capture common global factor.
- Consider three sample country groupings: “Safe-havens” (US, Japan, Switzerland), Emerging Markets, and Other AEs.

- ✓ Global factor explains slightly more variation than CCR, still not dominant.
- ✓ Effect, in currency depreciation units, averages 5 X larger for EMs than AEs.
- ✓ Global factor strength is episodic (enhanced in stress periods).

# US monetary policy and VIX: changes over time in consequences

Avdjiev, Gambacorta, Goldberg, Schiaffi 2017. Transmission into global liquidity statistically important, but changes over time in important ways.

Cross-border claims and international bond issuance, quarterly, 64 countries, 2000-2015. Post GFC, when attention on topic increased:

- Sensitivity to US MP rose sharply, peaked at 2013 Fed "taper tantrum", then reverted.
  - ✓ Peak when US MP signal of broader AE policies (synchronized cycle).
- Sensitivity to VIX declined and stayed low.
  - ✓ Shift in composition of lending banking systems, toward better capitalized and with more stable funding, reduces risk sensitivity of global liquidity.

## Evidence type 2. Micro-banking analysis through the International Banking Research Network

### Participating institutions

- jointly pose policy-relevant questions, construct common testing method
- compile data needed for common implementation
- independently analyze confidential bank-specific data, consider bank heterogeneity, and write own papers.

– *International Journal of Central Banking* March 2017. Special Issue.

“International Prudential Policy Spillovers: Evidence from the International Banking Research Network” by Buch, Bussiere, and Goldberg.

- 15 country analyses, 2 cross-country. New database.

- *Journal of International Money and Finance*. Forthcoming. Special Issue.

“International Transmission of Monetary Policy Via Banks: New Cross-Country Evidence from the International Banking Research Network” by Buch, Bussiere, Goldberg, Hills. April 2018. NBER 24454.

- 17 country analyses, 2 cross-country. Conventional, unconventional MP.



## **International spillovers of prudential instruments through banks**

- 1. Foreign changes in prudential instruments sometimes spill over through bank lending, influencing domestic credit conditions.**
- 2. Not one-size-fits-all: Spillovers heterogeneous in size and direction**
  - By prudential instrument (capital requirements, SSCB, LTV cap, RR LC deposits)
  - By bank business models (global bank, branch, subsidiary).
  - Banks with stronger balance sheets tend to reduce international lending by less when regulations tighten.
  - No clear difference between AEs and EMs, or stage of business cycle
  - Pattern not clearly predicted by simple theoretical frameworks
- 3. Market share repositioning occurs**
  - Banks with stronger balance sheets reduce lending by less when regulations tighten, may expand international and domestic roles.
- 4. International spillovers on loan growth have not been large.**
  - But potential for spillovers increase as tools are activated more.

# International spillovers of monetary policy through banks (1)

- Broad-based evidence of international spillovers through bank lending.
  - **Inward transmission**: Significant transmission of foreign policy to domestic banks
  - **Outward transmission**: Transmission mainly through global banks
- Monetary policy matters during both conventional and unconventional policy periods.
  - Short rate/QE and shadow rate results similar in **conventional periods**.
  - **Shadow rate** shows more spillovers in **unconventional periods**.
  - Size of central bank's **balance sheet** misses consequences of forward guidance and balance sheet composition that work along the yield curve.
- The degree of spillovers differs between **source countries**.
  - US policy generates significant spillovers for almost all countries.
  - Evidence of transmission is more varied for other source countries.

## International spillovers of monetary policy through banks (2)

- **Bank-specific characteristics matter, spillovers to lending are heterogeneous.**
  - **Cross-border gross and net liability** positions of banks matter most.
  - **Internal capital markets:** Banks have lower friction on shifting assets across countries or drawing on other funding sources. Significant role only during conventional monetary policy periods.
  - **Frictions** vary by currency, access to FX funding, monetary policy regime, country characteristics, or market structure.
  - Frictions do **not** map exactly to bank lending and portfolio channels as in literature focused on frictions of large advanced economies with developed financial markets.
- **Domestic lending activity is more insulated than expected.**
  - “Global factor” story does not dominate domestic loan growth.
  - Despite substantial spillovers, there is **low explanatory power**.

## **2. Implications for prudential policy?**

# Main points from across these explorations

- Extensive international spillovers
  - magnitudes on average not very large. Episodic, stronger for EMs, for synchronized policy cycles, and with proxies for (high) risk sentiment.
  - strongest in interbank lending, weaker for nonbank borrowers. How much translates into real activity versus sectoral prices? Prudential instruments to target those most systemically concerning?
  - Consistent role of bank health and banking system characteristics. Reinforces role of prudential policies in structural stability of international creditors, to reduce amplitude of swings.
  - Nonbank creditors and oversight frameworks? Enhancing similarities with bank creditors, but also strengthening institutions?
- Reinforce the importance of international and domestic efforts to strengthen institutions, and to avoid crises that concentrate spillover effects.



## Reference slides




Homepage of the IBRN: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/IBRN/index.html>

**Questions and suggestions are welcome!**

Exhibit shows change in sensitivities to VIX, pre- vs. post-break. The responsiveness of international bank lending to global risk conditions declined considerably post-crisis. Sensitivity of cross-border lending became more similar to that of international debt securities.

Post-break sensitivities to global risk ( $\beta_2$ ), evolution over time



Avdjiev, Gambacorta, Goldberg and Schiaffi, 2017. "The shifting drivers of global liquidity"

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