

# SYSTEMIC RISK

## Market functioning and resilience

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# 'RESILIENCE' OF MARKETS

- Three main factors are impacting market resilience
  1. Diversity of market participants
  2. Liquidity of markets
  3. Procyclical behavior




# DIVERSITY OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS

- Market makers (Banks)
  - Positions adjust as flows make securities rich/cheap. Reduced balance sheet capacity. Vol sensitivity in risk measures (VaR)
- Fast Money
  - Prop desks largely gone. Hedge funds and Asset Managers are constrained by lack of exit possibilities.
- Buy & Hold or fundamental long-term investors
  - Constrained by counterparty and leverage availability. Regulated entities in this segment are behaving more procyclically.
- Government money
  - Last resort – when government intervention needed, the damage is already done.


# LIQUIDITY OF MARKETS

- Liquidity of (bond) markets impacted negatively by regulation

- RWA
- Leverage ratio
- LCR / NSFR



**Entrance with no exit**  
 US credit mutual fund assets vs dealer inventory (\$bn, IG+HY)



**Bund, bobl & schatz monthly futures volume**



Source: ICI, NY Fed, Bloomberg, Haver Analytics, Citi Research.

# PRO CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR

- Clearing and margining
  - High quality assets – clearing members' discretion to increase margins
- Pension & Insurance regulation
  - Regulatory framework is risk based and as a consequence pro-cyclical ?
- Underestimation of liquidity requirements
- 'Search for Yield' and the role of QE


# CONCLUSION & ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION

- Bond markets are less resilient to shocks - caused by a diverse set of factors that are related and reinforcing
  - Reduced diversity of market participants
  - Reduced liquidity
  - Pro cyclical behavior – mandatory and voluntarily
- Does the group agree with this conclusion ?
- Do insurers suffer from a similar problem as (Dutch) pension funds ?
- Do insurers and pension funds have to change their asset mix when volatility increases ?
- Did Solvency II add to pro-cyclicality of markets ?
- Is this a temporary issue or structural ?
- Do the participants of the BMCG see possible solutions ?



# The Bund Conundrum

# There is no such thing as a free market




- Assets held by price-insensitive investors (central banks and passive trackers) are so large that the free float of high-quality bonds is much smaller than the outstanding amount (around 38%)
- This makes it impossible for investors to hold 'the market portfolio' in high-quality USD and EUR bonds
- Unlike the US and Japan, the ECB is (still?) passive in this process
- Main driver of squeeze on AAA EUR is FX reserve holdings and a large proportion of passive investments

Source: IMF (COFER), Eurex, BrokerTec, BoJ, FRB, DBIQ, GPIF, PFA, DB calculations



# Deficits are a slow remedy



- High public deficits alleviate the short squeeze, for EUR disinvestment has also been helpful
- The problem is bond indices: there is no free-float adjustment in how these are constructed (unlike equity)
- In EUR, the asymmetry in participation between core and non-core market leads to a distortion in cross-country spreads
- Investors are structurally short core and long non-core


Source: IMF (COFER), DBIQ, DB calculations

# Index methodology is creating problems



- In equity indices, it is quite common to reflect immobile long-term holdings in listed shares through free-float adjustments
- For fixed income indices, that is not possible because no holding data is publicly available
- This means, however, that investors trying to follow a benchmark chase an asset allocation that may not be available in the market
- As investors become aware of the shortage in some market segments, liquidity drops even more as relative value trading declines
- In effect, bond markets are not prepared for systematic distortions in supply
- Whether regulatory drivers for collateral (clearing, LCR) is hard to delineate from the COFER data analysis because the target market segment is the same (high credit rating, low duration)



# Some other factors also seem to be at work



- Eurex volumes relative to outstanding AAA debt are at lower point than post Lehman
- That said, retreat of reserves from EUR should have freed up some liquidity
- It is likely that adoption of Basel III in 2011 and crisis-related losses added to the loss of liquidity
- Impossible to quantify is the positive feedback effect between liquidity and volumes

Source: IMF (COFER), Eurex, DBIQ, DB calculations



# Food stamps for yield-starved investors: Option overlays



- EUR implied volatility levels tend to be extremely low and not reflective of risks, USD 50% higher and more realistic
- Option selling in EUR now more focused on ATM (1:1 call spreads)
- CBOT options have reached 24% of futures volumes, unlikely that the liquidity risk is reflected in pricing
- Cf Jan/Feb rally in Bobl which was emphasised by short call overlays
- Last week's move probably also hurt overlay sellers

Source: Eurex, CBOT, price date 10 October

# Underlying futures volumes do not support gamma scalping



Source: Eurex, CBOT

- Selling of options in overlay strategies is not a problem if there is enough liquidity in the underlying future to close delta risk quickly when required
- The problem is that options volumes are now larger compared to volumes in the underlying futures
- In times of stress, it is unlikely that delta risk can be fully controlled because underlying liquidity is not there
- A separate (but related) risk is that implied volatility is not offering a meaningful premium over realised so overlays do not make money systematically

# Issues for discussion II



- Nominal AAA yields are probably distorted downwards
- Purchases of government bonds would distort core markets yields more than periphery
- Potential remedy: include government guaranteed debt
- Corollary: Break-even inflation is possibly distorted downwards and not a good indicator for inflation expectations
- Indeed, massive purchases of nominal bonds could even lower breakeven inflation
- Should ECB buy inflation-linked bonds as part of QE? If so, at what breakeven level?

# Appendix 1

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